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To Members of the Forty-fourth Colorado General Assembly: 
As directed by the terms of Senate Joint Resolution 
No. 14 (1961), the Legislative Council is submitting herewith 
its report and recommendations concerning criminal law 
revision. The report covers several areas of criminal law, 
but because of the complexity and scope of the study, it was 
not possible to give full study and consideration to a 
number of important subjects. 
The Committee appointed by the Legislative Council 
to make this study submitted its report on November 30, 1962, 
at which time the report was accepted by the Legislative 
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Dear Senator Donnelly: 
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Transmitted herewith is the report of the 
Legislative Council Criminal Code Committee appointed 
pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution No. 14 (1961). This 
report covers the areas of criminal law studied by the 
committee during the past two years and the recommendations 
relating thereto. The subjects presented in the report 
include: sentencing, regulation of professional bail bonds-
men, provision of counsel for indigent defendants, inchoate 
crimes, crimes against property, criminal insanity, narcotics, 
and statutory changes resulting from the adoption of the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure by the Colorado Supreme Court. 
Because of the scope and complexity of the 
field of criminal law, the committee did not have sufficient 
time to consider such subjects as crimes against the person; 
crimes against public health, safety, and decency; arrest, 
arraignment, and other pre-trial procedures; and probation 
and parole. Further study is also needed on sentencing, 
criminal insanity, and crimes against property. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/s/ Charles E. Bennett, Chairman 
Criminal Code Committee 
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FOREWORD 
This study was authorized by Senate Joint Resolution No. 14 
(1961). This resolution directed the Legislative Council to appoint a 
committee to continue the study of the Colorado criminal statutes and 
their application, including, but not limited to such related subjects 
as parole, probation, sentencing, criminal insanity, narcotics, bail 
bonds, and criminal jurisdiction. 
The Legislative Council Committee appointed to make this study 
included: Senator Charles E. Bennett, Denver, chairman; Senator Wilkie 
Ham, Lamar, vice chairman; Senator Edward J. Byrne, Denver; Senator 
Carl W. Fulghum, Glenwood Springs; Senator J. William Wells, Brighton; 
Senator Paul E. Wenke, Fort Collins; Senator Earl A. Wolvington, Sterling; 
Representative Robert S. Eberhardt, Denver; Representative Frank E. 
Evans, Pueblo; Representative Bert A. Gallegos, Denver; Representative 
Harry C. Johns, Sr., Hygiene; Representative John L. Kane, Northglenn; 
Representative Phillip Massari, Trinidad; Representative Harold L. 
McCormick, Canon City; and Representative Walter R. Stalker, Joes. 
Senate Joint Resolution No. 14 (1961) authorized the Legislative 
Council to appoint in its discretion an advisory committee representing 
a cross section of knowledge and interest in criminal law and related 
matters. Pursuant to this authorization the Legislative Council appointed 
the following advisory committee members: Justice Edward Pringle, 
Colorado Supreme Court; Justice Leonard v.B. Sutton, Colorado Supreme 
Court; Judge Jean Jacobucci, 17th-Judicial District; Judge Gerald 
McAuliffe, 2nd Judicial District; Judge George Mclachlan, 15th Judicial 
District; Judge Hilbert Schauer, 13th Judicial District; Judge David 
Brofman, Denver County Court; Judge Hal Chapman, Otero County Court; 
Judge Daniel J. Shannon, Jefferson County; Judge Rex Scott, Boulder 
Municipal Court; Warden Harry Tinsley, Chief of Corrections, Department 
of Institutions; Warden Wayne Patterson, .Colomdo State Reformatory; 
Edward Grout, Director, Division of Adult Parole; Frank C. Dillon, 
Director, 2nd Judicial District Probation Department; District Attorney 
Marvin Dansky, 17th Judicial District; District Attorney Martin P. 
Miller, 18th Judicial District; District Attorney Fred Sisk, 16th Judicial 
District; Assistant District Attorney Leonard Carlin, 2nd Judicial 
District; Assistant District Attorney David Hahn. 18th Judicial District; 
Assistant District Attorney James P. Johnson, 8th Judicial District; 
Dr. Mark P. Farrell, consulting psychiatrist, state penitentiary and 
reformatory; Dr. John McDonald, Assistant Director, Colorado 
Psychopathic Hospital; Dr. Charles E. Rymer, Denver; Tom Adams, Juvenile 
Delinquency Project, Western Interstate Commission on Higher Education; 
Frank Dell' Apa, Colorado Prison Association; William L. Rice, Colorado 
Bar Association Criminal Law Committee; Professor Austin W. Scott, 
University of Colorado Law School; Chief Harry Cable, Salida Police 
Department; Lieutenant J. F. Moomaw, Denver Police Department; Captain 
James F. Shumate, Denver Police Department; Sheriff Ray K. Scheerer, 
Larimer County; Sheriff Guy Van Cleave, Adams County; and the following 
attorneys: Donald Brotzman, Boulder; Fred Dickerson, Denver; John 
Gibbons, Denver; Ernest Hartwell, Loveland; Dean C. Mabry, Trinidad; 
Isaac Moore, Denver; John Sayre, Boulder; Vasco Seavy, Pueblo~ and 
Anthony Zarl~ngo, Denver. 
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The staff work on this study was the primary responsibility of 
Harry o. Lawson, Legislative Council senior research analyst. Professor 
Jim R. Carrigan, University of Colorado Law School, served as legal 
consultant to the committee. 
The Legislative Council Criminal Code Committee held 11 meetings 
between May 1961, and November 1962. One two-day meeting was held at 
the penitentiary and reformatory to review correctional problems and 
another two-day meeting was held in connection with the 1962 Colorado 
Judicial Conference and the annual meeting of the Colorado Bar 
Association. One committee meeting was devoted to a discussion of 
narcotics legislation and control with William Eldridge, American Bar 
Foundation, who directed the foundation's study on this problem. 
The subject matter of criminal law is extremely diversified and 
complex, so the committee was forced to select certain areas upon which 
to concentrate its efforts. The subjects studied during the past two 
years and covered in this report include: sentencing, regulation of 
professional bail bondsmen; provision of counsel for indigent defendants; 
inchoate crimes; crimes against property; criminal insanity; narcotics 
legislation and control; and statutory changes resulting from the 
adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure by the Colorado Supreme 
Court. 
The committee wishes to express its deep appreciation to the 
advisory committee, many members of which gave considerably of their 
time to attend the committee meetings at their own expense. The 
assistance provided by advisory committee members in exploring the 
many complex problems involved in criminal code revision was invaluable. 
December 4, 1962 
viii 
Lyle C. Kyle 
Director 
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS 
1) The Criminal Code Committee makes no specific recommenda-
tions on the sentencing of criminal offenders at this time. The 
committee is of the opinion, however, that if any change is made in 
sentencing procedures, such change should follow one of three 
alternatives: 
a) Sentence set by statute. Either the maximum and minimum 
sentences would be set by statute, or the maximum would be set by 
statute and the court could impose a minimum not to exceed one-third 
of the maximum. Good time allowances would apply only against the 
maximum sentence. The parole board would have the authority to review 
and release an offender after half of the minimum sentence is served. 
Offenders not paroled prior to the expiration of their maximum sentence 
(less their good time allowance) would be released under parole 
supervision at that time, such supervision to continue until the date 
of maximum sentence expiration. Offenders released on regular parole 
could be kept under supervision until expiration of their maximum 
sentence, unless released sooner by the parole board. 
b) Court provided with sentencing options. In sentencing an 
offender the court could choose among several options: 
i) The court could designate the length of sentence within 
the maximum prescribed by statute and also the minimum 
term which must be served before an offender would become 
eligible for parole, which term may be less than but could 
be no more than one-third of the maximum sentence imposed. 
ii) The court could set the maximum sentence as prescribed 
by statute, in which event the court may specify that the 
offender would become eligible for parole at such time as 
the parole board may determine. 
iii) The court could commit the defender to the Department of 
Institutions for extensive study and evaluation. Under 
this alternative, it would b~ assumed that the maximum 
statutory sentence has been imposed, pending the results 
of the study and evaluation which would be furnished to 
the committing court within three months, unless the 
court granted additional time to complete the study. 
After the court receives the department's report and 
recommendations, it may do one of several things: place 
an offender on probation; affirm the sentence already set 
and let the parole board determine the date of parole 
eligibility; affirm the maximum sentence and set a minimum, 
not to exceed one-third of the maximum; or reduce the 
sentence already imposed and set a date for parole 
eligibility not to exceed one-third of the sentence. 
(Under both a) and b) above, the court could also place an 
offender on probation or commit him to the state reformatory.) 
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c) Adopt the Model Penal Code Provisions. All crimes would 
be divided into several grades: felonies of the first degree, second 
degree, and third degree; misdemeanors; and petty misdemeanors. The 
court would fix the minimum and maximum terms within the limits specifi.ed 
for the grade of crimes within which the offense falls. The limits 
would be higher for per~istent offenders, professional criminals, and 
dangerous mentally abnormal persons. The court would be prevented 
from imposing what in effect would be a fixed sentence by the requirement 
that the minimum could not be more than half of the maximum. The parole 
board would determine parole release after the minimum sentence (less 
any good time allowance) had been served. 
There are good and bad points to all three of these approaches 
to sentencing, and these are discussed in considerable detail along 
with other sentencing problems and considerations in the research report 
pp. 1-36. 
Findings. The subject of sentencing is an extremely complex 
one, especially when considered within the context of the total 
correctional process. Further, it is difficult to recommend specific 
changes in sentencing until the entire criminal code has been reviewed 
and revised as needed. As an illustration of the complexity of this 
subject, the following questions have been considered by the committee 
in the course of its study: 
a) What should be the basic approach to sentencing? Assuming 
that protection of society is the major objective, how may this best 
be achieved? Should the underlying philosophy (in addition to society's 
protection) be rehabilitation, punishment, or retribution? how can 
these different approaches to sentencing be reconciled? Does sentP.ncing 
serve as a deterrent? if so, to what extent, and should this be a 
prime consideration? 
b) What should be the extent of judicial authority in 
setting sentences? Should courts be limited to a finding of guilt? 
Should sentences be set by statute? If so, should this apply to both 
maxima and minima, or just one end of the sentence (which one)? 
Should it be possible to release an offender before completion of his 
minimum; on what basis and under what circumstances? If continuation 
of judicial sentencing authority (at least to a limited extent) is 
desirable, what would be a satisfactory combination of judicial and 
board sentencing authority, not only with respect to the role of 
each, b~t also in relationship to the basic approach to sentencing? 
Are the offender's rights safeguarded under the methods of sentencing 
being considered? 
c) If greater responsibility is given to the parole board, 
what should the composition of the board be (number, qualifications, 
method of appointment, civil service) and should it serve on a full-
time basis? 
d) What should be the relationship between the board 
and the institutions (as to scope of authority, division of responsibil-
ities, supervision)? Specific~lly, should the board pl~y any role or 
have any respon~ibility in initial classification, assignment, and 
placement of offenders? if so, to what extent? 
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5) payment of fees not corrvnensurate with the work involved 
in preparing an adequate defense; and 
6) total cost of providing court-appointed counsel in some 
of the larger counties. 
The proposed legislation has been adopted from the Model 
Public Defender Act and is entirely permissive, so that each county 
can make its own determination as to whether it wishes to adopt 
public defender system or any of the other alternatives in the act. 
4) The Criminal Code Committee recommends the adoption of 
proposed legislation which would define attempted crime and provide the 
penalties therefor. {The text of the proposed legislation on criminal 
attempt will be found on pp.71-75.) 
Findings. Present Colorado law has many gaps with respect 
to attempted crimes. There are a number of statutes in which the 
commission of a serious crime is punishable, but which provides no 
penalty for an attempt to commit the crime. Therefore, a person 
whose criminal intent is shown in conduct falling short of completing 
a crime, or whose attempted crime is aborted by alert police work, 
legal impossibility to commit the crime,or an effective defense 
against the intended crime by the intended victim cannot be 
prosecuted. 
5) The Criminal Code Committee recommends the adoption of 
proposed legislation which would define criminal solicitation and 
provide the penalties therefor. (The text of the proposed legislation 
on criminal solicitation will be found on PP.78-80•) 
Findings. In Colorado, one who advises or encourages 
another to commit a crime which the party thus solicited actually 
commits is guilty as a principal and punished as if he had personally 
committed the crime. There is no general criminal statute, however, 
defining as a crime the solicitation of another to commit a crime 
when the party solicited does .!1Q.:t commit the offense. While there 
are several statutes defining the solicitation of certain specific 
crimes as criminal and providing penalties, there are many gaps in 
the coverage of these provisions, and there is a wide divergence 
in the penalties provided. 
6) The Criminal Code Committee recommends that further study 
be made before any changes are made in criminal insanity definitions 
and proceedings. The committee calls special attention to the chapter 
on criminal insanity in this report (pp. 102-127) for an explanation 
of the problems and the presentation of some alternatives to present 
Colorado law. Attention is also directed to the addendum to this 
report covering some of the constitutional questions involved. 
Findings. There has been considerable dissatisfaction with the 
present criminal insanity statute. Some of this dissatisfaction is 
centered on the criminal insanity tests used, limitations on evidence, 
and jury determination. 
Other objections are related to the number of times the plea 11 
is made and the number of times it is successful. A study of Denver I 
District Court criminal cases, however, shows that the plea actually 
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is seldom used and is even less often successful (pp. 119-12.l). 
Several proposals have been made to change both the procedure in 
criminal insanity trials and the test to be used to determine insanity. 
One proposal goes much further in that it substitutes a three-judge 
panel for the jury and eliminates criminal insanity as a defense, 
substituting a new procedure therefor. There are several 
constitutional questions related to all of these recommendations, and 
further study and careful consideration is needed. 
7) The Criminal Code Committee recommends the statutory 
changes and deletions listed on pp. 149 through 154 to be made to 
bring the criminal statutes in conformance with the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure adopted in September 1961 by the Colorado Supreme Court. 
Further, the committee requests that the Colorado Supreme Court 
consider the changes in the Rules of Criminal Procedure listed on 
pp. 154 and 155. 
Findings. The statutory conflicts and duplications resulting 
from the adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure have been studied 
for over a year by a subcommittee of the Colorado Bar Association's 
Criminal Code Committee and reviewed extensively by the Criminal Code 
Committee. · Existing statutes which parallel the rules, whether the 
language is exactly the same or not, should be repealed as creating 
unnecessary duplication and confusion. Existing statute& which are 
inconsistent with the rules should be repealed to avoid the even 
greater confusion resulting from the question of which law to follow. 
Some statutes should be amended rather than repealed. 
8) The Criminal Code Committee recommend3 that the study of 
criminal law revision be continued under the auspices of the Legislative 
Council through the passage of a joint resolution to this effect at the 
first session of the Forty-fourth General Assembly. 
Findings. Although the Criminal Code Committee has studied 
and considered many subjects in the state's criminal laws and ha5 made 
recommendations concerning several, there is a large amount of work 
yet to be completed. The ultimate goal of further study should be 
the complete revision and codification of Colorado's criminal law&. 
In other states, such revision and codification has been a four to 
six-year project. Subjects already considered by the committee on 
which further work is needed include crimes against property, sentencing, 
narcotics control, and criminal insanity. 
Subjects which are still to be considered includes a) crimes 
against the person; b) crimes against public health, safety, and 
decency; c) crimes against the government; d) arrest, arraignment, 
and other pre-trial procedures; and e) probation and parole. 
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CRIMINAL CODE STUDY: AN INTRODUCTION 
The Legislative Council Criminal Code Committee was charged 
by Senate Joint Resolution No. 14 (1961) with the responsibility of 
examining all of Colorado's criminal laws, including, but not limited 
to, parole, probation, sentencing, criminal insanity, narcotics laws 
and their enforcement, bail bonds, and criminal jurisdiction. 
As an initial step in making an over-all study of Colorado's 
criminal laws, an index has been compiled of all statutes related in 
any way to crime and criminal proceedings. These statutes are scattered 
throughout the volumes of the 1953 Colorado Revised Statutes and the 
1960 Cumulative Supplement. A detailed cross index to all of these 
statutes will be published as a supplement to this report. 
The area of property crimes was focused upon as the starting 
point in making a complete revision of the criminal statutes. A general 
theft statute has been considered by the committee, but a number of 
questions have yet to be answered. Closely related to the property 
crime area are inchoate crimes (acts which are criminal even though a 
crime has not been committed) such as attempt and solicitation, and 
considerable attention has been given to these offenses. 
Extensive material has been compiled on the sentencing of 
criminal offenders and the possible effect of adopting certain approaches 
in Colorado. Generally, sentencing legislation and procedures should 
be considered within the context of over-all criminal code revision. 
Criminal insanity and narcotics control problems are among 
other subjects studied by the committee and covered in this report. 
Attention was also directed to the regulation of professional bail 
bondsmen and the problems of the indigent offender in criminal actions. 
As can be seen from the foregoing, the subject of criminal 
law is a complex and detailed one. Many other aspects are worthy of 
study, and more work is needed on some of the matters already given 
consideration by the committee. 
Sentencing 
In Colorado, the statutes presently provide for a form of 
indeterminate sentencing for convicted felons (i.e., rather than a 
fixed sentence, an offender is given a maximum and a minimum sentence 
by the judge which must be within the maximum and mimimum limits set 
by statute). 1 An offender must serve his minimum sentence, less statutory 
1. Some statutes provide only for a sentence of not more than a certain 
number of years. The supreme court has ruled, however, that the 
judge shall also set a minimum. If an offender is sentenced to the 
reformatory, he receives an indefinite sentence; no minimum or 
maximum is set, but the offender cannot be incarcerated for a period 
longer than the maximum set by statute for confinement in the 
penitentiary. The offender may be released at any time within the 
maximum at the discretion of the parole board. Usually, six months 
must be served before the parole board even considers the case. 
good time, before he is eligible for parole. He receives statutory 
good time for good behavior and work performance while he is in the 
penitentiary. 
Sentencing Difficulties 
Several impediments to the successful functioning of the 
sentencing process in Colorado have been identified by a number of 
judges, correctional officials, and members of the bar. Some of these 
impediments result from sentencing practices within the statutory 
limits and others appear to be inherent in the system itself. Because 
of these problems and in light of the methods of sentencing followed 
in other jurisdictions, there has been considerable support for a 
reexamination of Colorado's sentencing provisions and practices. 
Sentencing Disparity. A problem of great concern to 
correctional officials is sentencing disparity. With respect to 
sentencing disparity, Warden Harry Tinsley of the state penitentiary 
has made the following comments:2 -
2. 
It is obvious that in the population of over 
sixteen hundred in the Colorado State Penitentiary, 
going there_pu~suant to sentences imposed in 
seventeen Lsiy separate judicial districts, there 
is a great disparity in the sentences of prisoners 
who have been sentenced for similar crimes committed 
under rather similar circumstances. The prisoners 
at the penitentiary work closely together, are 
celled closely together, take their recreation in 
the same places, do the same things every day and, 
in general, receive the same general type of treat-
ment. Those persons who have received severe 
sentences are thrown in daily contact with those who 
have received more lenient sentences for what may be 
the same crime committed under similar circumstances 
by those with much the same individual backgrounds. The 
person who has received the light sentence generally 
feels fortunate, but also he may think that his 
sentence was not so long but what he can afford to 
have another try at his criminal activities. On 
the other hand, the individual who has received the 
longer sentence is understandably embittered toward 
society in general and toward authority in particular. 
This natural feeling may be heightened when he finds 
his short-term fellow prisoners back again in 
prison for crimes committed after their release, 
while he himself is still serving his original long 
sentence. This makes it extremely difficult to effect 
any positive change for the better in this prisoner's 
makeup during the time he is in the institution; for 
whether or not there has been an actual injustice, 
he himself is convinced that he has received unfair 
treatment. Often this conviction makes it impossible 
Rocky Mountain Law Review, "Indeterminate Sentencing of Criminals," 
by Harry C. Tinsley, Volume 33, Number 4, June, 1961, pp. 536-543. 
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to produce any positive or corrective change in him 
during his stay at the penitentiary. Because his 
minimum sentence is near his maximum sentence, he 
leaves the institution with a comparatively short 
period of parole which he, probably, can and will do 
in a satisfactory manner. But he often feels that 
he must get his revenge against society for being 
unfair to him. This, no doubt, is unsound thinking, 
but it is to be remembered that those who populate 
our correctional institutions are not here because 
they have done sound and constructive thinking in 
their past lives. 
Relationship Between Maximum and Minimum. It has been the 
opinion of most correctional authorities that an indeterminate sentence 
is much more satisfactory than one of a set number of years. The 
flexibility provided by a maximum and minimum offers a greater 
probability that an offender may be released at the time when he is 
best able to make a successful return to society. Society is further 
protected by a system of indeterminate sentencing, because the offender 
is placed under parole supervision until the expiration of his maximum 
sentence. With a sentence of a fixed duration it is assumed that his 
debt to society is paid upon its completion, and he is free to do as 
he wishes. 
The potential advantages of indeterminate sentencing may be 
negated in two ways: 1) by the imposition of sentences with the 
minimum and maximum set so close together that the effect is the same 
as if a determinate sentence is imposed, e.g., nine years and 11 months 
to 10 years or four years and six months to five years; 2) by the use 
of statutory good time allowances to decrease the minimum sentence which 
must be served. 
An examination of the penitentiary's annual statistical report 
shows that almost 10 per cent of the offenders confined in that 
institution as of June 30, 1961 received sentences in which the maximum 
and minimum were set so close together that these sentences were not 
actually indeterminate.3 Slightly more than one-third of the inmates 
as of June 30, 1961 received sentences in which the minimum was more 
than one-half of the maximum. 
3. Statistical Report and Movement of Inmate Population, Annual Report, 
July 1, 1960 through June 30, 1961, Colorado State Penitentiary. 
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Good Time Allowances. Statutory good time allowances reward 
an inmate for good behavior while he is in the institution. The 
subtraction of good time allowances from the minimum sentence adva~ces 
considerably the date at which an offender is eligible for parole. 
Unfortunately there is not necessarily any correlation between good 
behavior during confinement and an offender's readiness to return to 
society. While the parole board has the sole authority to determine 
release, each inmate knows that he is eligible for parole upon completion 
of his minimum sentence, less his good time credit. It has been the 
general practice over the years to release most inmates on this basis, 
and it is expected. The parole board will turn men down with good 
reason, but should there be a wholesale refusal of parole, the 
penitentiary might be faced with a difficult situation. 
Reason for Concern. Approximately 95 per cent of all committed 
offenders return to society sooner or later, even if some return only 
for relatively short periods of time. It is the opinion of correctional 
authorities and some judges and attorneys that the inadequacies of 
Colorado's present sentencing procedures result in some offenders being 
incarcerated longer than necessary to assure society's protection and 
in some being released who should remain for a much longer period or 
perhaps not be released at all. 
It is the observation of the wardens of both the penitentiary 
and the reformatory and the director of the adult parole division that 
unless an offender is released at the time he appears to have the best 
opportunity for a successful return to society, the chances of reha-
bilitation are considerably lessened and perhaps eliminated entirely. 
Many of those who have expressed concern over the sentencing 
of offenders feel that only minor changes are needed. Others have 
expressed the opinion that a complete revision is needed. It is the 
committee's judgment based on its study and discussion thus far that 
no method of sentencing is perfect, although the approaches taken in 
some jurisdictions may be more satisfactory than the present procedures 
in Colorado. 
Purpose of Incarceration 
During the colonial period and for at least the first hundred 
years of the nation's history, punishment was considered the major 
reason for imprisonment. This approach was more sophisticated than the 
4. 105-4-4. Reduced time for good conduct. -- Every convict who is, 
or may be imprisoned in the penitentiary, and who shall have 
performed faithfully, and all who shall hereafter perform faith-
fully, the duties assigned to him during his imprisonment therein, 
shall be entitled to a deduction from the time of his sentence for 
the respective years thereof, and proportionately for any part of 
a year, when there shall be a fractional part of a year in the 
sentence: For the first year, one month; for the second year, 
two months; for the third year, three months; for the fourth year, 
four months; for the fifth year, five months; for t~e sixth a~d. 
each succeeding year, six months. Inmates may receive an additional 
10 days per month as trusty time (105-4-5). 
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~eye for an eye" concept. It was assumed that punishment was a crime 
deterrent to the incarcerated criminal with respect to future offenses 
and to others who would be less likely to commit offenses because of 
the fear of retribution. The concept of rehabilitation as it is known 
at present did not play an important role in penal confinement, except 
that if imprisonment as punishment actually acted as a deter~ent to 
further crime, then, in that sense, rehabilitation can be said to have 
been accomplished. 
Although the concept of punishment is still an important 
factor to a varying degree, modern penology is based on the premise 
that institutional confinement has two purposes: l) the protection 
of society; and 2) rehabilitation of the offender. The second cannot 
be stressed to the detriment of the first, so that both probation and 
parole should be judiciously granted and competently supervised. The 
aspect of punishment through confinement for at least a specified 
number of years has been tempered by the desire to release an offender 
at the time at which he is considered to have a chance to make a 
successful return to society under parole supervision for as long a 
period as necessary. 
The adoption of minimum and maximum sentences is an implemen-
tation of the approach to penology which incorporates protection of 
society and rehabilitation of the offender. It provides a latitude 
within which an offender may be released, while at the same time the 
length of the minimum and maximum reflect the punishment aspect, inas-
much as these minima and maxima are usually set according to the severity 
of the various categories of crime in relationship to one another. 
While views on the purposes of incarceration have changed 
generally, the concepts of punishment, retribution, and deterrence are 
still cited as important reasons for penal confinement. To a certain 
extent, these three purposes of confinement are not necessarily 
incompatible with rehabilitation, but, according to many correctional 
authorities, their emphasis diminishes the possibility of developing 
meaningful rehabilitation programs. They argue that such programs, 
even with their present limitations, offer the best possible for the 
protection and safety of society and for the offender to become a 
useful citizen. 
Generally, law enforcement officials have placed considerable 
emphasis on the concepts of punishment and deterrence, and they have 
been joined in this point of view by many citizens who have been the 
unwilling victims of criminal acts and who also would like to see 
retribution made. This point of view is understandable, but carried 
to an extreme would result in lengthy sentences for most offenders, 
regardless of other considerations. Institutional personnel and 
programs also exhibit in varying degrees the concepts of punishment, 
deterrence, and retribution, even though there is more and more emphasis 
on rehabilitation. For this reason, there appears to be no state or 
other jurisdiction where correctional programs embody all aspects of 
the rehabilitative approach to penology to the exclusion of other 
concepts; given the general public reaction to the criminal offender 
it is little wonder that this is true. It can and has been argued that 
until much more is known about man and his reaction to his environment, 
society is best served through continued reliance on older and established 
concepts of incarceration, although these concepts more and more are 
being questioned. 
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Different Approaches to Sentencing 
In the broadest sense indeterminate sentencing may be defined 
as any method of sentencing which includes a variable rather than a 
fixed period of incarceration. This definition applies, regardless of 
whether sentencing is a judicial prerogative, set by statute, or the 
responsibility of a par6le board or similar authority. 
While the broad definition of indeterminate sentencing 
encompasses at least some part of the penal codes of more than two-thirds 
of the states, a more restricted definition would apply to relatively 
few. Advocates of sentencing reform usually refer to indeterminate 
sentencing as a system of sentencing in which judicial authority and 
responsibility extend only to the finding of guilt; the determination 
of actual sentence is the responsibility of the parole board or some 
similarly constituted commission. When sentence is passed by the 
courts under this system only the statutory limits may be imposed.5 
Discretion within these limits passes from the judiciary to the paroling 
authority. 
Some indeterminate sentencing advocates (within the narrow 
definition used above) believe in a flexible sentencing structure which 
allows an immediate parole in cases where such release is justified 
and likewise permits detention for a lifetime where that is justified --
both without regard for the particular crime for which the conviction 
was .had. This approach assumes that knowledge of human behavior has 
advanced to the stage that legal safeguards are unnecessary because the 
vesting o~ this power in a parole board or similar commission would not 
result in its arbitrary and/or capricious exercise. This method of 
sentencing in actuality provides an indefinite sentence rather than an 
indeterminate one and is similar to Colorado's sex offender law and to 
S.B. 188, introduced during the Forty-second General Assembly, First 
Session, 1959, and H.B. 42, introduced during the Forty-third General 
Assembly, First Session, 1961.6 
Because of ·the interest in this approach shown in Colorado, the 
following comments by the American Correctional Association are 
appropriate:? 
... The only form of sentencing which would place full 
discretion with the parole board to select and to 
release prisoners on parole at the time they are most 
ready for release and to retain in confinement as long 
as necessary those who are not ready for release would 
5. Variations of this approach include: a) imposition of statutory 
maximum only, minimum established by parole authority; orb) 
maximum set by judge within statutory limit, minimum established 
by parole authority. If the latter plan is followed, it is 
usually recommended that parole supervision be extended to the 
end of the statutory maximum term at the discretion of the paroling 
authority rather than be terminated at the end of the judicially 
imposed maximum. 
6. Provisions of these bills are discussed in a subsequent section. 
7. Manual of Correctional Standards, American Correctional Association, 
1959, p. 535. 
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be an indeterminate sentence of one day to life for 
every offense for which a prison sentence could be 
given. In a model correctional system with all the 
necessary diagnostic and treatment resources within 
the institution to prepare prisoners for release, 
with a professional board of parole to determine the 
optimum time for release, and with sufficient trained 
parole staff to give supervision, the complete 
indeterminate sentence law would be workable and 
practical. However, to place the power of life 
sentence over all prisoners with parole board members 
who were not appointed for their professional 
knowledge and competence, to permit lifelong 
confinement without legal safeguards in institutions 
without sufficient staff or facilities for effective 
treatment would be unthinkable (underlining added 
for emphasis). 
Dr. John MacDonald has also made some comments on the wholly 
indeterminate or ind~finite sentence drawn in part from the views of 
other psychiatrists.8 
The demands of some criminologists for wholly 
indeterminate sentences has been criticized by 
Jerome Hall. 'From a medical viewpoint, it may 
be absurd to release an offender at a fixed time 
that in fact has no relation to rehabilitation. 
But if no law fixes an upper limit, there is no 
adequate protection from life imprisonment.' 
Certainly there is the danger of unnecessarily 
prolonged imprisonment and this danger might be 
greater if the medical and psychological experts 
on the parole board were administratively rather 
than therapeutically oriented. 
Indeed the tyranny of the harsh judge might well 
be replaced by th~ tyranny of the scientist. The 
moral judgement Lsif/ so often condemned by 
psychiatrists, might be replaced by the last word 
of science. Yet the complexity of mental and social 
phenomena allows many a fallacy to be taken for the 
last word of science~ .. 
Unfortunately psychiatry lacks reliable predictive 
techniques and it is not always possible to 
predict, with any degree of confidence, the 
future career of an individual offender. Even the 
experienced psychiatrist is liable to serious error 
in prognosis ... 
Some psychiatrists have suggested that criminals 
should be divided into 2 groups; those who should 
be treated, and those who should be confined 
indefinitely. It is not clear, however, upon what 
criteria the differential diagnosis is to be made ••. 
8. Psychiatry and the Criminal, Dr. John M. MacDonald, 1958, pp. 199 
and 200. 
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... Although psychiatry has much to offer in regard 
to the rehabilitation of offenders, few psychiatrists 
would be willing to accept responsibility for 
confining a non-psychotic criminal, regardless of 
the crime for which he has been convicted, for the 
remainder of his life. 
It is not surprising that none of the states have gone this 
far with indeterminate sentencing. Those states which are considered 
the most advanced in this respect provide that no one may be incar-
cerated for a period longer than the maximum prescribed by law; 
although in some of these states it is possible to be released prior 
to the statutory minimum. 
Sentencing in Other States 
Sentencing as a Judicial Function 
In twenty-four of the states having indeterminate sentencing 
as broadly defined, setting the sentence is a judicial responsibility. 
In five of these twenty-four states, one ~f the two extremes is fixed 
mandatorily by statute while the other may be varied by the sentencing 
authority. These five states include: Michigan, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. In all except Michigan, the court 
may set the maximum term, but not the minimum, which is set by statute. 
In Michigan, the maximum term imposed is the statutory maximum, while 
the judge has the discretion to set the minimum. 
In eighteen of these twenty-four states, the judge sets the 
maximum and minimum at his discretion within the statutory limits. 
These states include: Arizona, Arkansas, COLORADO, Connecticut, 
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Vermont, and Wyoming. In Georgia, sentence is prescribed by the jury 
within the statutory minima and maxima. 
In three of these states, there are statutory provisions 
designed to prevent a judge from fixing a minimum term so closely 
identical to the maximum that the combined effect would approximate a 
definite sentence (e.g., 4½-S years). The statutes in these states 
(Maine, New York, and Pennsylvania) provide that the minimum term may 
not exceed half of the maximum term imposed. 
Generally, in these twenty-four states, parole eligibility 





Earliest Date of Possible Parole Release 
when one-third of minimum sentence has 
been served 
parole possible after two-thirds of minimum 







Earliest Date of Possible Parole Release 
when one-third of minimum sentence is 
served, if minimum less than 10 years; if 
more than ten years, must serve one-third 
of first ten plus one month for each 
additional year 
when one-fourth of minimum sentence has 
been served 
with ~rfect prison conduct record, when 
either minimum or one-fourth the maximum 
has been served, whichever is less; with 
imperfect conduct record, one-third of 
maximum or fifteen years, whichever is 
less, must be served 
after two years, or one-half maximum 
sentence, whichever is less 
Several of these states allow prisoners time off for good 
behavior (known as statutory good time and trusty good time). This 
"good time" is subtracted from the minimum sentence in determining 
eligibility for parole release.9 
In the states which allow release prior to completion of the 
minimum sentence, the parole authority in effect has some of the powers 
of the sentence-fixing board in that it can release an inmate sooner 
than was prescribed in the minimum sentence. It would appear that the 
parole authorities in the states where the minimum (less good time) 
must be served still has some sentencing discretion, because the parole 
boards have the discretionary power to withhold release until the 
maximum is served. In actual practice this may not be the case, if 
the Colorado practice of releasing almost every inmate of the 
penitentiary on parole upon completion of minimum sentence less statutory 
good time is an example of the procedures in these other states. 
Sentence Set by Statute 
In twelve states, the courts have the responsibility only for 
the determination of guilt. In seven of these states {California, 
Indiana, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, and West Virginia), the 
sentence imposed is a restatement of the maximum and minimum set by 
statute. In the other five states {Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Utah, and 
Washington), there is no minimum sentence and the statutory maximum 
sentence is imposed. 
Maximum and Minimum Set by Statute. Parole board authority 
and application of statutory good time varies among the seven states 
in which both the maximum and minimum are set by statute. These 
differences are indicated in the following table: 
9. In Wisconsin, statutory good time is deducted from the maximum 
sentence to insure that every inmate will be subject to at least 











after one-third of minimum if 
more than one year, if minimum 
less than one year, six months 
or end of minimum 
must serve at least one year 
of minimum sentence (less good 
time) 
after minimum sentence (less 
good time) 
if minimum sentence is 10 years 
or less, must serve at least 
one-third of minimum; if 
minimum is more than 10 years, 
must serve one-third of 10 
years plus one month for each 
year over 10 
must serve at least one year 
of minimum sentence (less good 
time), unless three prior 
felony convictions; seven years 
must be served with three prior 
felony convictions 
statutes not clear as to whether 
minimum (less good time) must 
be served or board can release 
prior to expiration of minimum 
sentence 
after minimum sentence, if 
conduct record good for three 
months prior to date of 
eligibility, except those with 
definite sentence must serve 
one-third 
Good Time Allowance 
applies to maximum 
sentence 
applies to minimum 
sentence 
applies to minimum 
sentence 
applies to maximum 
sentence 
applies to minimum 
sentence 
applies to minimum 
applies to definite 
sentences only 
a. The provision for parole eligibility after one-third of a definite 
sentence is served was apparently designed to cover inmates 
incarcerated prior tp the adoption of indeterminate sentences. 
As shown by the above table, in four of the states (California, 
Indiana, Nevada, and New Mexico), an inmate may be paroled prior to the 
expiration of his minimum sentence. In two of these states (Indiana 
and Nevada), good time allowances are subtracted from the minimum time 
to be served. It has been indicated that many correctional authorities 
feel that good behavior and parole readiness do not necessarily coincide, 
yet these two states as well as Kansas and ?hio (which re9uire the . 
minimum, less good time, to be served) provide for good time deductions 
from the minimum time to be served. This conflict was apparently 
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recognized in Indiana where another statutory section states that 
parole release is not a reward for good conduct or efficient performance 
of duties in the institution, but depends on the inmate's readiness 
to return to society and the reasonable probabilities of his success. 10 
In addition to Kansas and Ohio, West Virginia also requires 
that the minimum sentence be served. It is the only one of the three, 
however, in which good time allowances do not apply to the minimum 
sentence. 
No Minimum - Statutory Maximum. In the five states where 
there is no minimum, good time is deducted from the maximum sentence. 
There are, however, some differences in the date of parole eligibility 
and parole board authority among these states. In Utah, the Board of 
Paroles and Pardons has full authority to set the minimum sentence but 
both the judge and the prosecutor make sentence recommendations to the 
board. These recommendations are accompanied by information concerning 
the crime and surrounding circumstances and any other pertinent data. 
The board is not bound by these judicial recommendations but must review 
them prior to setting the minimum sentence. 
Judges and prosecutors may also make recommendations as to 
sentence to the Washington Parole Board. While the board is not bound 
by these recommendations, there are certain statutory restrictions 
which must be adhered to in setting the minimum sentence. Any first 
offender who is sentenced for a crime involving the use of a deadly 
weapon must serve at least five years. Any offender with a previous 
felony conviction who is sentenced for a crime involving a deadly weapon 
must serve at least seven and one-half years. Habitual offenders 
(three previous felony convictions) must serve at least 15 years, and 
embezzlers of public funds must serve at least five years.l 
In Iowa, the parole board may release a first offender after 
conviction, but prior to incarceration. (A further examination of the 
Iowa statutes indicates that there are no provisions for probation, so 
that this method of parole is actually a probation substitute. This 
premise is confirmed further by the statute providing that the 
committing judge may recommend immediate parole release.) Offenders 
in Florida must serve at least six months before being considered for 
parole release. Florida has a statutory provision very similar to 
Indiana's, which specifies that parole is not a reward for good conduct 
and efficient performance and that: "No person shall be placed on 
parole until and unless the commission shall find that, there is 
reasonable probability that if he is placed on parole, he will live 
and conduct himself as a respectable and law abiding person, and that 
his release is compatible with his own welfare and the welfare of 
society. 11 12 
10. 13-15-33, Burns Indiana Statutes Annotated. It is not known how 
the Indiana Parole Board reconciles the two different philosophies 
expressed by statute; that of rewarding an inmate for good 
institutional behavior by good time deductions, while at the same 
time specifying that parole release is not a reward for such 
behavior. 
11. 9.95.040, Revised Statutes of Washington. 
12. 947.18, Laws of Florida, 1957. 
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Various Methods of Sentencing: A Summary 
As seen from the sentencing practices of other states, there 
are various approaches which are used. These may be summarized as 
follows: 
l) Definite Sentence: No maximum or minimum, sentence could 
be set by statute or court; a limited amount of flexibility could be 
provided by deduction of good time credit. 
2) Maximum and Minimum Limits Set by Statute, Court Sets 
Sentence Within Statutory Limits: This approach followed by several 
states, including Colorado. Most of these states allow good time 
deductions from minimum sentence. Parole release is usually not 
possible until expiration of minimum term (less good time). 
. 3) Either Maximum or Minimum Sentence Set by Statute, With 
the Other End of the Sentence Set by the Court: If the minimum is set 
by statute, the court's authority extends only to the determination of 
the maximum period of incarceration. The parole board may fix a release 
date after·completion of the minimum sentence or soonerJ if so provided 
by law. Good time may be allowed and in some jurisdictions applies to 
the minimum sentence and in others to the maximum. If the maximum 
sentence is set by statute, the court's discretion extends only to the 
determination of the minimum sentence. The parole board then has 
discretion between completion of the judicially-imposed minimum and the 
statutory maximum, although eligibility for release after completion 
of a certain portion of the minimum term may be provided by law. Again 
good time may be allowed, with a difference among the states which 
have this- provision as to whether good time is deducted from the 
minimum or maximum sentence. 
4) Maximum and Minimum Limits Set by Statute, Court Sets 
Sentence Within Statutory Limits, Except that Court is Restricted on 
the Len th of the Minimum Sentence: This approach is very similar to 
2 above except that the court may impose a minimum not to exceed a 
certain proportion of the maximum (e.g., one-third or one-half). 
5) Maximum and Minimum Sentence Set by Statute: The court's 
only function is the determination of guilt. The paroling authority 
determines release within the statutory sentence limits, although the 
statutes may provide that an offender is eligible for parole after 
completion of a specified portion of the statutory minimum. Good time 
may also be allowed under this approach, applying to the minimum 
sentence in some jurisdictions and to the maximum sentence in others. 
6) Maximum Sentence Set by Statute, No Minimum: As in the 
preceding approach, the court's function is limited to a determination 
of guilt. The paroling authority fixes the minimum sentence by 
determining the release date. Good time allowances apply to the maximum 
sentence. 
It should be noted that 2) through 6) above do not apply to 
capital crimes or certain others where life imprisonment is the p7nalty. 
There may be other ,crimes as well, such as armed robbery, or multiple 
convictions for which a specified term of confinement is provided by 
law before an offender is eligible for release. A number of states 
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provide that an offender may be considered for parole release after a 
specified number of years of a life sentence has been served. In 
others, the life term offender may be considered for commutation of 
sentence after serving a specified number of years. 
Good Time Applied to Maximum Sentence 
While correctional authorities appear to be in general 
agreement that there is little relationship between institutional good 
behavior and societal readiness, a good case can be made for allowing 
good time credits to be applied to the maximum sentence. Good time 
deduction from the maximum sentence, however, should not result in an 
offender being released without supervision prior to the expiration of 
his maximum sentence~ Rather it should be used as a method of providing 
parole supervision, even if only for a limited time, for every offender. 
The offender who has not been released on parole prior to 
completion of his maximum sentence or who has failed on parole poses 
the greatest potential menace to society. Yet if he is released after 
completion of his maximum sentence, he has paid his debt to society 
and is free to do as he chooses. It is possible that such an offender 
could accumulate good time credit for his institutional behavior, even 
though the parole board has not considered him ready for release. In 
Wisconsin, for example, he would be released under parole supervision 
after he completed his maximum sentence, less good time, and would 
remain under supervision until expiration of the maximum sentence. 
Sentence Determination by Board -- Some Pros and Cons 
Following is a brief summary of some of the major arguments 
for and against giving broad sentencing determination powers to a 
parole board. 
1) Legal training does not necessarily equip judges to be 
able to make proper determination of the sentence to be imposed. 
Consequently, the sentence may bear no relationship to the period of 
incarceration needed before an offender is ready for a successful 
return to society. Some violators need little if any confinement, while 
others may never be released safely. 
2) The courts for the most part do not have enough adequately 
trained probation officers to provide judges with sufficient pre-sentence 
data to assist them in setting sentences commensurate with an offender's 
possibilities for rehabilitation. 
3) Sentencing practices differ among judges -- not only among 
those whose courts are in different districts, but also among judges 
in the same district. This disparity is known to convicted offenders 
who compare sentences and it lessens the success of institutional 
rehabilitation programs for this reason. 
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4) Judicial sentencing when combined with statutory good 
time deductions results in virtually automatic parole for all inmates 
upon completion of their minimum sentence minus good time allowance. 
Such parole release may or may not coincide with the inmate's potential 
for successful return to society. In those cases where inmates are 
not ready for parole, an injustice is done both to them and society. 
An injustice is also done to those inmates who perhaps are ready for 
release, but are held up because their minimum sentence was lengthy 
and has not yet been completed. The inclusion of statutory good time 
presumes that there is a direct correlation between institutional good 
behavior and readiness for release, which may not be the case, especially 
in regard to the institution-wise prisoner. 
5) Length of sentence can be more adequately and fairly 
determined by a full-time qualified board removed from the heat and 
emotionalism of the court room and local attitudes toward crime. This 
is especially true, when the board has the assistance of competent, 
professional, institutional personnel who can observe and evaluate the 
offender during his period of incarceration. 
1) The judge is the person most acquainted with the case. 
He has presided during the trial, has observed the offender, and is 
acquainted with his record. Consequently, the judge can do a better 
job of setting sentence than a board whose determination will be based 
primarily on secondary written reports and brief personal observation. 
2) There is no basis for assuming that a board would be any 
better at sentencing than the courts, either with respect to length 
of sentence, or sentence variation for the same offense. In fact, a 
qualified board could do much worse than the courts, if the institutions 
are not adequately staffed to provide the data the board needs, and if 
the board members are not well qualified and cannot devote full time to 
their deliberations. 
3) There is the possibility of recourse in the courts, if 
the offender believes that he has been given an unfair sentence. What 
recourse would be available from an unjust sentence determination on 
the part of the parole board? 
4) There are institution-wise prisoners who can con profes-
sional personnel as easily as they can accumulate good time credits. 
Institutional conduct may not indicate that a man is ready for release, 
but it does show an effort to get along and obey rules and regulations; 
therefore, it should be considered in determining release. 
5) The paroling authority will be subjected to undue public 
pressure and criticism if it exercises sentencing authority. Mistakes 
made by the board will cause public reaction which in turn could limit 
the board's effectiveness by forcing it to be more conservative in its 
actions regardless of the worthiness of the cases before it. 
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Method of Sentencing Proposed in the Model Penal Code 
The following description of and comment on the sentencing 
method proposed in the Model Penal Code is abstracted from a recent 
Rocky Mountain Law Review article ~3 Professor Austin W. Scott, Jr. University of Colorado Law School: 
The American Law Institute has been at work for 
about ten years (with one more year to go for 
completion of its task) on a Model Penal Code, 
which, in addition to defining the various 
principal crimes from murder down to disorderly 
conduct, and stating the various general principles 
(e.g., insanity, self-defense, mistake, coercion) 
applicable to several or to all crimes, contains 
a number of sentencing and parole provisions, 
The Code divides all crimes into several categories: 
felonies of the first degree, second degree, and 
third degree; and misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors. 
For felonies other than some forms of murder, and 
for misdemeanors calling for an extended term of 
imprisonment, the Code provides for a type of 
indeterminate sentence in which the court, as well 
~s the pa~o~e authority, plays a substantial part 
1n determining the length of the imprisonment. The 
court (besides having power to suspend the imposition 
of sentence and place the convicted defendant on 
probation) generally fixes the minimum and maximum 
terms within limits provided by the Code for the 
particular type of offense; the limits are, of 
course, placed somewhat higher in the case of ex-
tended terms given to persistent offenders, 
professional criminals and dangerous mentally abnormal 
persons. The Code prevents the court from imposing 
(as a Colorado court may impose) what is in effect 
a fixed sentence (e.g., 9½-to-10 years imprisonment) 
by requiring, where the court fixes both the minimum 
and .the maximum, that the minimum be no more than 
half the maximum. Within these minimum- and maximum 
limits, as they may be reduced by good time deductions, 
the parole board determines the actual date of the 
prisoner's release under parole supervision. 
The Model Code also concerns itself with the problem 
of concurrent versus consecutive sentences for a 
defendant tried and convicted in a single trial on 
a single accusation charging several crimes or on 
several accusations consolidated for trial; in general, 
the Code imposes some limitations upon the discre-
tionary power of the trial court to aggregate to 
13. Rocky Mountain Law Review, "Comment on Indeterminate Sentencing 
of Criminals," Professor Austin W, Scott, Jr., Vol. 33, Number 4, 
June, 1961, pp. 547-549. 
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great lengths the. terms of imprisonment for the 
various crimes. On the other hand, the Code 
gives the sentencing court some discretionary 
power, which it does not now enjoy in Colorado 
and elsewhere, to alleviate hardship in a 
particular case, by entering a judgment of 
conviction for a lesser degree of crime than 
the degree of crime for which convicted, 
when in view of all the circumstances the 
punishment would otherwise be too harsh. 
Besides the above provisions concerning length 
of imprisonment, the Model Penal Code introduces 
a new concept into the handling of parole. 
In each case whe~ the defendant is sentenced 
for an indefinite term of imprisonment, the 
sentence automatically includes as a separate 
portion of the sentence an indefinite "parole 
term" -- of from one to five years, for most 
crimes. The parolee may be discharged from 
parole by the parole board any time after one 
year and before five years. If he violates 
the terms of his parole before his discharge, 
however, he may be recommitted. 
The new Code provision thus does away with 
the anomalous situation, which exists in 
Colorado as in other states, whereby those 
who need parole the most get it the least, 
and those who need it the least get it the most 
-- the situation which necessarily prevails 
when the term of parole terminates when the 
maximum sentence has been served. 
Besides these provisions relating to length 
of imprisonment and length of parole, the 
Model Penal Code calls for a full-time, salaried, 
nonpolitical parole board consisting of 
persons possessing skill~ evidenced by training 
or past experience, in correctional 
administration or criminology. 
Classification of Offenses and 
Penalties as Proposed in the Model Penal Code 





Minimum (fixed by court) 
l to 10 years 
l to 3 years 
l to 2 years 
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Maximum (fixed by court) 
20 years or for life 
not more than 10 years 
not more than 5 years 








Minimum (fixed by court) 
5 to 10 years 
l to 5 years 
l to 3 years 
Misdemeanor--Extended Term 
Minimum 
(fixed by court) 
not more than l year 
not more than 6 months 
Parole Boar~ Comgosition 
Maximum 
life imprisonment 
10 to 20 years 
5 to 10 years 
Maximum 
(fixed by law) 
3 years 
2 years 
If considerable sentencing discretion is given to the parole 
authority, it is extremely important that the board be composed of pro-
fessionally trained and experienced personnel who serve in this capacity 
on a full-time basis. The American Correctional Association recommends 
the following qualification standards for parole board members:14 
l) Personality: He must be of such integrity, 
intelligence, and good judgment as to command respect 
and public confidence. Because of the importance 
of his quasi-judicial function, he must possess the 
equivalent personal qualifications of a high judicial 
officer. He must be forthright, courageous, and 
independent. He should be appointed without reference 
to creed, color, or political affiliation. 
2) Education: A board member should 
have an educational background broad enough to 
provide him with a knowledge of those professions 
most closely related to parole administration. 
Specifically, academic training which has qualified 
the board member for professional practice in a 
field such as criminology, education, psychiatry, 
psychology,social work, and sociology is desirable. 
It is essential that he have the capacity and desire 
to round out his knowledge, as effective performance 
is dependent upon an understanding of legal process, 
the dynamics of human behavior, and cultural 
conditions contributing to crime. 
3) Experience: He must have an intimate 
knowledge of common situations and problems 
confronting offenders~ This might be obtained from 
a variety of fields, such as probation, parole, the 
judiciary, law, social work, a correctional institution, 
a delinquency prevention agency. 
14. A Manual of Correctional Standards, .Q.Q• cit., pp. 537 and 538. 
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4) Other: He should not be an officer 
of a political party or seek or hold elective office 
while a member of the board. 
It might be expected that most small states would have part-
time parole boards, even though the paroling !uthority has a considerable 
amount of discretionary sentencing power. Most of these states do 
not have a sufficient number of offenders appearing before the board 
to require a full-time parole authority. What is surprising, however, 
is that some of the larger states have part-time parole boards, when 
these boards have considerable authority in setting sentences. 
States in this category with part-time boards include: Iowa, 
Indiana, Kansas, and Tennessee, although the Tennessee board has one 
full-time member. 
Full-time parole boards with broad sentencing authority are 
found in Michigan, Texas, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, 
California, and Florida. 
Eight of the states under discussion (both large and small) 
have no statutory qualifications for parole board members: Idaho, 
Tennessee, Texas, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, and Indiana. 
The statutory qualifications in three additional states (Kansas, 
South Dakota, and Iowa) do not specifically require knowledge and 
experience in corrections or related fields. Wisconsin is the only 
sta~e in which the parole board is under civil service. In most 
of the other states, board members are appointed by the governor, 
usually with senate approval. 
New Federal Approach to Sentencing 
Federal judges have several alternatives in sentencing 
offenders as a consequence of the adoption of Public Law 85-752 (1958). 
This law applies only to offenders for which the court feels that a 
sentence of at least one year is required to serve "the ends of justice 
and the best interests of the public." 
First, the court may designate the length of the sentence 
within the maximum prescribed by statute and also the minimum term 
which must be served before an offender shall become eligible for 
parole, which term may be less than but shall be no more than one-third 
of the maximum sentence imposed. This alternative incorporates the 
features of indeterminate sentencing, because even though a 
definite sentence is imposed (e.g., 10 years), the offender will be 
eligible for parole no later than the completion of one-third of this 
sentence (three years and four months if sentence is 10 years) and 
possibly sooner if the court so indicates. 
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Second, the court may set the maximum sentence as prescribed 
by statute, in which event the court may specify that the offender may 
become eligible for parole at such time as the board of parole may 
determine. This alternative is very similar to the method of sentencing 
followed in some states in which the maximum sentence i~ set by statute 
and the minimum is determined by the parole authority. 
Third, if the court desires more detailed information as a 
basis for determining the sentence to be imposed, the court may commit 
the defendant to the custody of the attorney general for purposes of 
extensive study and evaluation. If this alternative is followed by 
the court, it is deemed that the sentence imposed is the maximum pre-
scribed by law, although the results of this study and evaluation shall 
be furnished to the committing court within three months, unless the 
court grants additional time, not to exceed three months, for completion 
of the study. After the court receives the report and any recommen-
dations which the director of the Bureau of Prisons believes may be 
helpful in determining disposition, the court may do one of several 
things: 
1) place the offender on probation; 
2) affirm the maximum sentence already imposed, and leave 
it up to the parole board to determine the date of parole 
eligibility; 
3) affirm the maximum sentence already imposed and set a 
date for parole eligibility which may be less than but 
not more than one-third of the maximum; or 
4) reduce the sentence already imposed and set a date for 
parole eligibility which may be less than but not more 
than one-third of the maximum. 
There are also two other sentencing alternatives afforded the 
court. The court has the following authority with respect to offenders 
convicted of any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment; 
1) Regardless of the maximum penalty provided by law, the 
court may suspend sentence and place the offender on probation for a 
period not to exceed five years. 
2) If the maximum penalty provided by law is more than six 
months, the court may fix a sentence in excess of six months and pro-
vide that the offender be confined in a jail-type or treatment 
institution for a period not exceeding six months. After completion 
of this six-month period, the remainder of the sentence is suspended, 
and the offender is placed on probation for a period not to exceed 
five years. 
In all instances where probation is granted the court has 
the authority to revoke or modify any condition of probation or may 
change the period of probation; however, the total period of probation 
shall not exceed five years. 
15. Washington, Utah, Florida, and Iowa. 
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Sentencing and Institutional Programs 
Sentencing, incarceration, and parole are all integral parts 
of a continuous correctional process. Regardless of how this process 
is organized, 95 per cent of all committed offenders sooner or later 
return to society, even if some return only for relatively short 
periods of time. The separate components of the correctional process 
should be coordinated to achieve maximum results with respect to the 
protection of society and the rehabilitation of offenders, and, insofar 
as possible, the same philosophy should underlie the total program. 
Sentencing is the key to a successful corrections program. 
Even if the institutions and parole department are staffed with 
qualified, dedicated personnel and programs are aimed at rehabilitation, 
the possibilities of success are minimized if the method of sentencing 
used does not make it possible for the parole authority to release 
an offender at the time that he is considered to be a good societal 
risk. If he must remain in the institution for a longer period, the 
effects of the program are diminished or perhaps even negated. If 
he must be released from the institution before he is considered 
ready, then the program has little chance of being helpful and 
both society and the offender are losers. 
Conversely, it is dubious that much can be accomplished by 
a change in the method of sentencing if accompanying changes, as 
needed, are not made or at least initiated in institutional programs. 
In addition to a qualified parole board, correctional institutions 
and facilities must have properly qualified and experienced professional 
personnel on their staffs, not only to develop and emphasize 
rehabilitation programs, but also to make evaluations and prepare the 
pertinent data needed by the board in making its decisions. 
As examples, some of the more important components of the 
correctional program in this respect are: l) initial evaluation, 
classification, and placement; 2) vocational training and education 
programs; 3) counseling and testing; 4) psychiatric services; and 
5) pre-parole planning and guidance. 
During the past few years in Colorado, major advances have 
been made in these areas at both adult correctional institutions, 
and further improvements are planned. 
Wisconsin's Correctional Program - An Example 
Wisconsin's correctional program has received Rational 
recognition. The following description of the Wisconsin program is 
taken from a speech made by Sanger B. Powers, Director, Wisconsin 
Division of Corrections.16 
16. "Wisconsin's Answer," a speech by Sanger B. Powers, Director, 
Wisconsin Division of Corrections, presented to the Oklahoma 
Health and Welfare Association, Oklahoma City, November 20, 1958. 
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We believe that our basic responsibility 
established by law and public policy is the 
protection of society, for this is why institutions 
are built, why provisions are made for probation 
and parole services. We feel, however, that 
society will receive maximum protection only 
from a positive program focused on the treatment 
of each offender as an individual -- one with 
problems, a person who is frequently maladjusted 
socially, mentally, physically, or spiritually 
who might be characterized as socially ill. 
Nationally something like 95 per cent of all 
persons committed to institutions are released 
through parole, conditional release, or discharge 
It should be obvious that if society is to 
receive any long-term protection as the result 
of an offender being taken out of circulation 
and incarcerated for a limited period of time, 
that protection must come from something 
other than locking him up and throwing the 
key away ••• Long-term protection can come 
only through positive programs in institutions 
and through probation and parole -- through 
programs aimed at retraining rather than 
restraining, through efforts to rehabilitate 
rather than being content to restrict, 
through programs geared to reformation 
through a professionalized service rather 
than mere repression • 
• • • the job of an institution or a corrections 
service is not to punish. Punishment might 
properly he the function or aim of a court 
in depriving a person of his liberty by 
commitment to an institution, but· the,job of 
the in st it u ti on . • • i s • • • to ma ke the 
maximum efforts to train, retrain, educate, 
guide and counsel, and through the use of 
psychological and psychiatric and social 
services, to get at and treat the causes, 
the things responsible for anti-social or 
criminal conduct. 
We believe in the value of the maximum 
use of treatment and rehabilitative services 
Such services must be individualized, for 
each offender differs from all others in 
terms of aptitudes, attitudes, emotional 
make up, cultural, and social background 




• we are operating six institutions 
a statewide probation and parole service, 
of which are integrated and enmeshed 
designed to protect society through 
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• • • 
the restoration of people to useful living 
at the earliest possible time consistent 
with the protection of the public and the 
readiness of each individual offender to 
resume his place in the community. I am 
not naive about all this business and I 
am not seeking to give the impression that 
we turn out only successes or that every 
prisoner received is a hopeful person 
interested in re-establishment of himself 
in society ••• The great majority of 
the offenders committed to our custody are not 
hopeless ••• There may be people in prisons. 
to whQm hope has been denied, but there are 
few Lwho ari] hopeless. 
• • 
Mr. Powers then went on to describe institutional programs 
as follows:17 
••• a copy of the pre-sentence investigation 
accompanies the offender to the institution 
and is used by the institution in planning 
a positive program for the offender ••• 
Shortly after an offender is received ••• 
he will appear before a classification 
committee, which will determine the treatment 
and training program for him ••• at this time ••• 
the pre-sentence social history will be 
supplemented and amplified by appraisals and 
reports from the psychiatrist, psychologist, 
director of education, supervisor of vocational 
training, chaplain, director of recreation, 
and the institutional social service worker 
assigned to the specific case ••• complete 
information is available to the cl~sslfication 
committee which will permit them Lsif/ to make an 
intelligent determination with respect to the 
security classification, education, and vocational 
training or work assignment, and type of 
guidance or counselling necessary. 
As an inmate progresses through an institution, 
a social worker keeps close tab on his 
progress and adjustment and his response 
17. Ibig. 
to the program set up for him. When the 
prisoner is initially seen by the Parole 
Board, the Board will have a report from 
the social service department which is 
up-to-date and which will supplement all 
of the material previously referred to and 
which is also utilized by the Parole Board. 
Thus the Parole Board in making its decision 
is able to use the pre-sentence social history, 
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all of the institution classification 
material, and the up-to-date progress report 
in determining the readiness for parole of 
any particular applicant ••• Board members 
are qualified by training and experience 
to properly assess and appraise this type of 
material, are conversant with the dynamics of 
human behavior and are able to understand the 
meaning and significance of the psychiatric 
and psychological data which frequently bear 
significantly on the question of readiness 
for parole • 
• • • during an offender's stay at an 
institution he is seen at regular intervals 
by the parole officer who will be his supervisor 
upon release ••• Thus there is a continuous 
link between the community and the offender, 
between the offender's parole officer and the 
institution, and the parole officer has 
access to all of the institutional information 
in an offender's record which will go with 
the offender to the field when he is released 
under parole supervision. This we feel makes 
for an integrated and coordinated total 
correctional process. 
This description of the c?rrect!onal proce!~ was followed by 
some comments on the costs of the Wisconsin program: 
•.•• we do this in Wisconsin because we are 
not a wealthy state and because we cannot 
afford a program which does not provide for 
adequate probation and parole supervision and 
which does not provide society with the 
protection afforded through the supervision 
of offenders upon ;,ple_a~e from institutions ••• 
As of November 1, Ll95§/ the Division of 
Corrections had 8,120 persons under its 
supervision. Of this number 3,018 were in 
institutions while 5,102 were under supervision 
in the field/Lon probation and parol!J ••• 
18 • lli,g . 
63 per cent of the offenders ••• were in the 
community under the supervision of a probation 
and parole officer while only 37 per cent 
were institutionalized ••• the average 
weekly per capita cost o.f SY,Pervision 
on probation or parole Lwa§/ $4.25 ••• 
the average per capita cost of institutionalization ••• 
approximates $37.50 per week. If the 
5,102 persons presently being supervised on 
probation and parole were in institutions 
an extra $9,180,000 of ·state funds would be 
- 23 -
required ••• This added annual operating 
cost of $9,180,000 does not include the 
tremendous capital outlay necessary to 
provide bed space in institutions for 
an additional o,102 prisoners. At current 
construction costs averaging $10,00U per 
bed, this would represent a minimum added 
capital outlay of $51 million ••• non~ of this 
takes into consideration other ~hidden" costs 
which would have to be reckoned with: l ••• 
the e~onomic contribution of these 5,102 
people to society in terms of productivity ••• 
2 •.•• the approximate $16 million in wages of 
these people are currently earning and spending 
••• 3 ••• the taxes being paid on this 
$16 million ••• this loss would have to 
be made up along with the added tax necessary 
t2 keep these people confined •.• 4 ••• 
Lthy cost to maintain the families of the 
productive wage earners now ••• on 
probation and parole. 
So all in all we are really dealing with 
staggering added costs if we were to consider 
abandoning our program in favor of a program 
which substituted institutionalization for 
adequate probation and parole services. 
And none of this reckons with the human 
values involved, the effect on people of the 
grinding routine and monotony of institution 
life, particularly if the institution 
program and staff are such that people are not 
kept constructively occupied with programs 
intelligently designed to retrain, re-educate, 
reform, and return to useful living. 
For these reasons Wisconsin does not feel 
it can afford what on the surface might seem 
to be a cheaper operation, but which would 
actually be substantially more expensive. The 
state does not want and cannot afford institutions 
and institutional programs which do not do anything 
· to rehabilitate, which do nothing to improve an 
offender during his period of institutionalization. 
We do not want people released on parole or by 
discharge who are not ready for release. 
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Difficulty in Measuring Success of Sentencing Practices and Institutional 
Programs 
Most correctional authorities agree that a program such 
as Wisconsin's (described above) represents the most successful 
approach as yet developed to sentencing, incarceration, and release. 
Yet it is extremely difficult, even for correction officials in 
states with such programs, to measure accurately the extent to which 
their programs contribute to parole success. This is especially 
true when comparisons are attempted. Several reasons why measurement 
is difficult were cited in correspondence frf~ correction officials 
in California, Wisconsin, and other states. 
l) It is difficult to compare present results with results 
in the state previous to adoption of the present program. 
a) Few records were kept formerly. 
b) Very few offenders were released on parole previously, 
and these were the ones most likely to succeed. 
c) There have been changes in the nature and type of 
crimes and criminals which make comparisons impossible. 
2) It is impossible to compare states because of: 
a) differences in use of probation and parole (In 
some states parole is not used extensively so that those who are 
paroled are more likely to be successful. Use or nonuse of probation 
has a great bearing on institutional population. First offenders 
who perhaps should have been placed on probation are committed and 
then ~roled with better chance for success than a two or three-time 
loser.); and 
b) regional and local differences in crime rates, 
community attitudes, and related factors. 
3) It is very difficult to measure parole success or to 
determine accurately the reasons therefor. 
a) The rate of success depends on how parole success is 
defined and the length of time being considered. Should technical 
violations be included or just new offenses? Should two, three, or 
five years be used, or should the successful completion of parole -
regardless of length of time - be the criterion? 
b) There are so many factors involved in each parole 
success, and they vary from case to case, it is hard to tell precisely 
which is the most important. Among these are: institutional programs, 
time of release, family and community acceptance, employment, parole 
supervision, and previous background and record. 
19. These responses were a result of a staff questionnaire sent to 
selected states in April, 1960. 
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Previous Proposals to Change 
the Method of Sentencing in Colorado 
1957 Parole Department Proposal 
In 1957, legislation suggested by the Adult Parole Department 
provided for statutory maximum sentences and no minimum, except that 
the court could, if it so desired, set the minimum sentence· however 
the minimum could not exceed one-third of the statutory maximum or 16 
years, whichever was less. The court was also empowered to reduce a 
minimum term at any time before expiration thereof upon the recommenda-
tion of the parole board, if the court was satisfied that such reduction 
would be in the best interests of the public and the welfare of the 
prisoner. This proposed measure made no change in parole board 
composition nor did it provide for institutional transfer. 
S.B. 188 (1959) and H.B. 42 (1961) 
This proposal introduced in two different sessions was far 
reaching in scope and would have made a drastic change in sentencing. 
Under the provisions of this measure a three-member corrections and 
parole authority would be established under civil service. The court 
would determine guilt and commit to the authority. The court, if it so 
desired, could set a sentence, but such sentence would be purely 
advisory. 
The parole and corrections authority would determine the 
institution in which the offender would be incarcerated (penitentiary, 
reformatory, state hospital) and would also have the authority and 
responsibility for transferring offenders among the three facilities. 
The authority would also have the responsibility for providing 
psychiatric services and diagnostic facilities at the three institutions. 
Authority members would be required to have a broad background 
in and ability for appraisal of law offenders and the circumstances of 
the offenses for which convicted Members selected, insofar as 
possible, should have a varied and sympathetic interest in corrections 
work, including persons widely experienced in the fields of corrections, 
sociology, law, law enforcement, and education. 
Previously-sentenced offenders would have the choice of 
coming under the jurisdiction of the proposed act or continuing to 
serve their sentences under the statutes in effect upon the date of 
sentence, with allowances for good behavior. 
Discussion of S.B. 188 1959 and H.B. 42 1961). This 
proposal wou d have estab ished one day to life sentences in all cases. 
The parole and corrections authority would have both parole and admin-
istrative responsibility. The requirement that the authority provide 
for both psychiatric services and diagnostic facilities conflicts with 
institutional functions and programs and the general authority of the 
Department of Institutions. Th;s overlapping could lead to unnecessary 
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expense, duplication, and confusion of functions between the proposed 
authority and the Department of Institutions, with its divisions of 
corrections and psychiatric services. 
While the authority would be required to classify each 
offender and assign him to an institution, it would be required only to 
interview him and study his case some time during the initial six months 
of his confinement. The question arises as to what would be the 
status and placement of the offender during the period (which might be 
as long as six months) before the authority interviews him and reviews 
his case. Further, there is no provision for the assistance of 
professional personnel on the institutional staffs in making these 
determinations. 
It would be possible under the terms of the act for one 
authority member to interview an offender and make recommendations con-
cerning his status for consideration by the authority sitting en bane. 
It would be far better if each authority member could have equal --
opportunity to interview offenders and review cases prior _to determining 
status or disposition. In addition to the possible overlapping of 
functions with the Department of Institutions, the authority would be 
given the administrative responsibility for the Adult Parole Division. 
This change would increase the administrative confusion. No provision 
is made, however, for giving the authority administrative control over 
the correctional institutions. So if one purpose of the measure is to 
create an independent correctional agency embracing all facets of the 
correctional program, it falls short in this respect. Rather the 
result would be a considerable amount of administrative confusion. The 
authority would not have control of the correctional institutions but 
would have the responsibility of establishing and administering certain 
programs within the institutions as well as administration of the 
Division of Adult Parole. 
Three Possible Approaches to Sentencing 
in Colorado: Some Implications 
Three possible approaches to sentencing in Colorado were 
subjected to further examination by the Criminal Code Committee. These 
included: 
1) limitation on judicial sentencing discretion accompanied 
by broader parole board authority similar to the practice 
in California, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin; 
2) the sentencing alternative embodied in the 1958 federal 
legislation; and 
3) the method of sentencing outlined in the Model Penal Code. 
To determine how these approaches to sentencing might be 
adopted in Colorado the following subjects were examined: 
1) administrative changes, staff needs and cost; 
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2) effect on other aspects of the judicial and law 
enforcement processes; 
3) broad social implications; and 
4) possible statutory changes. 
As a first step in making this analysis, these three 
approaches to sentencing were defined more precisely in the form in 
which they might be applied in Colorado. 
l) Sentence Set by Statute.20 This approach was limited to 
two variations: 
a) maximum and minimum sentences would be set by 
statute; and 
b) maximum set by statute, court could impose minimum, 
not to exceed one-third of the maximum. Good time 
allowances would apply only against the maximum 
sentence. 
The parole board would have the authority to review and release 
an offender after half of the minimum sentence is served. Offenders 
not paroled prior to the expiration of their maximum sentences less 
good time allowance could be released under parole supervision at that 
time, such supervision to continue until the date of maximum sentence 
expiration. Offenders released on regular parole could be kept under 
supervision until expiration of their maximum sentence, unless released 
sooner by the parole board. 
2) Federal Sentencing Option. In sentencing an offender, 
the court could choose among several options: 
a) The court could designate the length of sentence within 
the maximum prescribed by statute and also the minimum term which 
must be served before an offender would become eligible for parole, 
which term may be less than but could be no more than one-third 
of the maximum sentence imposed. 
b) The court could set the maximum sentence as prescribed 
by statute, in which even the court could specify that the offender 
would become eligible for parole at such time as the parole board 
may determine. 
c) The court could commit the offender to the custody 
of the Department of Institutions for extensive study and evaluation. 
Under this alternative, it would be considered that the ma~imum 
statutory sentence has been imposed, pending the results of this 
study and evaluation which would be furnished to the committing court 
within three months, unless the court granted additional time to complete 
the study (not to exceed three months). After the court receives the 
department's report and recommendations, it could do one of several 
things. 
20. Under all three approaches, the court would have the discretionary 
authority to place offenders on probation as at present. 
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i) place the offender on probation; 
ii) affirm the maximum sentence already imposed and let the 
parole board determine the date of parole eligibility; 
iii) affirm the maximum sentence already imposed and set 
a date for parole eligibility which could be less than 
but not more than one-third of the maximum; or 
iv) reduce the sentence already imposed and set a date 
for parole eligibility which could be less than but not 
more than one-third of the maximum. 
(In Colorado, another option would be commitment to the 
state reformatory, unless the reformatory commitment laws were changed. 
The court could commit to the reformatory initially or after diagnosis 
and evaluation by the Department of Institutions.) 
3) Model Penal Code. All crimes would be divided into 
several grades: felonies of the first degree, second degree, and 
third degree; misdemeanors; and petty mi5demeanors, The court would 
fix the minimum and maximum terms within the l111u.ts specified for the 
grade of crimes within which the offense falls. The limits would be 
higher for persistent offenders, professional criminals, and dangerous 
mentally abnormal persons. The court would be prevented from imposing 
what in effect would be a fixed sentence by the requirement that the 
minimum could not be more than half of the maximum. The parole board 
would determine parole release after the minimum sentence less any 
good time allowance has been served. 
There would be some limitations on the authority of the court 
to impose an extensive consecutive sentence on an offender convicted 
of several crimes in a single trial. On the other hand, the court 
would have the discretionary authority to alleviate hardship in_a 
particular case by entering a judgment of conviction for a lesser 
degree of crime than the offense for which found guilty when, in view 
of all the circumstances, the punishment would otherwise be too harsb. 
Sentences for felony convictions would include, as a separate 
portion thereof, an indefinite parole term of one to five years. A 
parolee could be discharged from parole by the parole board any time 
after one year and before five years. 
Possible Costs Involved in Changing the Method of Sentencing 
Full-time Parole Board. Many of the states in which 
sentencing discretion is vested to a considerable extent in the parole 
authority have full-time parole boards, and such boards are generally 
recommended by correctional and parole officials. It would appear 
that the adoption of either of the first two approaches to sentencing 
outlined above would require a full-time professional parole board 
in order to be successful. A full-time board would be less necessary 
under the method of sentencing which follows the Model Penal Code, be-
cause the authority of the parole board would be more limited than in 
either of the other two approaches. 
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Full-time parole boards in other states vary in size from 
three to seven members. Qualifications for board members vary, but they 
usually include experience and training in one or more of the 
following fields: 
l} parole and probation; 
2} law; 
3} law enforcement and/or corrections; 
4} psychology; and 
5} social work. 
Colorado's present part-time parole board costs the state 
approximately $10,000 per year. A full-time parole board in Colorado 
might cost from $68,000 to $90,000 annually, depending on whether it 
would be a three or five~member board. This cost estimate is based on 
the following: 
l} Parole board members (annual salary, $12,000} 




Supplies, travel expense, etc. 










It might be pos~ible initially for a full-time board to use 
the staff of the Adult Parole Division for clerical work, and thus 
reduce the annual cost $7,000 to $8,000. 
Diagnostic Center. If Colorado adopted the federal sentencing 
program, a professionally staffed diagnostic facility would be needed 
for offenders who might be referred by the courts for diagnosis and 
evaluation. At least 1,200 offenders are sentenced each year to the 
reformatory and penitentiary. (In addition, there are a large number 
placed on probation, many of whom might be committed by the courts 
for evaluation, should such a facility and service be available.} 
Even if only 10 per cent of the committed offenders (plus the same 
proportion of· potential grobati9ners) were referred f~r evaluation, 
at least 180 to 200 violators would be 1nvuiveu, and it is likely 
that this estimate is low. Even on the basis of three or four 
commitments per week, a facility for 35 to 50 inmates would be needed 
if most of them were to be kept for observation and evaluation for 
the full 90 days provided in the federal system. 
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It is very difficult to present even a faiily adequate 
estimate of construction and operation costs for such a facility and 
program. Many policy questions are involved such as, but not limited 
to, the following: 
1) Should the diagnostic facility be located near the 
penitentiary? 
2) Should the penitentiary be responsible for over-
all administration and correctional services? 
3) Should the reformatory and penitentiary be permitted 
to send offenders already incarcerated to the center for evaluation 
and study upon approval of the director of institutions, or should 
the facility be limited to court referrals? 
4) Should the center be operated in conjunction with a 
facility for the criminally insane? 
If the answers to the first two question~ are in the affirmative, 
the costs would be considerably less, because it would be extremely 
expensive to staff a small facility with a sufficient number of 
correctional officers in addition to professional, clerical, and 
maintenance personnel. Professional staff is very expensive and 
extremely difficult to recruit; thus, it would appear more feasible 
to share professional personnel, insofar as possible. This could be 
accomplished by having such a diagnostic center attached either to the 
penitentiary or to a special facility for the criminally insane, 
although separated from it. 
If the reformatory and penitentiary are allowed to send 
inmates to the diagnostic facility for evaluation and study, it would 
more than likely increase the size facility needed and perhaps the 
number of professional staff members. On the other hand, it might be 
quite shortsighted to have such a facility and not to ~se it as needed 
as an ~djunct to the institutional rehabilitation program. 
From the few examples cited above it can be seen that a 
change in sentencing involves much more than statutory revision 
or policy decisions which relate only to sentencing. These broader 
implications should be considered: 1) in order to decide whether Colorado 
should follow the federal system; 2) in order to present the General 
Assembly with a comprehensive picture of the factors and costs involved 
in adopting such an approach; and 3) in order to avoid potential· 
difficulties through careful planning. 
Cost estimates, as indicated above, are almost impossible 
to make without basic policy decisions; however, construction might 
cost at least $500,000, depending on whether inmate labor is used. 
It would cost approximately $26,000 annually to employ a psychiatric 
team (p~ychiatrist,clinic~l psychologist, and psyc~iatric social 
worker) based on present civil service salary levels. It is doubtful 
whether one team would be adequate, but the number of additional 
professional employees needed would depend on whether professional 
staff is to be shared and what the function of the diagnostic 
center would include. 
- 31 -
Additional Institutional Staff. Under two of the three 
sentencing approaches {excluding the Model Penal Code), it is likely 
that additional professional staff would be required at the penitentiary 
and reformatory within a short period of time, if not initia1ly. 
These professional employees (psychologists, counselors, social 
workers) would be necessary ·if the experience of other states 
is indicative (Wisconsin,fo~ example), to. provide the full-time parole 
board with information, analyses, and evaluations which it would 
require as reference material in reviewing cases and making parole 
determination. 
Again it is difficult to make an accurate cost estimate, 
but such additional personnel to the two institutions whether employed 
by the institution or the Adult fiarole Division could easily cost 
from $50,000 to $100,000 per year. 
Summary. The cost estimates and related material presented 
in this section indicate some pos~ible impacts of sentencing changes upon 
institutional facilities, staffs, and programs. These are not all the 
factors and costs involved, nor are the cost estimates to be considered 
accurate; and further study is needed. 
Broader Implications of Sentencing Changes 
Judicial Functions. Under the first two suggested 
approaches to sentencing, Judicial discretion would be limited. In 
the first·proposal, judges would have the responsibility only to 
determin~ guilt, sentence would be according to statute (although as 
an alternative it is suggested that there might be a judicially 
imposed minimum not to exceed one-third of the maximum). If changes 
in sentencing followed the federal system, judges would. have more 
assistance and options in the disposition of offenders, but they would 
also be subject to certain limitations with respect to the imposition 
of a minimum sentence. The method of sentencing embodied in the Model 
Penal Code would leave the judge considerable latitude, but not as 
much as at present, because statutory maxima and minima would not 
only be determined by the type of crime but also by the severity of 
the offense. Further, the court could not impose a minimum that 
is more than one-half the maximum. 
A comprehensive survey of the attitudes of district judges 
towards sentencing and possible changes was made by the Legislative 
Council Administration of Justice Committee, which discussed this 
topic at its regional meetings. In its report to the General 
Assembly, the Administration of Justice Committee summarized the 
sentencing discussions at the regional meetings as follows:21 
Two-thirds of the 27 district judges with 
whom sentencing was discussed at the com-
mittee's regional meetings favored a change 
in the method of sentencing. The other nine 
21. Judicial Administration in Colorado, Research Publication no. 49, 
Colorado Legislative Council, 1960, p. 139. 
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judges advocated retention of the present 
judicial sentencing authority. Most of the judges 
favoring change felt that the California 
system had merit and recommended that the 
maximum and minimum sentences be set by statute, 
with the courts' function confined to a 
determination of guilt. One district 
judge advocated one day to life sentences in 
all felonies, with the parole board to 
determine release within this range. Another 
district judge felt that the parole board 
should be given the discretionary authority 
to determine release at any time after six 
months had been served. These judges were 
unanimous in the opinion that a qualified 
full-time parole board would be necessary to 
make such a change in sentencing procedures 
successful. Fixed statutory sentences were 
favored rather than open-ended sentences to 
limit the effect of arbitrary parole board 
action, which might result in incarceration 
of unjust length. 
Several reasons were given by the district 
judges in favor of adopting a system of statutory 
sentencing. Some judges said that it is not 
possible to determine at the time sentence is 
imposed what the offender's possibility for 
rehabilitation might be five to 10 years in the 
future. It was pointed out that legal training 
does not give judges special competence to 
determine what to do with a man after he has been 
found guilty. Even recognizing differences between 
individual ca~es, several judges felt that 
there was inequality in the imposition of 
sentences and that the proposed change would 
provide more opportunity for release on the 
basis of an offender's prospects for a 
successful return to society. 
The judges who opposed a change in the method 
of sentencing pointed out that the sentencing 
judge is much more acquainted with the case 
and the offender than any board would be after 
reviewing the record and interviewing the 
offender months or years after the crime had 
been committed. In imposing sentence, these 
judges said they took into consideration the 
crime and extenuating circumstances as well as 
the information developed through the pre-
sentence investigation. 
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Attorneys and other judges with whom the com-
mittee discussed sentencing at the regional 
meetings were also divided two to one on this 
question; the reasons advanced for both positions 
were very similar to those of the district judges. 
Law Enforcement Officials. A change in sentencing which 
would limit the courts' discretion might be looked upon by law 
enforcement officers, especially district attorneys, as hampering 
their efforts because, with fixed maxima and minima, elimination of 
good time, and the placement of prison release determination in the 
parole board, there is no way in which a lighter sentence can be 
guaranteed to an offender for cooperation. The best that could be 
promised is that a report on the offender's cooperation would be 
included in tne material reviewed by the parole board and a 
recommendation made for a snort minimum sentence bef or~ parole 
eligibility. 
That the possibility of such opposition to a change in 
sentencing by law enforcement officials is not farfetched is 
demonstrated by what happened in the state of Washington when the 
statutory sentencing system was adopted in· 1934. For several years 
district attorneys and sheriffs opposed the system and the parole 
board. The crux of the opposition can be found in two questions 
raised by the Washington State Association of Prosecuting Attorneys 
in a meeting with the state parole board. "Why do the se nte nee s 
you set vary so much from what we r~sommended?" "Why doesn't the 
Board back our deals with inmates?" After numerous conferences and 
years of experience working with the new sentencing system, it became 
generally accepted by law enforcement officers and prosecuting 
attorneys, many of whom decided that the board knew more about the 
offenders than they did and also asked how they could assist the 
board by prepar1:§lg better statements of the crimes ·and their 
investigations. 
The foregoing comments are not intended as criticism of 
prosecuting attorneys or law enforcement officers. Rather, its 
purpose is to show the need for cooperation and the problems which 
can result from the lack of communication. It is understandable that 
law enforcement officials might become upset if they feel that their 
efforts are being hampered because of restrictions placed upon them 
through the adoption of a sentencing system which, unless explained, 
is perceived as a means of rapidly returning dangerous offenders to 
society. 
Changes in Society's Approach to Crime. The first two 
sentencing alternatives would give more legal sanction to the current 
trend in the handling of criminals away from retribution, punishment, 
and deterrence and toward emphasis on society's protection and 
rehabilitation efforts. On the surface this may appear as a "get 
soft" approach. Those who support this shift in emphasis argue that 
22. Law and Contemporary Problems, "Sentencing by ~n Administrative 
Board," Vol. XXIII, No. 3, Normans. Hayner, Duke University School 
of Law,p. 481. 
23. Ibig. 
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the contrary is true because: 1) Release of an offender at the time 
he appears to be best able to return to society successfully protects 
society far more than if the is released after serving the required 
amount of time, regardless of his chances to be a good citizen. 
2) Parole supervision protects society and helps the offender to keep 
from backsliding; release without supervision is far more dangerous. 
3) If an offender has an incentive, he is more likely to try to face 
reality and the real causes of his problems; such incentive is provided 
if an offender knows the time of his release depends to a great 
extent upon himself. There is little motivation if he knows he has to 
serve a certain length of time anyway. 4) Focusing more attention 
on the offender rather than concentrating on the crime committed makes 
it possible to release offenders at the time they are considered 
ready to be returned to society and to hold dangerous offenders as 
long as the law will allow. 
The problem, therefore, is not one only of equalizing 
sentences for like crimes (although disparity has been demonstrated 
by penitentiary statistics) but also to provide a sentence tailored 
to a particular offender to the extent that through his own efforts 
(with assistance) he can be released sooner if it is determined to be 
safe to do so and can be held for the maximum period if it is in 
society's best interest. 
Both the California-Wisconsin-Washington method of 
sentencing and the federal system are in line with this approach. 
Equalization of sentences for like crimes is recognized bY imposition 
of statutory maxima and by either statutory minima or limitations 
on the length ot minimum sentence which may be judicially imposed. 
(The court may request diagnostic assistance under the federal system 
in considering carefully what is best for the offender and for society.) 
Within these sentence limitations, there is no automatic formula to 
guarantee the date of release, it is dependent upon the offender and an 
evaluation of his chances of becoming a useful citizen. 
The same remarks apply, but to a lesser extent, with 
respect to the method of sentencing embodied in the Model Penal Code, 
because the Model Penal Code places much more emphasis on the 
severity of the crime in establishing maximum and minimum sentences, 
provides for good time allowances, and allows the court to set both a 
minimum and a maximum sentence, although the minimum cannot exceed 
one-half the maximum. 
Complexity of Problem 
The subject of sentencing is an extremely complex one, 
expecially when considered within the context of the total correctional 
process. Consequently, the following questions should be considered 
in reaching a decision on changes in present sentencing procedures: 
l) What should be the basic approach to sentencing? 
Assuming that protection of society is the major objective, how may 
this best be achieved? Should the underlying philosophy (in addition 
to society's protection) be rehabilitation, punishment, or retribution? 
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How can these different approaches to sentencing be reconciled? Does 
sentencing serve as a deterrent? If so, to what extent, and should 
this be a prime consideration? 
2) What should be the extent of judicial authority in 
setting sentences? Should courts be limited to a finding of guilt? 
Should sentences be set by statute? If so, should this apply to both 
maxima and minima, or just one end of the sentence (which one)? 
Should it be possible to release an offender before comP.Jetion of _his 
minimum; on what basis and under what circumstances? If continuation 
of judicial sentencing authority (at least to a limited extent) is 
desirable, what would be a satisfactory combination of judicial and 
board sentencing authority, not only with respect to the role of each, 
but also in relationship to the basic approach to sentencing? 
Are the offender's rights safeguarded under the methods of sentencing 
being considered? 
3) If greater responsibility is given to the parole board, 
what should be the composition of the board (number, qualifications, 
method of appointment, civil service), and should it serve on a full-
time basis? 
4) What should be the relationship between the board and 
the institutions (as to scope of authority, division of responsibili-
ties, supervision)? Specifically, should the board play any role 
or Dave any responsibility in initial classification, assignment, 
placement, and transfer of offenders? If so, to what extent? 
·5) To what extent should present institutional programs 
be augme~ted or changed if the method of sentencing is changed? What 
do the institutions now have in the way of professional personnel and 
rehabilitation programs? What is needed and how far reaching should 





6) Are the present statutory penalties for crimes satis-
If not, which ones should be changed? How should statutory 
provisions be handled? What provision should be made for 
already committed? 
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LICENSING AND REGULATION OF BAIL BONDSMEN 
There are no prov1s1ons in the Colorado statutes regulating 
bail bondsmen or prescribing the terms and conditions for the issuance 
of bail bonds. Members of the iudiciary, the bar, and the press, as 
well as the general public, have· been concerned over this lack of 
regulation, primarily because of happenings in the Denver metropolitan 
area in recent months. 
Although there is presently more general concern, the lack 
of regulation and control of bail bondsmen has been recognized as a 
serious problem by judges and attorneys for a number of years. At 
the March 18, 1960, Denver regional meeting of the Legislative Council 
Administration of Justice Committee, the following allegations were 
made about bail bondsmen: 
1) Many ex-convicts are in the bail bond business. 
2) Fees charged by many bail bondsmen are exorbitant. 
3) It is not uncommon for a bondsman to request the court 
to terminate bond after the fee has been paid on the grounds that the 
alleged violator was a poor risk, even though this is not the case. 
4) There is no way to prohibit possible'agreements between 
bail bondsmen and attorneys.l 
Regulatory Legislation in Selected States 
The statutory regulation of bail bondsmen was surveyed in 
seven states known to have such legislation as a guide to possible 
legislative action in Colorado. These states included: Arizona, 
Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New 
York. A summary analysis of the bail bondsmen regulatory legislation 
of each of these states is presented below. 
Arizona 
Arizona requires only that each professional bondsman (other 
than a surety company) be registered with the clerk of the superior 
court. 
Connecticut 
This act requires that each professional bondsman be licensed 
by the state and includes other regulations. 
Bondsmen Licensed. Any person who makes bail in five or more 
criminal cases, whether for compensation or not, must be licensed. 
l. Judicial Administration In Colorado, Colorado Legislative Council, 
Research Publication No. 49, December 1960, p. 1~4. 
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Licensing Authority. The state police commissioner is charged 
with the licensing and regulation of professional bondsmen. 
Qualifications. Each applicant must make a sworn statement 
which contains the following: 
a list of assets and liabilities 
applicant's fingerprints and photo 
proof of sound moral character 
proof of financial responsibility 
statement that applicant has never been 
convicted of a felony 
The commissioner may deny or suspend a license if any of the 
above are not truthfully provided. 
License Fee. The license fee is $100. 
Maximum Bond Fees. First $100 of bond 
$5,000 -- five per cent of bond amount; over $5,000 
bond amount. 
$5 fee; $100 to 
2.5 per cent of 
Annual Report. Each bondsman must submit an annual report 
to the commission showing: 1) the number of bonds handled; 2) amount 
of bonds; and 3) the fees charged. 
Penalty. For violation of any of the above laws, sentence 
may be $1~000 fine and/or two years in jail. 
Florida 
Florida's legislation is quite detailed and comprehensive 
and also covers runners (who are leg men for professional bondsmen). 
Bondsmen Licensed. The state licenses sureties, bail 
bondsmen, and runners. 
Licensing Authority. The state treasurer is the designated 
insurance commissioner and enforces the law regulating bondsmen and 
runners. 
Qualifications for Bondsmen. Each applicant for a license 
must take an examination administered by the commissioner of insurance. 
In addition, he must show the following qualifications: 
~~ 
f) 
21 years of age 
citizen and resident for six months 
experience in bonding business by previous employ-
ment or completion of correspondence course 
high moral character 
a detailed financial report 
the rating plan the applicant will use (bond fees) 
License Fee. The license fee in Florida is $10. 
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Annual Report. Once a year the professional bondsman must 
file a statement of his assets and liabilities and must list every 
bond forfeiture. 
Penalty. Any violation of law may be punished by $500 fine 
and/or six months in jail. 
Other. Several specific prohibitions are made in the law 
pertaining to the conduct of bondsmen, including: 
a ) 
Indiana 
Bondsmen may not advise employment of a 
particular attorney. 
Bondsmen may not solicit business in court. 
Bondsmen may not pay any fee to a jailer, 
attorney, policeman or public official. 
No bond agency may hold itself out as a surety 
company. 
Indiana has the most recent and most comprehensive legislation 
among the states surveyed. 
Bondsmen Licensed. No person shall act in the capacity of 
a bail bondsman or runner or perform any of the functions, duties or 
powers prescribed for bail bondsmen or runners under the provisions of 
this act unless that person shall be qualified and licensed as provided. 
None of the provisions of the act shall prohibit any person or persons 
from pledging security for a bail bond if such person or persons are 
neither promised nor receive money or anything of value therefor. 
Licensing Authority. The state insurance commissioner is 
charged with the authority and responsibility for the licensing and 
regulation of bail bondsmen and runners. 
Qualifications for Bondsmen. The commissioner of insurance 
may require from an applicant information concerning his qualifications, 
residence, prospective place of business, and any other matters which 
the commissioner deems necessary or expedient to protect the public 
and ascertain the qualifications of the applicant. The commissioner 
may also conduct any reasonable inquiry or investigation to determine 
the applicant's fitness to be licensed or have his license renewed. 
A deposit of from $10,000 to $25,000 as determined by the commissioner 
is required before any licensed bondsman may write cash or security 
bail bonds. 
is $10. 
License Fee. The annual license fee (including renewals) 
Annual Report. An annual detailed financial statement must 
be filed under oath, and such statement shall be subject to the same 
examination as is prescribed by law for domestic insurance companies. 
On or before August 15 of each year, each bondsman must file a sworn 
statement listing every bond forfeiture, amount of forfeiture and name 
of court where the forfeiture is recorded, and the date of payment. 
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Penalty. Violation of any prov1s1ons of the act is punishable 
by a fine of not more than $500 or six months in jail or both. 
Other. Several specific prohibitions are made in the law 









suggest or advise the employment of or name 
for employment any particular attorney to 
represent his principal; 
pay a fee or rebate or give or promise anything 
of value to a jailer, policeman, peace officer, 
committing magistrate or any other person who 
has the power to arrest or hold in custody, or 
to a public official or employee in order to 
secure a settlement, reduction, remission, or 
compromise in the amount of any bail bond or 
the forfeiture thereof; 
pay a fee or rebate or give anything of value 
to an attorney in bail bond matters, except 
in defense of any action on a bond; 
pay a fee or rebate or give or promise anything 
of value to the principal or anyone in his 
behalf; 
participate in the capacity of an attorney at 
a trial or hearing of one on whose bond he is 
surety; 
accept anything of value from a principal except 
the premium, provided that he may be permitted 
to accept collateral security or other indemnity 
from the principal which shall be returned upon 
final termination of liability on the bond; and 
solicit business in or about any place where 
prisoners are confined. 
Bondsmen are required to register but are subject to very 
few regulations; they are regulated by the local courts. 
Bondsmen Registered. All bondsmen, other than surety 
companies, who make bond on five or more occasions must be registered. 
Registering Authority. Each bondsman must register with and 
be approved by the superior court (similar to Colorado's county court) 
and be subject to the rules of the court. 
Monthly Report. A 1959 amendment to the Massachusetts law 
requires each bondsman to submit a monthly report to the chief judge 
of each superior court showing the bail or surety, defendant's name, 
offense charged, and fee charged on each case bonded for that month. 
Penalty. Any violation of Massachusetts law is subject to 
$1,000 fine and/or one year in jail. 
- 40 -
New Hampshire 
The law requires registration of all bondsmen and makes them 
subject to limitations on the fees that may be charged. 
Bondsmen Registered, All professional bondsmen who receive 
compensation for making bail must register. 
Registering Authority. The clerk of the superior court 
registers and administers an oath of financial responsibility to each 
bondsman. 
Registration Fee. The clerk of each superior court sets the 
fee. 
Maximum Fees. Professional bondsmen are prohibited from 
charging more than five per cent of the amount of bail and in no instance 
can charge more than $100 for a bond. 
Penalty. Failure to comply with any of the above requirements 
may result in a $100 fine or 30 days in jail. 
New York 
New York has a rather rigid set of license requirements for 
bondsmen. 
Bondsmen Licensed. Any person other than a surety company 
who makes bond on more than two occasions within a two-month period 
must be licensed. 
Licensing Authority. The superintendent of insurance licenses 
and regulates all professional bail bondsmen. 
Qualifications. Each applicant must submit to a written 
examination over any phase of the bonding business administered by the 
superintendent of insurance. In addition, each applicant must show 
proof of good character and reputation. 
Qualification Bond. Each applicant must post a $5,000 bond 
in order to do business in New York State. 
License Fee. Examination fee of $5 and a license fee of 
$25 is charged to applicants. 
Other. The superintendent of insurance may suspend or revoke 
such licenses for any "fraudulent or dishonest conduct" after due 
notice and opportunity for hearing is given the licensee. 
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Suggested Legislation for Colorado 
Proposed legislation for the regulation of professional bail 
bondsmen in Colorado has been studied and considered favorably by the 
Legislative Council Criminal Code Committee. 
Analysis of Proposed Legislation 
Following is an analysis of the major provisions of the 
proposed legislation to regulate bail bondsmen and their key employees. 
Licensing is limited to those bondsmen who operate in counties with 
50,000 population or more because of the consensus of opinion that the 
problem is confined primarily to metropolitan areas. 
Professional Bondsmen, Solicitors, and Runners. Professional 
bondsmen, soliciting agents, and runners, as defined in the act, would 
be licensed. A professional bondsman is defined as any person who 
shall furnish bail, whether for compensation or otherwise, in five or 
more criminal cases per year in any court in counties having a 
population of 50,000 or more, or any person who furnishes such bail 
in criminal cases in any two or more counties, _one of which has a 
population of 50,000 or more. A soliciting agent is defined as any 
person who as an employee of a professional bondsman or as an independent 
contractor shall solicit, advertise, or actively seek bail bond business 
for· or in behalf of a professional bondsman. A runner is defined as 
a person employed'by a professional bondsman to assist him: 1) in 
presenting the defendant in court when required; 2) in the apprehension 
and surrender of the~defendant to the court; or 3) in keeping the 
defendant under necessary surveillance. Insurers as defined in the act 
are exempt from this provision. 
License Fee. The annual fee for a professional bail bondsman's 
license would be $100. The annual license fee for soliciting agents 
and runners would be $10. 
Responsible Agency. The department of insurance is vested 
with the authority and responsibility of licensing and regulation of 
bail bondsmen, soliciting agents, and runners. 
License Application and Requirements 
A license applicant (whether for bondsman, soliciting agent, 
or runner) must provide the following information on forms provided by 
the insurance department: 1) full name, age, residence during previous 
12 months, occupation and business address; 2) complete financial 
statement; 3) whether he has ever been convicted of a felony or a 
crime involving moral turpitude; 4) a set of fingerprints certified 
by a law enforcement official .and a full face photograph; 5) evidence 
of good moral character; and 6) such other information as the depart-
ment may require. Each professional bondsman would be required to 
post a qualification bond of $5,000 if he furnishes bail in less than 
50 criminal cases. If he furnishes bail in more than 50 criminal 
cases, the amount of the qualification bond would be $10,000. 
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Reports. Each professional bondsman licensed under the 
proposed act would be required to file a report under oath semi-annually 
with the insurance department. These reports would be filed prior to 
January 31 and July 31 of each year and would include: 1) the names 
of the persons for whom the bondsman has become surety; 2) the dates 
and amounts of the bonds issued and the courts in which such bonds were 
posted; 3) the fee charged for each bond; 4) the amount of collateral 
or security received from insured principals or persons acting in their 
behalf; and 5) financial statements, other business activities, names 
and addresses of soliciting agents and runners if any employed, and 
any other information required by the department. 
Restrictions on Licensing. No firm, partnership, association, 
or corporation, as such, would be licensed. Licenses would also be 
denied to: 1) any person convicted of a felony or any crime involving 
moral turpitude; 2) any person not a resident of the state; 3) any 
person under age of 21; and 4) any person engaged as a law enforcement 
or judicial official. 
License Denial, Suspension, and Revocation, If the depart-
ment denies, suspends, revokes or refuses to renew any license, the 
aggrieved person would be given the opportunity for a hearing subjec1 to judicial review as provided in the administrative procedures act. 
The insurance department would have the authority to deny, 
suspend, revoke or refuse to renew a license for-a bondsman, soliciting 
agent, or runner for the following reasons: 
1) any cause for which the issuance of the license could 
have been refused had it then existed and been known to the department; 
2) failure to pose a qualified bond in the required amount 
with the department during the period such person is engaged in the 
business within this state, or if such bond has been posted, the 
forfeiture or cancellation of such bond; 
3) material misstatement, misrepresentation, or fraud in 
obtaining the license; 
4) misappropriation, conversion, or unlawful withholding of 
moneys belonging to insured principals or others; 
5) fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of the 
business under the license; 
6) willful failure to comply with, or willful violation of 
any provisions of the act or of any proper order, rule, or regulation 
of the department or any court; 
7) any activity prohibited in the act; and 
8) default in payment to the court, should any bond issued 
by such bondsman be forfeited by order of the court. 
2. Article 16, Chapter 3, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953 (1960 Perm. 
Supp. ). 
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Prohibited Activities and Penalties, It would be illegal for 
any licensee to engage in any of the following activities: 
1) specify, suggest, or advise the employment of any 
particular attorney to represent his principal; 
2) pay a fee or rebate, or to give or promise to give 
anything of value to any law enforcement or judicial officer or employee; 
3) pay a fee or rebate or to give anything of value to an 
attorney in bail bond matters, except in defense of any action on a 
bond, or as counsel to represent such bondsman, his agent, or employees; 
4) pay a fee or rebate, or to give or promise to give 
anything of value to the person on whose bond he is surety; 
5) 
he is surety, 
or premium on 
security; 
accept anything of value from a person on whose bond 
or from others on behalf of such person, except the fee 
the bond, but the bondsman may accept collateral 
6) ,coerce, suggest, aid and abet, offer promise of favor, 
or threaten any person on whose bond he is surety or offers to become 
surety, to induce that person to commit any crime; and 
7) 
Colorado. 
secure any bond with real property located outside of 
·A licensee convicted of any of the activities listed above 
would be ~uilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not more than 
$1,000 or a jail sentence of not more than one year or both. Any person 
who attempts or who acts as a professional bail bondsman, soliciting 
agent, or runner and who is not licensed would be subject to the same 
fine and imprisonment. 
Text of Proposed Legislation 
BY 
A BILL FOR AN ACT 
RELATING TO BAIL, BAIL BONDS, AND BAIL BONDSMEN. 
BILL NO. 
B.a. ll Enacted b:t. ~ General Assembly Qf. 1.h..e. State Qf. Colorado: 
SECTION 1. Chapter 72, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, as 
amended, is hereby amended by the addition of the following NEW ARTICLE: 
ARTICLE 22 
Bail Bondsmen 
72-22-1. Definitions. The following terms when used in this 
article shall have the following meanings: 
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(1) "Department" shall mean the department of insurance. 
( 2) "Commissioner" sha 11 mean the commissioner of insura nee. 
(3) "Insurer" shall mean any domestic or foreign corporation, 
association, partnership, or individual engaged in the business of 
insurance or suretyship which has qualified to transact surety or 
casualty business in this state. 
(4) "Professional bondsman" shall mean any person who shall 
furnish bail, whether for compensation or otherwise, in five or more 
criminal cases in any court or courts in any county having a population 
of fifty thousand or more, as determined by the latest decennial federal 
census,· during any one calendar year; or any person who furnishes such 
bail in criminal cases in any two or more counties, one of which 
has a population of fifty thousand or more. 
(5) "Soliciting agent" shall mean any person who, as an 
agent or employee of a professional bondsman, or as an independent 
contractor, for compensation or otherwise, shall solicit, advertise, 
or actively seek bail bond business for or in behalf of a professional 
bondsman. 
(6) "Runner" shall mean a person employed by a professional 
bondsman for the purpose of assisting the professional bondsman in 
presenting the defendant in court when required, or to assist in the 
apprehending and surrender of the defendant to the court, or in 
keeping the defendant under necessary surveillance. Nothing herein 
shall affect the right of professional bondsmen to have counsel or to 
ask assistance of law enforcement officers. 
(7) "Obligor" shall mean any person, assoc1'at1·on partnersh1°p , , 
or corporation who shall execute a bail bond either as principal or 
surety. 
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72-22-2. License reguired - enforcement. (1) No person 
shall act in the capacity of professional bondsman, soliciting agent, 
or runner, as defined in 72-22-1, or perform any of the functions, 
duties, or powers of the same unless that person shall be qualified 
and licensed as provided in this article; provided that the terms of 
this article shall not apply to insurers regulated under article 3, 
chapter 72, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, as amended. Any person 
other than a professional bondsman as defined herein may furnish such 
bail as may be approved by the judge. 
(2) No license shall be issued except in compliance with 
this article and none shall be issued except to an individual. No 
firm, partnership, association, or corporation, as such, shall be so 
licensed. No person who has been convicted of a felony or any crime 
involving moral turpitude, or who is not a resident of this state, or 
who is under twenty-one years of age shall be issued a license here-
under. No person engaged as a law enforcement or judicial official 
shall be licensed hereunder. 
(3) The department is vested with the authority to enforce 
the provisions of this article. The department shall have authority 
, to make investigations and promulgate such rules and regulations as 
may be necessary for the enforcement of this article. 
(4) Each license issued hereunder shall expire annually on 
January 31, unless revoked or suspended prior thereto by the depart-
ment, or upon notice served upon the commissioner by the insurer or 
the employer or user of any soliciting agent or runner that such insurer, 
employer, or user has cancelled the licensee's authority to act for 
or in behalf of such insurer, employer, or user. 
(5) The department shall prepare and deliver to each 
licensee a pocket card showing the name, address, and classification 
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of such licensee and shall certify that such person is a licensed 
professional bondsman, soliciting agent, or runner. 
72-22-3. License requirements - application - qualification 
bond - forfeiture. (l} Any person desiring to engage in the business 
of professional bondsman, soliciting agent, or runner in this state 
shall apply to the department for a license on forms prepared and 
furnished by the department. Such application for a license, or renewal 
thereof, shall set forth, ~nder oath, the following information: 
(a} Full name, age, residence during the previous twelve 
months, occupation, and business address of the applicant. 
(b} Complete financial statement. 
(c} Whether the applicant has ever been convicted of a 
felony or a crime involving moral .turpitude. 
(d} Such other information, including, but not limited to, a 
complet~ set of fingerprints certified to by an authorized law 
enforcement official and a full face photograph, as may be required 
by this article or by the department. 
(e} In the case of a professional bondsman, a statement 
that he will actively engage in the bail bond business. 
(f} In the case of a soliciting agent or a runner, a 
statement that he will be employed or used by only one professional 
bondsman and that such professional bondsman will supervise his work 
and be responsible for his conduct in his work. Such professional 
bondsman shall sign the application of each soliciting agent and 
runner employed or used by him. 
(2) Each applicant shall satisfy the department of his good 
moral character by furnishing references thereof. 
(3) Each applicant for professional bondsman shall be 
required to post a qualification bond in the amount of five thousand 
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dollars with the department, provided that any such professional 
bondsman making application for license renewal, as herein provided, 
who shall have furnished bail in fifty or more criminal cases shall 
post such bond in the amount of ten thousand dollars. The qualifi-
cation bond shall meet such specifications as may be required and 
approved by the department. Such bond shall be conditioned upon the 
full and prompt payment on any bail bond issued by such professional 
bondsman into the court ordering such bond forfeited. The bond shall 
be to the state of Colorado in favor of any court of this state, 
whether municipal, justice of the peace, county, superior, district, 
or other court. In the event that any bond issued by a professional 
bondsman is declared forfeited by a court of proper jurisdiction, and 
the amount of the bond is not paid within a reasonable time, to be 
determined by the court, but in no event to exceed ninety days, such 
court shall order the department to declare the qualification bond of 
such professional bondsman to be forfeited. The department shall then 
order the surety on the qualification bond to deposit with the court 
an amount equal to the amount of the bond issued by such professional 
bondsman and declared forfeited by the court, or the amount of the 
qualification bond, whichever is the smaller amount. The department 
shall suspend the license of such professional bondsman until such 
time as another qualification bond in the required amount is posted with 
the department. The suspension of the license of the professional 
bondsman shall also suspend the license of each soliciting agent and 
runner employed or used by such professional bondsman. 
(4) The department shall, upon receipt of the license 
application, the required fee, and proof of good moral character, and, 
in the case of a professional bondsman, an approved qualification 
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bond in the required amount, issue to the applicant a license to do 
business as a professional bondsman, soliciting agent, or runner, as 
the case may be. 
(5) No licensed professional bondsman shall have in his 
employ in the bail bond business any person who could not qualify for 
a license under this article, nor shall any licensed professional 
bondsman have as a partner or associate in such business any person 
who could not so qualify. 
72-22-4. License fees. Each license application and 
application for license renewal to engage in the business of 
professional bondsman shall be accompanied by a fee of one hundred 
dollars. Each license application and application for license renewal 
to engage in the business of soliciting agent or runner shall be 
accompanied by a fee of ten dollars. 
72-22-5. Semi-annual reports required. Beginning January 
31, 1964, each professional bondsman licensed under the provisions of 
this article shall, under oath, report semi-annually to the department 
on forms prescribed by the department. The reports shall be made 
prior to January 31 and July 31 of each year and shall contain the 
following detailed information for the preceding calendar year: 
(1) The names of the persons for whom such professional 
bondsman has become surety. 
(2) The date and amount of the bonds issued by such bondsman, 
and the court or courts in which such bonds were posted. 
(3) The fee for each bond charged by such professional 
bondsman. 
(4) The amount of collateral or security received from 
insured principals or persons acting on behalf of such principals by 
such professional bondsman on each bond. 
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(5) Such further information as the department may require, 
including, but not limited to, residence and business addresses, 
financial statements, other business activities, and the name and 
address of each soliciting agent and runner, if any, employed or used-
by such professional bondsman. 
72-22-6. Denial, suspension, revocation, and refusal to 
renew license - hearing. (1) The department may deny, suspend, revoke, 
or refuse to renew, as may be appropriate, the license of any person 
engaged in the business of professional bondsman, soliciting agent, 
or runner for any of the following reasons: 
(a) Any cause for which the issuance of the license could 
have been refused had it then existed and been known to the department. 
(b) Failure to pose a qualified bond in the required amount 
with the department during the period such person is engaged in the 
business within this state, or, if such bond has been posted, the 
forfeiture or cancellation of such bond. 
(c) Material misstatement, misrepresentation, or fraud in 
obtaining the license. 
(d) Misappropriation, conversion, or unlawful withholding 
of moneys belonging to insured principals or others and received in 
the conduct of business under the license. 
(e) Fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of 
the business under the license. 
(f) Willful failure to comply with, or willful violation of 
any provisions of this article or of any proper order, rule, or 
regulation of the department or any court of this state. 
(g) Any activity prohibited in 72-22-9 (1). 
(h) Default in payment to the court should any bond issued 
by such bondsman be forfeited by order of the court. 
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(2) If the department shall deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse 
to renew any such license, the aggrieved person shall be given an 
opportunity for a hearing subject to judicial review as provided in 
article 16, chapter 3, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953 (1960 Perm. 
Supp.). 
72-22-7. Notice to courts - to the department. (1) The 
department shall furnish to all courts in this state the names of 
all professional bondsmen licensed under the provisions of this article, 
and shall forthwith notify such courts of the suspension, revocation, 
or reinstatement of any bondsman's license to engage in such business. 
No court shall accept bond from a professional bondsman unless such 
bondsman is licensed under the provisions of this article and unless 
such bondsman shall exhibit to such court a valid pocket card or license 
issued by the department and the license of such bondsman shall not have 
been suspended or revoked. 
(2) The clerk of each court of this state shall report to 
the commissioner prior to January 31 and July 31 of each year the 
name of each bondsman furnishing bail in such court and the number 
of bonds posted and outstanding by each such bondsman. 
72-22-8. Maximum commission or fee. No professional 
bondsman shall charge for his premium, commission, or fee an amount 
more than ten per cent of the amount of bail furnished by him. 
72-22-9. Prohibited activities - penalties. (1) It shall 
be unlawful for any licensee hereunder to engage in any of the 
following activities: 
(a) Specify, suggest, or advise the employment of any 
pdrticular attorney to represent his principal. 
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{b) Pay a fee or rebate, or to give or promise to give 
anything of value to a jailer, policeman, peace officer, clerk, deputy 
clerk, any other employee of any court, district attorney or any of 
his employees, or any person who has power to arrest or to hold any 
person in custody. 
{c) Pay a fee or rebate or to give anything of value to an 
attorney in bail bond matters, except in defense of any action on a 
bond, or as counsel to represent such bondsman, ·his agent, or employees. 
(d} Pay a fee or rebate, or to give or promise to give 
anything of value to the person on whose bond he is surety. 
(e) Accept anything of value from a person on whose bond he 
is surety, or from others on behalf of such person, except the fee or 
premium on the bond, but the bondsman may accept collateral security 
or other indemnity. 
(f) Coerce, suggest, aid and abet, offer promise of favor, 
or threaten any person on whose bond he is surety or offers to become 
surety, to induce that person to commit any crime. 
(g} Secure any bond with real property located outside this 
state. 
(2) Any licensee who violates any provision of subsection 
(1) of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon 
conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not more than one thousand 
dollars, imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, 
or both such fine and imprisonment. 
(3) Any person who acts or attempts to act as a professional 
bondsman, soliciting agent, or runner as defined in this article and 
who is not licensed as such under this article shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not 
more than one thousand dollars, imprisonment in the county jail for 
not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment. 
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72-22-10. Penalty for violation of bond conditions. Any 
person charged with a criminal violation who has obtained, his release 
from custody by having a professional bondsman, surety company, or 
person other than himself furnish his bail bond, and who fails to 
appear in court at the time and place ordered by the court, with intent 
to avoid prosecution and trial shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, 
upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars, imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 
one year, or both such fine and imprisonment. 
72-22-11. Forfeiture - exoneration - continuance of bonds. 
(l)(a) If there is a breach of condition of a bond, the court shall 
declare a forfeiture of the bail. 
(b) The court may direct that a forfeiture be set aside, 
upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears that 
justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture. 
(c) By entering into a bond the obligor submits to the 
jurisdiction of the court. His liability may be enforced without the 
necessity of an independent action when a forfeiture. has not been set 
aside. The court shall order the issuance of a citation directed to 
the obligor to show cause, if any there be, why judgment should not 
be entered against him forthwith and execution issued thereon. Said 
citation may be served personally or by certified mail upon the 
obligor directed to the address given in the bond. Hearing on the 
citation shall be held not less than 20 days after service. The 
defendant 1 s attorney and the prosecuting attorney shall be given 
notice of the hearing. 
(d) After entry of such judgment, the court may remit it 
in whole or in part under the conditions applying to the setting 
aside of forfeiture in paragraph (b) of this subsection. If a 
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bond forfeiture has been paid into the general fund of the county, 
the commissioners thereof shall be notified of any application for 
remission. 
(2) The obliger shall be exonerated as follows: (1) When 
the condition of the bond has been satisfied; or (2) When the amount 
of the forfeiture has been paid; or (3) Upon surrender of the defendant 
into custody before judgment upon an order to show cause, upon payment 
of all costs occasioned thereby. The obliger may seize and surrender 
the defendant to the sheriff of the county wherein the bond shall be 
taken, and it shall be the duty of such sheriff, on· such surrender 
and delivery to him of a certified copy of the bond by which the 
ohli9or is bound, to take such person into custody, and by writing 
acknowledge such surrender. 
(3) In the discretion of the trial court and with the 
consent of the surety or sureties, the same bond may be continued until 
the final disposition of the case in the trial court or pending 
disposition of the case on review. 
SECTION 2. Effective date. This act shall become effective 
on July l, 1963. 
SECTION 3. Safety clause. The general assembly hereby 
finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. 
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COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 
In district court criminal actions, statutory authority is 
given the judge to appoint counsel for indigent defendants. 1 This 
authority is permissive rather than mandatory, but if counsel is 
appointed he receives a fee fixed by the judge and paid by the county 
in which the case is tried. 2 There are no provisions for court-appointed 
counsels in cases before county, juvenile, and municipal courts. The 
method of providing counsel for indigent defendants in Colorado has 
been criticized for several shortcomings: 1) Counsel is provided only 
for district court defendants when there is often need for counsel in 
other courts as well. 2) Usually counsel is not appointed until the 
defendant is arraigned, and to prepare an adequate defense, counsel 
should be appointed as shortly after arrest as possible. 3) The alleged 
violator is entitled to the best possible defense, but often 
inexperienced attorneys are appointed. 4) The present system does not 
provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete 
defense. 5) In some counties, the fees paid are too small for the work 
involved in preparing an adequate defense. 6) In some of the larger 
counties where the fees paid are more commensurate with the work 
required, the total cost is too great for the services provided. 
Other Methods of Providing Counsel 
These criticisms have also been made of the assigned-counsel 
system in other states. As a result, several alternate approaches to 
providing counsel for indigent defendants have been developed. These 
include the voluntary-defender s3stem, the public-defender system, and the mixed private-public system. 
These systems may be described as follows: 4 
The Voluntary-Defender System 
Voluntary-defender organizations ... iar_g/ private, 
non-governmental organizations representing 
indigent defendants accused of crime. They may 
or may not be affiliated with a civil legal aid 
organization ... 
The voluntary-defender system is characterized 
by what may be termed the "law-office" approach 
to the representation of the indigent defendant. 
While the assigned-counsel system generally 
results in a number of different lawyers being 
assigned from time to time to represent indigent 
1. 39-7-29, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Equal Justice for the Accused, Special Committee of the New York 
City Bar Association and the National Legal Aid Association, 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 1959, p. 25. 
4. Ibid., pp. 50-52. 
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defendants, the voluntary-defender system creates 
a law office which the court may assign to represent 
any and all indigent defendants. These law offices 
vary in size from the substantial organizations of 
New York and Philadelphia to smaller offices such as 
New Orleans. Nevertheless, under this system the 
function of defending indigents is centralized in 
a professional defense unit. 
Voluntary-defender offices are privately controlled 
and supported. Private control is usually achieved 
through an independent governing body to which the 
staff of the organization is responsible. Financial 
support is sought either through independent efforts 
to secure charitable donations or through partici-
pation in cooperative charitable efforts such as 
the Community Chest. In some instances, both 
methods are used. 
The voluntary-defender system may utilize 
trained, salaried investigators to assist its 
legal staff. It may also be aided by volunteers 
from private law offices or local law schools ... 
The Public-Defender System 
The public defender, like the public prosecutor, 
is a public official. The former is retained by 
the government to fulfill society's duty to see 
that all defendants, irrespective of means, have 
equal protection under the law; the latter is 
retained by the government to serve society's 
interest in law enforcement. Generally, whenever 
there is a public-defender office, that office 
represents all indigent defendants in those 
courts in 'Nhich the public defender regularly 
appears. 
Public-defender systems vary in size from 
large offices such as those in Los Angeles County 
and Alameda County, California, to a single-lawyer 
office such as the public defender in the New 
Haven District in Connecticut. Some, such as 
certain offices in California, have facilities for 
investigation; others have only limited funds 
and facilities. 
The staff of public-defender offices may be 
selected through civil service procedures, 
appointed by the judiciary or the appropriate local 
officials, or elected. On the whole, the legal 
staffs of public-defender offices appear to be 
relatively stable and in a number of instances 
these staffs have developed the characteristics 
of career services. 
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The larger public-defender offices receive 
office facilities from the government. However, 
.smaller public-defender offices often are 
operated from the private law office of the 
attorney serving as public defender. 
Public-defender systems are financed by public 
funds. In some instances, they are treated 
in the same manner as other government 
institutions and submit a yearly budget to 
the proper appropriating body. Others operate 
on a fixed retainer basis, the public defender 
being paid a yearly salary or fee for his 
services and being expected to finance his office 
expenses from his compensation. 
The Mixed Private-Public System 
The cities of Rochester and Buffalo, New York, 
have a mixed private-public system which is 
unique in the United States. 
Rochester has had for some time a Legal Aid 
Society which is active in civil cases. In 
1954, pursuant to an enabling statute, the 
Legal Aid.Society requested and received from 
the Board of Supervisors of Monroe County an 
appropriation to establish a defender service to 
function in the inferior criminal courts of 
the county. A lawyer employed by the Society 
has since performed this function. 
Thus, Rochester furnishes counsel to the 
indigent defendant in lower court criminal cases 
within the organizational framework of a private 
legal aid society and supports this system by 
public funds. Buffalo has recently instituted 
a similar program of operation. 
Recommendations for the Defense of the Indigent in Colorado 
In both the 1957 and 1959 sessions of the General Assembly~ 
a bill was introduced to establish a public defender system in 
judicial districts with more than 50,000 population. A public defender 
was to be appointed for each such district by the governor from 
persons recommended to him by the district judge or judges. The 
salaries set for public defenders were comparable to those for district 
attorneys. In neither session was this measure approved by the 
General Assembly. 
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Permissive Public Defender System 
In September, 1960, the Metropolitan Public Defender Com-
mittee was formed with its membership composed of representatives 
from the Legal Aid Society, Denver Mental Health Association, League 
of Women Voters, Catholic Welfare, American Civil Liberties Union, 
and other organizations. After considerable study, this group . 
recommended legislation patterned after the Model Defender Act, which 
was drafted by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association in 
conjunction with the American Bar Association. This model act was 
adopted in 1959 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws. 
This legislation in slightly modified form was introduced 
in both houses of the General Assembly in 1961 but was not adopted. 
Supporters of the proposed measure still are of the opinion that this 
legislation is a desirable step toward the adequate provision of 
counsel for indigent defenders, and there are plans to submit this 
proposal to the Forty-fourth General Assembly in 196B. 
This legislation differs from the measures introduced in 
1957 and 1959 in three important respects: 1) The act is permissive 
rather than mandatory. 2) All counties, singly or in groups, may 
establish a defender system, instead of limiting the office of public 
defender to judicial districts of a certain size. 3) The public 
defender would be authorized to represent indigent defendants charged 
with crimes in county and municipal court, as well as in district 
court. In addition, he would also be authorized to represent 
juveniles in delinquency actions. 
In those counties where the office of public defender is 
established as permitted in this act, the county commissioners would 
appoint the defender, set his salary, and provide adequate office space 
and supplies. The commissioners would also determine the number of 
additional professional and clerical staff members, prescribe their 
method of appointment, and set their salaries. If a public defender 
office were established on a multi-county basis, the county commissioners 
of the several counties would make the appointment of the defender 
jointly and devise a formula for sharing the expense of the office. 
In the City and County of Denver, the bill provides that the public 
defender would be appointed by the city council. 
Even if the office of public defender is established, the 
court would have the authority to appoint an attorney other than the 
public defender in the same way as now provided by law in district 
courts. If the defender were appointed, however, it would be his 
duty to represent the indigent defendant and provide counsel at 
every stage of the proceedings following arrest. 
The proposed act also would permit the court to appoint a 
representative of a local legal aid and/or defender organization as 
counsel, if the county does not wish to establish the office. 
Proponents of this measure feel that the permissive and 
flexible provisions will make it possible for each local area to 
adopt a system tailored to meet its own needs. Those areas which do 
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not desire to take advantage of any of the permissive features of the 
proposed legislation would continue to appoint counsel for indigent 
defendants in district court criminal actions as already provided by 
statute. 
Text of Proposed Legislation 
A BILL FOR AN ACT 
RELATING TO PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
Be It Enacted J2.y the General Assembly of the State of Colorado: 
SECTION 1. Definitions. As used in this act, unless the 
context clearly indicates otherwise: 
(1) The term "governing authority" shall mean the board of 
county commissioners in the case of a county, and the city council in 
the case of a city and county. 
(2) The term "county" shall include a city and county. 
SECTION 2. Permissive authority to establish office of 
public defender - guaiification. In any county the governing authority 
may establish the office of public defender. Any county may join with 
one or more counties to establish one office of public defender to 
serve those counties. The public defender shall be a qualified attorney, 
licensed to practice law in this state, and shall be appointed by the 
governing authority. 
SECTION 3. Representation of ind iqent persons. ( 1) The 
public defender shall represent as counsel, without charge, each 
indigent person who is under arrest for or charged with committing a 
felony, if: 
(a) The defendant requests it; or 
(b) The court, on its own motion or otherwise, so orders, 
and the defendant does not affirmatively reject of record the 
opportunity to be so represented. 
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(2) The public defender may represent indigent persons 
charged in district or county court with crimes which constitute 
misdemeanors, juveniles upon whom a delinquency petition has been 
filed, and persons charged with municipal code violations as such 
defender in his discretion may determine, subject to review by the 
court, if: 
(a) The defendant, or his parent or legal guardian in 
delinquency actions, requests it; or 
(b) The court, on its own motion or otherwise, so orders, 
and the defendant, or his parent or legal guardian ~n delinquency 
actions, does not affirmatively reject of record the opportunity to 
be so represented. 
(3) The determination of indigency shall be made by the 
public defender, subject to review by the court. 
SECTION 4. Term of public defender - assistant attorneys 
and employees - compensation. (1) The term and compensation of the 
public defender shall be fixed by the governing authority. 
· (2) The public defender may appoint as many assistant 
attorneys, clerks, investigators, stenographers, and other employees 
as the governing authority considers necessary to .enable him to carry 
out his responsibilities. Appointments under this section shall be 
made in the manner prescribed by the governing authority. An assistant 
attorney must be a qualified attorney licensed to practice law in this 
state. 
(3) The compensation of persons appointed under subsection 
(2) of this section shall be fixed by the governing authority. 
SECTION 5. Duties of public defender. When representing 
an indigent person, the public defender shall (1) counsel and defend 
- 60 -
him, whether he is held in custody or charged with a criminal offense, 
at every stage of the proceedings following arrest; and (2) prosecute 
any appeals or other remedies before or after conviction that he 
considers to be in the interest of ju~tice. 
SECTION 6. Appointment of other attorney in place of public 
defender. For cause, the court may, on its own motion or upon the 
application of the public defender or the indigent person, appoint an 
attorney other than the public defender to represent him at any stage 
of the proceedings or on appeal. The attorney shall be awarded 
reasonable compensation and reimbursement for expenses necessarily 
incurred, to be fixed by the court and paid by the county. 
SECTION 7. Report of public defender. The public defender 
shall make an annual report to the governing authority covering all 
cases handled by his office during the preceding year. 
SECTION 8. Office space, equipment, etc. - expenses- sharing 
by counties. The governing authority shall provide office space, 
furniture, equipment, expenses, and supplies for the use of the public 
defender suitable for the conduct of the business of his office. 
However, the governing authority in any case may provide for an 
allowance in place of facilities. Each such item is a charge against 
the county in which the services were rendered. If the public 
defender serves more than one county, expenses that are properly 
allocable to the business of more than one of those counties shall be 
prorated among the counties concerned, as shall be agreed upon by the 
governing authorities of the counties concerned. 
SECTION 9. Absence of office of public defender. If the 
governing authority does not create the office of public defender, then, 
at county expense, either: 
- 61 -
(1) The services prescribed by this act may be provided by 
a qualified attorney appointed by the court in each case and awarded 
reasonable compensation and expenses by the court; or 
(2) The services prescribed by this act may be provided 
through nonprofit legal aid or defender organizations designated by the 
governing authority, which organizations may be awarded reasonable 
compensation and expenses by the governing authority or courts. 
SECTION 10. Repeal. 39-7-29 and 39-7-31, Colorado Revised 
Statutes 1953, are hereby repealed. 
SECTION 11. Short title. This act may be cited as the 
"Colorado Defender Act". 
SECTION 12. Effective date. This act shall take effect on 
July 1, 1963. 
SECTION 13. Safety clause. The general assembly hereby 
finds, determines, and declares that this act is .necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. 
Fees Paid Court-Appointed Attorneys 
The last comprehensive survey of fees paid court-appointed 
attorneys was made by the Legislative Council Administration of Justice 
Committee. This survey covered calendar year 1958. At that time only 
three judicial districts of the 12 for which data was compiled had 
averaged court-appointed attorney fees of more than $100 (2nd, 17th, 
18th districts). In five judicial districts (3rd, 7th, 8th, 15th, 
16th), the average fee was less than $75.~ 
Many of the attorneys and judges who appeared before the 
Administration of Justice Committee at its regional meetings complained 
of the low fees paid but pointed out that the county commissioners 
refused to allow larger amounts. The attorneys stated generally that 
they tried to do an adequate job, even if the fees were not commensurate 
5. Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legislative Council, 
Research Publication No. 49, December 1960, p. 151. 
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with the work involved. However, many felt 6hat they lacked sufficient time for investigation to do a thorough job. 
Defendants Represented by Counsel in Criminal Cases 
The Administration of Justice Committee found that one-fourth 
of the defendants in criminal cases filed in the district courts in 
1958 were not represented by counsel. In three judicial districts 
{11th, 12th, and 14th), more than three-fourths of the defendants 
were not represented by counsel, and there were three others {4th, 
9th, and 16th) where counsel appeared for less than half of the 
defendants. In contrast, there were five districts {2nd, 3rd, 8th, 
15th, and 17th) where 88 per cent or more of the defendants had 
attorneys. In one of these districts {15th), all defendants were 
represented by counsel.? 
Sixty per cent of the defendants represented by counsel had 
court-appointed attorneys. This proportion variea from almost 80 per 
cent in the 3rd District to 12.5 per cent in the 12th District. In 
a number of cases in which no counsel appeared, the docket analysis 
shows that a plea of guilty was entered on arraignment and that no 
counsel was requested, Some criminal cases in which there was no 
representation by counsel were dismissed at the request of the district 
attorney without prosecution, and in a few instances the alleged 
offender had not been apprehended or had been returned to prison for 
parole violation rather than prosecuted on a new charge.B 
Obstacles and Objections to Public Defender System 
One of the major obstacles to adopting a public defender 
system in most of the judicial districts is the small number of criminal 
cases filed each year. Only eight judicial districts have more than 
100 cr.iminal cases filed annually. Proponents of the public defender 
system contend that the appointment of a part-time public defender and 
assistants in these districts at salaries equal to those received by 
the district attorney and his assistants would provide better defense 
counsel at less cost. At the Administration of Justice Committee's 
regional meetings, very few attorneys and judges in non-urban districts 
wished to adopt the public defender system in their areas, although 
conceding that perhaps such a system would work in Denver and the 
surrounding counties. Expense and the small number of criminal cases 
were cited as the reasons why a defender system would not be satisfactory 
in rural areas. 
There have also been objections to the adoption of the public 
defender system in Denver and other metropolitan areas. Some judges 
and attorneys feel that adequate defense is now being provided and at 
less cost than through a public defender's office. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid., p. 152. 
8. Ibid., p. 153. 
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INCHOATE CRIMES 
Inchoate, as defined by Webster, is an adjective meaning: 
recently or just begun being in the first stages, or rudimentary. 
Inchoate crimes are, therefore, not completed crimes but proposed 
criminal acts in their initial stages. Included in this category are 
attempted crimes and solicitation or attempted solicitation of others 
to commit or assist in the commission of a criminal act. Colorado has 
no general attempt or solicitation statutes, although many statutes 
relating to a specific crime also contain a penalty for attempt or 
solicitation. In considering possible general attempt and solicitation 
legislation, the Criminal Code Committee has examined the legislation 
and the supreme court cases related thereto of some of the states 




Wisconsin attempt legislation was selected for examination 
because Wisconsin adopted a new criminal code in 1955 after six years 
of work by legislative committees aided by the University of Wisconsin 
Law School and the Wisconsin Bar Association. The new criminal code 
has been in effect long enough so that a body of case law has 
developed interpreting various provisions including the sections on 
attempt. Following is the Wisconsin attempt statute: 
Attempt Legislation. Whoever attempts to commit a 
felony or a battery as defined by section 940.20 or theft as defined 
by section 943.20 may be fined or imprisoned or both not to exceed 
one-half the maximum penalty for the completed crime; except that for 
an attempt to commit a crime for which the penalty is life imprisonment, 
the actor may be imprisoned not more than 30 years. 
An attempt to commit a crime requires that the actor 
have an intent to perform acts and attain a result which, if accomplished, 
would constitute such crime and that he does acts toward the commission 
of the crime which demonstrate unequivocally, under all the circumstances, 
that he formed that intent and would commit the crime except for the 
intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor. 
Post-1955 Wisconsin Supreme Court Cases on Attempt. There 
are several post-1955 cases dealing with this general attempt statute 
and matters relat~d to it. These cases are discussed separately below: 
l ) State v. Carli, 2 Wisconsin 2d 429, 86 N.W. 
2d 434 (1957). The defendant was charged 
with mayhem and attempted mayhem, allegedly 
committed by biting off the complaining 
witness's ear during a bar room brawl. He 
was convicted of assault with intent to do 
great bodily harm, and on appeal he contended 




ground that assault with intent to do great 
bodily harm is not a lesser offense included 
in a charge of mayhem. His conviction was 
affirmed. From this case it would seem to 
follow that by enacting a general attempt 
statute making it a crime to attempt to 
commit any felony, Wisconsin did not do away 
with the doctrine allowing conviction of a 
lesser included offense -- even in a case such 
as this where there is not only a charge o( 
the completed crime of mayhem but also a 
charge of an attempt to commit mayhem. 
State v. Bronston, 7 Wisconsin 2d 627, 97 
N.W. 2d 504 (1959). The defendant entered 
a liquor store and struck the woman attendant 
on the head with a wrench and then fled when 
she regained consciousness and threw a bottle 
of whiskey at him. The defendant was charged 
with aggravated battery and attempted robbery 
and was convicted of both by the trial court. 
On appeal the supreme court reversed the 
conviction of aggravated battery on the_ 
ground that the harm caused the injured woman 
was not up to the statutory standard of "great 
bodily harm" which must actually be caused 
(not merely intended) in an aggravated battery 
case. However, the supreme court directed the 
trial court to enter a judgment of guilty of 
an attempt to commit aggravated battery, 
apparently on the theory that the attempt was 
a lesser included offense. In addition, the 
conviction of attempted robbery was sustained. 
State v. Damms, 9 Wisconsin 2d 183, 100 
2d N.W. 2d 592 (1960) is destined to become 
a leading case on the law of attempt in 
Wisconsin. The charge was attempt to commit 
murder in the first degree. Damms had held 
a gun to his estranged wife's head and pulled 
the trigger, but the gun had not fired because 
it was not loaded. He had left the clip 
containing cartridges in his car. Damms was 
convicted in the trial court. On appeal the 
chief issue was whether the fact that it was 
actually impossible for Damms to commit murder 
with the unloaded gun precluded convicting 
him of an attempt to murder. The court felt that 
this issue boiled down to whether the 
impossibility of completing the target crime 
because the gun was unloaded fell within the 
statutory words, "except for the intervention 
of ... some other extraneous factor." 100 N.W. 
2d at 594. 
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In holding that this requirement of the 
statute was satisfied -- and thus holding 
the fact that the gun was unloaded to be 
an "extraneous factor," the court followed 
the majority view that impossibility not 
apparent to the defendant does not absolve 
him of an attempt to commit an intended 
crime. Said the majority of the court: 
"An unequivocal act accompanied 
by intent should be sufficient to 
constitute a criminal attempt. 
Insofar as the actor knows, he has 
done everything necessary to insure 
the commission of the crime intended, 
and he should not escape punishment 
because of the fortuitous circumstance 
that by reason of some fact unknown to 
him it was impossible to effectuate 
the intended result." 
The court rejected the defense argument 
that because a subsection expressly stating 
that impossibility brought about by mistake 
of fact or law was not a defense was 
eliminated during revision of the code, it 
should follow that the legislature intended 
impossibility to be a defense regardless of 
the defendant's awareness. (Of course if 
the defendant is aware that it is impossible 
to complete the target crime, he does not 
have the reguisite intent for an attempt 
conviction.) 
State v. Dunn, 10 Wisconsin 2d 447, 103 
N.W. 2d 36 (1960), involved a conviction 
of attempt to murder where the defendant 
had hidden in the back seat of his lover's 
husband's car, and when the husband entered, 
the defendant had pulled a cloth bag over 
his face. Defendant also had with him some 
wire with which he might have strangled the 
husband. After a brief struggle the 
intended victim escaped. The trial court's 
judgment of conviction was affirmed on 
appeal. 
Law Review Comments. One of the draftsmen of the Wisconsin 
Criminal Code has written:! 
Attempt requires acts toward the commission 
of the crime which demonstrate unequivocally 
that the actor had the intent to and would 
commit the crime unless prevented. 
1. Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wisconsin Law Review pp. 350, 364, 
and 365. 
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No 'assaults with intent' will be found among 
the crimes defined in the code; such acts are 
all covered by the general attempt statute 
which applies to felonies and to two 
misdemeanors, battery and (petty) theft. 
'Attempt' is defined for the first time in the 
law of this state, and in a more intelligible 
fashion than by using such expressions as 
'beyond mere preparation,' 'locus poenitentiae,' 
or 'dangerous proximity to success.' By 
avoiding such wording it is intended to 
forestall any possibility of Wisconsin courts 
fQllowing the New York case of People v. Rizzo 
LThe defendant planned to rob a payroll messenger 
but was apprehended while driving about looking 
for the messenger, before locating him; and the 
court reversed the conviction of attempted robbery 
because there was no act tending to accomplish _ 
robbery and coming sufficiently close to successd-
In other words Wisconsin chose to make the test of attempt 
turn on whether the defendant's conduct sufficiently demonstrated 
dangerous propensities to justify punishimg him, rather than on how 
close he came to success in accomplishing the target crime. This 
rationale was considered by the Wisconsin committee more appropriate 
to the purposes of criminal law to protect society and reform offenders 
or at least isolate them where they could cause no harm. 
The question of impossibility is not specifically covered 
due to deletion of the provision in the 1953 code relating to that 
subject. While it is clear under case law that the completed crime 
need not be capable of accomplishment, as where the attempt is to pick 
an empty pocket or to produce a miscarriage upon a woman who is not 
actually pregnant, courts have refused to hold the actor guilty of an 
attempt in some circumstances where the effort was doomed to failure, 
as where one shoots at an inanimate object mistaking it for a man who 
he intends to kill. In the writer's opinion, even without the deleted 
provision the code definition of "attempt" does not require proof 
that the completed crime was possible of 2accomplishment, since ''dangerous proximity to success" is not an element. 
Illinois 
The new Illinois Criminal Code went into effect in January 
1962. This code is an example of the most recent approaches to criminal 
law revision. The language is simplified, sections are brief, and 
many statutes were eliminated through general provisions with wide 
application. The Illinois Criminal Code was the product of many years 
of study by committees of the Illinois and Chicago bar associations. 
There is no case law as yet because the code has been in effect for 
less than a year. Following is the attempt provisions in the new 




(a) Elements of the Offense. 
A person commits an attempt when, with intent 
to commit a specific offense, he does any act 
which constitutes a substantial step toward the 
commission of that offense. 
(b) Impossibility. 
It shall not be a defense to a charge of attempt 
that because of a misapprehension of the circum-
stances it would have been impossible for the 
accused to commit the offense attempted. 
(c) Penalty. 
A person convicted of an attempt may be fined 
or imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum 
provided for the offense at tempted: Provid,ed, 
however, 
(1) that the penalty for attempt to commit 
treason, murder or aggravated kidnapping 
shall not exceed imprisonment for 20 
years, and 
(2) that the penalty for attempt to commit 
any other forcible felony shall not 
exceed imprisonment for 14 years, and 
(3) that the penalty for attempt to commit 
any offense other than those specified 
in Subsections (1) and (2) hereof shall 
not exceed imprisonment for 5 years. 
Model Penal Code 
The provisions of the Model Penal Code pertaining to attempt 
are much more specific than those contained in the Illinois Code. 
Following are the attempt provisions in the Model Penal Code: 
Section 5.01. Criminal Attempt 
(1) Definition of attempt. A person is guilty 
of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with 
the kind of culpability otherwise required for 
commission of the crime, he: 
(a) purpose,ly engages in conduct which would 
constitute the crime if the attendant circum-
stances were as he believes them to be; or 
(b) when causing a particular result is an 
element of the crime, does or omits to do 
anything with the purpose of causing or with 
the belief that it will cause such result, 
without further conduct on his part; or 
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(c) purposely does or omits to do anything 
which, under the circumstances as he believes 
them to be, is a substantial step in a course 
of conduct planned to culminate in his commission 
of the crime. 
(2) Conduct which marbe held substantials~ 
yndgr-paragraph:]1}(c_-:-· Conduct shall not oe 
held to constitute a substantial step under 
paragraph (l)(c) of this Section unless it is 
strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal 
purpose. Without negativing the sufficiency of 
other conduct, the following, if strongly 
corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, 
shall not be held insufficient as a matter of 
law: 
(a) lying in wait, searching for or following 
the contemplated victim of the crime; 
(b) enticing or seeking to entice the 
contemplated victim of the crime to go to 
the place contemplated for its commission; 
(c) reconnoitering the place contemplated for 
the commission of the crime; 
(d) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or 
enclosure in which it is contemplated that the 
crime will be committed; 
(e) possession of materials to be employed 
in the commission of the crime, which are 
specially designed for such unlawful use or 
which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor 
under the circumstances; 
(f) possession, collection or fabrication of 
materials to be employed in the commission of 
the crime, at or near the ·place contemplated 
for its commission, where such possession, 
collection or fabrication serves no lawful 
purpose of the actor under the circumstances; 
{g) soliciting an innocent agent to engage 
in conduct constituting an element of the 
crime. 
(3) Conduct designed to aid another to commit 
crime. A person who engages in conduct designed 
to aid another to commit a crime which would 
establish his complicity under Section 2.06 if 
the crime were committed by such other person, 
is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime, 
although the crime is not committed or 
attempted by such other person. 
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Louisiana 
(4) Renunciation of criminal purpose. When the 
actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an 
attempt under paragraph (l)(b) or (l)(c) of this 
Section, it is an affirmative defense that he 
abandoned his effort to commit the crime or 
otherwise prevented its commission, under circum-
stances manifesting renunciation of his criminal 
purpose. The establishment of such defense does 
not, however, affect the liability for the 
attempt of an accomplice who did not join in 
such abandonment or prevention. 
The Louisiana Criminal Code was revised in 1942. In this 
code attempt is defined as follows: 
Section 27. Attempt 
Any person who, having a specific intent to 
commit a crime, does or omits an act for the 
purpose of and tending directly toward the 
accomplishing of his object is guilty of an 
attempt to commit the offense intended; and it 
shall be immaterial whether, under the 
circumstances, he would have actually accomplished 
his purpose. 
Mere preparation to commit a crime shall not 
be sufficient to constitute an attempt; but 
lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the 
intent to commit a crime, or searching for the 
intended victim with a dangerous weapon with 
the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient 
to constitute an attempt to commit the offense 
intended. 
An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of 
the intended crime; and any person may be 
convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, 
although it appears on the trial that the crime 
intended or attempted was actually perpetrated 
by such person in pursuance of such attempt. 
Proposed Attempt Legislation for Colorado 
Present Colorado law has many gaps with respect to attempted 
crimes. There are a number of statutes in which the commission of 
a serious crime is punishable, but which provide no penalty for an 
attempt to commit the crime. Because there are many instances of 
attempts to commit serious crimes in which tre attempt is not a crime, 
one whose criminal intent is shown in conduct falling short of 
completing a crime, or whose attempted crime is aborted by alert police 
work, legal impossibility, or an effective defense by the intended 
victim, cannot be prosecuted. Examples of such anti-social conduct 
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carrying no penalties under present Colorado law include attempted 
larceny (not covered by crime of assault with intent to commit 
larceny, for in most larceny there is no assault), attempted kidnapping, 
attempted malicious mischief, attempted abortion on a woman not in 
fact pregnant, attempted murder where there is no assault (as where 
intended victim is asleep or unconscious), attempted robbery by acts 
falling short of assault (as where defendant is arrested while lying 
in wait for a bank messenger). Moreover, the case of People v. Dolph, 
124 Colorado 553 (1951) holds that there is no common law crime of 
attempt in Colorado because Colorado adopted the English common laws 
as of 1607, a date prior to recognition of the common law crime of 
attempt by the English courts. Professor Austin W. Scott of the 
University of Colorado School of Law has done extensive research in 
this area and has found that every state, except Colorado, has a 
general statute covering criminal attempts. 
Because some attempts are presently crimes, a new general 
attempt statute should state whether its provisions for punishing those 
attempts are in lieu of or merely alternatives to'the penalties already 
provided. Otherwise, upon enactment of the general attempt statute, 
present statutes should be amended to eliminate specific definitions 
of attempt crimes. 
Provisions of Suggested Statute. The suggested statute 
generally follows the substantive definition of attempt contained in 
the Model Penal Code. Added are several provisions adapted from the 
codes of Illinois, Louisiana, California, and Wisconsin. This definition 
is far more comprehensive than any contained in the recently adopted 
criminal codes of other states. This more comprehensive definition 
was used in order to try to cover problems which otherwise might require 
case law determination. 
The penalty provision generally follows that contained in 
the Illinois code, but the maximum penalty for attempt would be one-
half of the penalty which would be applicable if the target crime had 
been completed, subject to certain express limitations. 
The text of the proposed attempt statute as reviewed, 
amended, and approved by the Criminal Code Committee follows. 
A BILL FOR AN ACT 
RELATING TO CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 
Be It Enacted .QY. the General Assembly of the State of Colorado: 
SECTION 1. Chapter 40, Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, is 




40-25-1. Criminal attempt. (l)(a) A person is guilty of 
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with th~ state of mind other-
wise required for the commission of the crime, he: 
(b) Purposely engages in conduct which would constitute 
the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to 
be; or 
(c) When causing a particular result is an element of the 
crime, does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with 
the belief that it will cause such result, without further conduct on 
his part; or 
(d) Purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the 
circumstances as he believes them to be, is a substantial step in a 
course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. 
(2)(a) Such person's conduct shall not be held to 
constitute a substantial step under paragraph (l)(c) of this section 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. 
Without negativing the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, 
if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not 
be held insufficient as a matter of law: 
(b) Lying in wait for, searching for, or following the 
contemplated victim of the crime; 
(c) Enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim 
of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission; 
(d) Reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission 
of the crime; 
(e) Unlawful entry of a vehicle, into a structure, into 
any enclosure, or onto any real property in which or on which it is 
contemplated that the crime will be committed; 
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(f) Possession of items or materials to be employed in the 
commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such 
unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under 
the circumstances; 
(g) Possession, collection, or fabrication of items or 
materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the 
place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, 
collection, or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor 
under the circumstances; or 
(h) Soliciting an accomplice or an innocent agent to 
engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime. 
40-25-2. Conduct in aid of another. Any person who engages 
in conduct intended to aid another to commit any crime which would 
establish his complicity under section 40-1-12 or 40-1-13, if the 
crime were committed by such other person, is guilty of an attempt to 
commit a crime, although the crime is not committed or attempted by 
such other person. 
40-25-3. Defenses available - not available. (1) When the 
actor's previous conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to 
commit a crime, as defined in this article, it is a defense that he 
abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its 
commission, under circumstances manifesting the renunciation of his 
criminal purpose. The establishment of such defense shall not affect 
the liability for the attempt of an accomplice who did not join in 
such abandonment or prevention. 
(2) It shall not be a defense to a conviction of the crime 
of attempt to commit a crime that: 
(a) Because of a misapprehension of the circumstances it 
would have been factually or legally impossible for the accused to 
commit the offense attempted; or 
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(b) Under the circumstances, the accused could not have 
actually accomplished his purpose; or 
(c) The crime attempted or intended was actually perpetrated 
by the accused. 
40-25-4. Multiple convictions. No person shall be convicted 
of both the perpetration of a crime and the attempt to commit that 
crime where the acts constituting such attempt were part of the same 
conduct constituting the completed crime. 
40-25-5. Penalties. (l)(a) A person convicted of an 
attempt to commit a crime may be fined or imprisoned br both in the 
same manner as for the offense attempted, but such fine or 
imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half 
of the longest term of imprisonment, or both, prescribed for the 
offense attempted; provided that: 
·(b) If the offense attempted is punishable by death or 
life impiisonment, such person shall be imprisoned in the state 
penitentiary at hard labor for not less than one year nor more than 
twenty years; 
(c) If the offense is an attempt to commit any felony 
involving bodily injury of or an assault on any person, other than 
one punishable by death or life imprisonment, the penalty shall not 
exceed fourteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary; 
(d) If the offense is an attempt to commit any felony 
other than those referred to in paragraphs (l)(b) and (l)(c) of this 
section, the penalty shall not exceed five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary; and 
(e) If the offense is an attempt to commit any misdemeanor, 
the penalty shall not exceed six months imprisonment in the county 
jail. 
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SECTION 2. Safety clause. The general assembly hereby finds, 
determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate 
preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. 
Solicitation 
Other States 
The solicitation statutes of Wisconsin and Illinois were 
surveyed as was the case law and law review comments on solicitation 
in Wisconsin. In addition, the provisions of the Model Penal Code 
on solicitation were examined. 
Wisconsin. The new Wisconsin Criminal Code provides the 
following on solicitation: 
Whoever, with intent .that a felony be committed, 
advises another to commit that crime under circum-
stances which indicate unequivocally that he has 
such intent may be fined not more than $2,500 or 
imprisoned not to exceed the maximum provided for 
the completed crime, but in no event to exceed 
five years, or both; except that for a solicitation 
to commit a crime for which the penalty .is life 
imprisonment the actor may be imprisoned not more 
than 10 years. 
There are no Wisconsin cases construing the solicitation 
statute but there have been several law review comments. An article 
by an assistant attorney general of Wisconsin states that the 1953 
code as originally prepared had contained a general provision that the 
inchoate crimes -- solicitation, conspiracy and attempt -- be punished 
the same as the completed crime except that instead of life imprisonment 
the maximum imprisonment should be thirty years. But the committee 
which revised the code between 1953 and 1955 changed this penalty 
provision for solicitation and attempt while leaving it intact as to 
conspiracy. Thus, the code as enacted in 1955 provided for a 
fine for solicitation of up to $2,500 or imprisortment.up to· the maximum 
provided for the completed crime, but not exceeding five years, or 
both. (For attempt, the code as enacted provides a fine or 
imprisonment, or both, not to exceed one-half the maximum provided for 
the completed crime. for conspiracy one may draw the maximum fine or 
imprisonment, or both, provided for the complete crime.) The assistant 
attorney general commented on the~e penalty changes as follows: "It 
is difficult to explain this rearrangement of penalites, particularly 
when it is considered that many attempts and solicitations under the 
old law were state prison offenses while 'common law conspiracy' was 
but a misdemeanor. 
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"All of the inchoate crimes require more than a~ criminal 
intent. Solicitation requires advice to another to commit a felony 
under circumstances which ind~cate unequivocally that the actor intends 
that the felony be committed. " 
These comments imply that solicitation and the other inchoate 
crimes defined in the 1955 Wisconsin Code require a specific rather than 
merely a general criminal intent. In solicitation this specific intent 
is to induce or persuade the person solicited to commit the target 
crime. The solicitation offense, of course, is complete where the 
person solicited declines to commit the suggested crime. 
It should be noted that the Wisconsin statute covers only 
solicitation to commit felonies. At common law it was a misdemeanor 
to solicit another to commit any felony, and furthermore was a 
misdemeanor to solicit another to commit a serious misdemeanor which 
may tend to a breach of the peace -- and perhaps to solicit any 
indictable misdemeanor. The Wisconsin statute in ef£ect makes 
solicitation a felony in many cases. This crime was never a felony 
at common law. It is not a crime at all in Colorado today, except in 
the case of specific offenses whose solicitation is expressly made 
criminal. 
The Wisconsin statute differs from the solicitation legislation 
in several other states in that it covers the solicitation of all 
felonies while the solicitation in these other states is limited to 
enumerated offenses. For example, California restricts the crime of 
solicitation to offenses involving bribery, murder, robbery, burglary, 
grand theft, receiving stolen property, extortion, rape by force and 
violence~ perjury, subornation of perjury, forgery or kidnapping. 
Illinois. The Illinois Criminal Code defines solicitation 
and provides the penalty therefore as follows: 
§8-1. Solicitation 
(a) Elements of the offense. 
A person commits solicitation when, with intent 
that an offense be committed, he commands, 
encourages or requests another to commit that 
offense. 
(b) Penalty. 
A person convicted of solicitation may be fined 
or imprisoned or both not to exceed the maximum 
provided for the offense solicited: Provided, 
however, that no penalty for solicitation shall 
exceed imprisonment for one year. 
Model Penal Code. Solicitation is defined in the Model Penal 
Code as follows: 
3. Ibid. 
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Section 5.02. Criminal Solicitation 
(1) Definition of solicitation. A person is 
guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with 
the purpose of promoting or facilitating its 
commission he commands, encourages or requests 
another person to engage in specific conduct which 
would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit 
such crime or which would establish his complicity 
in its commission or attempted commission. 
(2) Uncommunicated solicitation. It is 
immaterial under Subsection (1) of this Section 
that the actor fails to communicate with the 
person he solicits to commit a crime if his 
conduct was designed to effect such communication. 
(3) Renunciation of criminal purpose. ,It is an 
affirmative defense that the actor, after soliciting 
another person to commit a crime, persuaded him not 
to do so or otherwise prevented the commission of 
the crime, under circumstances manifesting a 
renunciation of his criminal purpose. 
Proposed Solicitation Legislation for Colorado 
In Colorado, one who advises or encourages another to commit 
a crime which the party thus solicited actually commits is guilty as 
a principal and punished as if he had personally committed the crime 
(40~1-7,40-1-8, 40-1-12, C.R.S. 1953). But there is no general criminal 
statute in Colorado defining as a crime the solicitation of another to 
commit a crime when the party solicited does not commit the offense. 
Unsuccessfully soliciting another to commit a crime was not 
well established as a common law offense in England until 1801. Since 
that time it has been the accepted view that to solicit another to 
commit a felony, or a serious misdemeanor tending toward a breach of 
the peace, is a misdemeanor. 
States which have recently adopted new penal codes all have 
included a provision on criminal solicitation. The draftsmen of the 
Model Penal Code concluded that solicitation is socially dangerous 
enough to be considered a crime. 
There are several present Colorado statutes defining the 
solicitation of certain specific crimes as criminal and providing 
penalites therefore. There are many gaps in the coverage of these 
provisions, and there is wide divergence in the penalties provided. 
Among crimes which may be solicited in Colorado without fear of penalty 
are murder, rape, robbery, larceny, kidnapping and most other serious 
crimes against the person. 
Text of Proposed Legislation. In reviewing and approving 
proposed general solicitation statute, the Criminal Code Committee 
decided that this legislation should not apply in those instances of 
solicitation presently covered by law. The text of the proposed general 
solicitation legislation follows: 
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A BILL FOR AN ACT 
CONCERNING CRIMINAL SOLICITATION AND PUNISHMENTS THEREFOR 
Be It Enacted !2.Y. the General Assembly of the State of Colorado: 
SECTION l. Criminal solicitation. A person is guilty of 
criminal solicitation if with the purpose of promoting or 
facilitating its commission he commands, encourages, or requests 
another person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute 
such crime or an attempt to commit such crime, or which would 
establish his complicity in its commission or attempted commission. 
SECTION 2. Uncommunicated solicitation. It is immaterial 
under section l of this act that the actor fails to communicate with 
the person he solicits to commit a crime if his conduct was designed 
to effect such communication. 
SECTION 3. Renunciation of criminal purpose. It is a 
defense that the actor, after soliciting another person to commit a 
crime, persuaded him not to do so or otherwise prevented the commission 
of the crime, under circumstances manifesting a renunciation of his 
criminal purpose. 
SECTION 4. Corroborating evidence required. No person shall 
be convicted of criminal solicitation on the mere testimony of the 
party allegedly solicited to commit a crime, but to support a 
conviction there must be, in addition to or in lieu of testimony by 
the party allegedly solicited, any of the following: 
(a) A confession by the accused; 
(b) Testimony of two witnesses, one of whom may be the party 
allegedly solicited; or 
(c) Other evidence direct or circumstantial. 
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SECTIONS. Penalties. (l)(a) A person convicted of 
criminal solicitation may be fined or imprisoned, or both, in the 
same manner as for the offense solicited, but such fine or imprisonment 
shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the 
longest term of imprisonment, or both, prescribed for the offense 
solicited; provided that: 
(b) If the offense solicited is punishable by death or life 
imprisonment, such person shall be imprisoned in the state peniten-
tiary at hard labor for not less than one year nor more than twenty 
years; 
(c) If the offense is a solicitation to commit any felony 
involving bodily injury of or an assault on any person, other than one 
punishable by death or life imprisonment, the penalty shall not 
exceed fourteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary; 
(d) If the offense is a solicitation to commit any felony 
other than those referred to in paragraphs (1) (b) and (1) (c) of this 
section, the penalty shall not exceed five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary; and 
(e) If the offense is a solicitation to commit any 
misdemeanor, the penalty shall not exceed six months imprisonment in 
the county jail. 
SECTION 6. Applicability. Where by the provisions of any 
other la~ solicitation of specific conduct is included in the 
definition of any felony or misdemeanor, and a penalty provided 
therefor, such other law shall control and the provisions of this act 
shall not apply. 
SECTION 7. Safety clause. The general assembly hereby finds, 
determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate 
preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. 
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CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY (THEFT) 
General Theft Statute 
There are more than 50 Colorado statutes covering crimes 
against property. These include among others: larceny of various kinds, 
false pretenses embezzlement, forgery, extortion, blackmail, receiving 
stolen property, and joy riding. Study of these statutes has indicated 
that many of them are burdened with overcomplicated and highly 
technical language. Further, they are scattered throughout all volumes 
of the present Colorado revised statutes. 
The simplification and codification of these statutes was 
considered by the Criminal Code Committee to be a proper starting 
point for an over-all revision and codification of the criminal statutes. 
The practice in other states which have recently revised their criminal 
codes has been to adopt a general theft statute which is sufficiently 
broad in definition and application to make it possible to eliminate 
most if not all of the previous specialized statutes relating to crimes 
against property. For example, the general theft statutes in the new 
Illinois criminal code cover larceny, false pretenses, embezzlement, 
larceny by bailee, extortion, and blackmail. Fraud is covered in 
the new Illinois code in the section on deception,and joy riding is 
covered in the section on trespass. 
If a general theft statute is to replace most if not all of 
the existing specialized statutes, the definition must be carefully 
worded so as to cover the gamut of property crimes. No matter how 
carefully such a statute is drafted, it usually takes several years 
of experience and case law from state supreme court decisions to 
determine which property crimes, if any, are excluded. Consequently, 
there is always the possibility that additional legislation might be 
needed. 
The Illinois code has been in effect for too short a time 
for there to be any case law as yet. However, a considerable body 
of case law has been developed in several other states which have 
adopted general theft statutes in recent years. 
Experience in Other States 
The simplified general theft statutes and related case law 
in several states were studied. These statutes, related court cases, 
and comments for two states (Louisiana and Wisconsin) which are of 
particular help in further study of this subject in Colorado are 
presented below: 
Louisiana 
In 1942, Louisiana adopted a new penal code which greatly 
simplified the substantive criminal law of that state. One of the most 
extensive changes was in the theft area where pre-1942 Louisiana statutes 
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had been a confusing morass of highly detailed and frequently over-
lapping statutes which all too often had been given overly technical 
restrictive interpretation by the courts. The Louisiana State Law 
Institute, charged by the legislature with responsibility of preparing 
a draft code, sought to consolidate statutes, simplify language, and 
close loopholes by eliminating technicalittes. All property crimes 
were reduced to 25 sections organized under three main classifications. 
In 1948 one section was repealed, reducing the total to 24 sections. 
General Theft Statute. § 67. Theft 
Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything 
of value which belongs to another, either without the consent of the 
other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent 
conduct, practices or representations. An intent to deprive the other 
permanently of whatever may be the subject of the misappropriation or 
taking is essential. 
Whoever commits the crime of theft, when the misappropriation 
or taking amounts to a value of one hundred dollars or more, shall be 
imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten years. 
When the misappropriation or taking amounts to a value 
of twenty dollars or more, but less than a value of one hundred 
dollars, the offender shall be fined not more than three hundred 
dollars, or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more 
than two years, or both. 
When the misappropriation or taking amounts to less than 
value of twenty dollars, the offender shall be fined not more than 
one hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or 
both. In such cases, if the offender has been convicted of theft once 
before, upon a second conviction he shall be fined not less than one 
hundred dollars nor more than two hundred dollars, or imprisoned 
for not less than six months nor more than one year, or both. If 
the offender in such cases has been convicted of theft two or more times 
previously, upon any subsequent conviction he shall be fined not less 
than one hundred dollars nor more than three hundred dollars, or 
imprisoned for not less than six months nor more than two years, or 
both. 
When there has been misappropriation or taking by a number 
of distinct acts of the offender, the aggregate of the amount of the 
misappropriations or takings shall determine the grade of the offense. 
Several points should be noted in reading this statute. 
Most important is the first paragraph, which in two brief, simple. 
sentences defines the substantive elements of all the crimes previously 
defined by multitudinous special provisions on various type~ ot larceny, 
embezzlement, and obtaining by false pretenses. The important elements 
are: (a) a "misappropriation or taking ..• without the consent" of 
the owner or by practicing on him "fraudulent conduct, practices or 
representations;" (b) "intent to deprive the other permanently" 
of his property -- i.e., the classical specific intent requirement 
of larceny; and (c'Tproperty subject to theft -- here defined in 
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the broadest possible terms as "anything of value." The draftsmen 
avoided lanouage which had s~ttled technical meaning in the case law 
of larceny. There i~ also apparent elimination of the "asportation" 
requirement and of the traditional restriction of the theft crimes 
to "chattels" or "personal property." 
Reporter's Commen~s on General Theft Statutes. Serving 
as reporters, and therefore as the actual draftsmen of the code, were 
three law professors, one each from the law schools of Tulane, 
Louisiana State, and Loyola. After completion and adoption of the 
code, these reporters prepared explanatory notes on each new section. 
These comments on the general theft section, abridged to eliminate 
matters of no special interest or utility to Colorado, are as follows: 1 
Gene!al purpose of section: This section has the 
effect of combining the traditional offenses 
of larceny, embezzlement, and obtaining by 
false pretenses. In spite of the tremendously 
complicated nature of the problem as a 
matter of historical development, there seems 
to be absolutely no reason why today the 
fundamental notion that it is socially wrong to 
take the property of another, in any fashion 
whatsoever, cannot be stated as clearly and 
simply as it has been above. There is eminent 
theoretical and practical authority for this step 
Technical common law distinctions abolished: 
Louisiana has not defined larceny by statute, but 
has looked to the common law for its definition. 
The common law restricted the concept in a 
number of ways which seem unnecessary ••• 
For instance, only personal property, not real 
property or 'fixtures,' might be the subject 
of larceny. This rule caused absurd 
distinctions between standing trees and trees 
which have been cut •.• and also caused the 
e n a c t me n t of . • . s pe c i a 1 st a tut e s • . • on 
stealing plumbing and electric fixtures. 
At common law, also, electricity, gas, etc., 
and many animals were not 'property' and 
subjects of larceny •.• In Louisiana 
(as in Colorado today) special statutes have 
been enacted to take care of this defect ••. 
Accordingly, in the'theft' section of the 
code, very broad language has been used: 
'anything of value which belongs to another,' 
which is intended to eliminate all of the 
common law distinctions and to include all 
of the objects mentioned above. The word 
'property' was not used, since it might be 
• • • 
• • 
1. Louisiana Revised Statutes, Reporter - Comments following 14:67 
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narrowly construed and have read into it all 
of the traditional dogmatic distinctions as 
to those things which might be the 'subject of 
ownership.' By saying, 'which belongs to 
another' the way is clear for the court to 
interpret this broadly in the popular sense 
of that phrase, and not as synonymous with the 
technical legal term 'property.' This intended 
broad meaning of 'anything of value which 
belongs to another' is made clear in the code 
itself in the definition section. 
Larceny and 'embezzlement' mer9ed: One of the 
most important single changes made by the 'theft' 
section is the combination of what was 'larceny' 
and what was 'embezzlement.' This was 
accomplished by the elimination of the element 
of common law larceny known as 'a trespass in 
the taking' or 'taking out of the possession' 
was originally a requirement, so that a 
misappropriation by one lawfully in possession 
was not larceny. This fact alone led to 
the enactment of statutes denouncing a new 
offense, 'embezzlement,' which included a 
taking by one in 'possession' who necessarily 
could not 'take out of the owner's possession.' 
••• The important factor is clearly the 
misappropriation, and the matter of who has 
possession (which involves the further 
refinement of 'custody' as distinguished 
from 'possession') seems entirely immaterial. 
This phase of the section, of course, 
represents an innovation in the Louisiana 
criminal law ••. It is a reform 
which has been instituted in a number of states, 
however, and one which has been urged earnestly 
by authorities in the field generally ••• 
'Asportation' and consent of owner: There are 
other problems in connection with the law of 
larceny at common law about which it does not 
appear to be necessary to set out details in 
the code. Obviously, in particular cases, 
there may be some question as to whether there 
has been sufficient 'asportation' of the 
stolen thing in the common law sense. 
The slightest 'asportation' or misuse of 
anything belonging to another should be 
sufficient, but in any case it would be a 
question for the court to decide whether the 
offender's activity was sufficient to amount 
to a 'taking.' So also of the question of 
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the owner's consent: if he was not aware 
of the taking, or if he turned over the 
thing knowingly but unwillingly, clearly 
the taking would be 'without his consent.' 
Again the court must determine, in particular 
cases, whether the circumstances fall within 
the legislative language. 
Embezzlement: Some observations should be 
made about the former concept of 'embezzlement,' 
which is merged in the crime of 'theft.' 
As indicated above, embezzlement as a 
separate offense from larceny is a historical 
accident. Generally speaking it involved 
a misappropriation by one lawfully 'in 
possession,' usually by ~eason of the 
offender's holding a position of trust and 
confidence. Under this section, which 
provides that anyone can commit theft of 
anything, all of the acts which formerly 
amounted to 'embezzlement' will be 'theft' 
under the code and much statutory material and 
many historical distinctions eliminated. 
It will no longer be necessary, for instance, 
to try to enumerate every conceivable 
type of fiduciary relationship in particular 
••• Whether the offender was in 'possession' 
or had 'custody,' etc., will clearly be immaterial. 
Obtaining by false pretenses: This section 
concerns itself also with the offense of 
obtaining by false pretenses, but it is 
stated broadly to include much more than that 
traditional offense •••• 
Originally 'obtaining by false pretenses' 
was accomplished in the English law only by the 
use of false weights, measures, and 'tokens,' 
but it has been extended by statute in most 
jurisdictions to include a great variety 
of conduct .... In general, it consists 
of depriving someone of property (of various 
descriptions in various statutes) under 
circumstances in which the owner intends to 
relinquish ownership, not merely 'possession' 
or 'custody.' Thus a type of consent is 
secured and larceny does not result. • •• 
It is a consent affected by the vice of 
fraud, however, ••• The analogy to civil 
fraud was not complete, however, because 
the concept as it exists in Anglo-American 
law included only false 'pretenses' or 
'representations' about present or past facts. • •• 
Inducing another to part with his property by 
means of representations or promises as to 
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future events was not included •••• By not 
including this latter concept in the definition 
of 'theft,' it is intended to produce 
identity of meaning between civil and criminal 
fraud. Whenever the situation is such that 
the transaction between the parties could be 
avoided because of fraud, the defrauder 
is guilty of theft. 
The phrase 'anything of value which belongs 
to another' is particularly necessary here • 
• • • The word 'taking' also has been used 
advisedly, rather than 'obtain,' since the 
only significant consideration is whether 
someone lost, not whether the offender or 
anyone else gained by 'obtaining.' 
In1ent: No matter what approach was used 
with reference to the problem of intent in 
the code, it was necessary to include a 
spec i a 1 men ta 1 e 1 e me n t a s an e s se n ti a 1 in 
this section's definition. It is well . 
established that an intent to deprive the 
owner permanently of his property is a 
necessary element in any 'stealing' crime . . . 
Case Law and Law Review Comments. The 1942 Louisiana Code 
has been cited in at least 29 Louisiana appellate court opinions and 
at least 28 articles or comments in the Tulane Law Review and the 
Louisiana Law Review. Some of these cases and law review articles 
are of particular interest to Colorado. 
One of the earliest Louisiana Supreme Court interpretations 
of the criminal code was a theft case in which the defendant launched 
a five-pronged attack on the constitutionality of the theft provision 
in particular and the code in general. In this case the defendant 
was prosecuted under an information charging simply, "the theft of 
an automobile, of the value of ••• ($1,200) ••• 
The defendant attacked the code and the theft provision 
as unconstitutional on these grounds: 
1) their effect was to deprive the defendant of 
liberty without due process because, "he has not 
been charged with any specific crime"; 
2) they violate the Louisiana Constitution by 
embracing more than one subject and being broader 
than their titles (Cf. Colo. Const. Art. V, § 21, 
imposing the same restrictions on legislation 
as those contained in the Louisiana Constitution); 
3) they violate the Louisian~ Constitution by seeking to 
revise and amend articles of the code merely by reference 
without fully reciting all sections being affected; 
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4) they derive from an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power to draft statutes to the State 
Law Institute: and 
5) they make changes in the substantive law of crimes so 
drastic as to be outside the power of the legislature 
acting without an express authorization by constitutional 
amendment. 
The Louisi~na Supreme Court rejected all five defense 
theories and upheld the constitutionality of the theft provision and 
the code itself. 
In answer to the defense contention that the legislature 
could not constitutionally combine in one theft definition the separate 
crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses, the supreme 
court said:2 
Clearly the legislature could define such crimes 
as were intended to be covered by the criminal 
code, and in so defining them, could group all 
offenses of the same character in a single 
article, as was done in defining the crime of 
'theft' in article 67. By such a definition 
the legislature sought to denounce under the 
single heading of 'theft' all of the crimes 
that it considered constituted the culpable 
taking of anything of value belonging to 
another, whether such taking was without the 
consent of the owner, commonly known as larceny 
or the taking with his consent, as is the case 
in confidence games, embezzlement, and false 
pretenses. This is in accordance with the 
modern trend, followed in numerous states, 
of simplifying the law by discarding ancient and 
outmoded forms and redefining offenses to 
prevent confusion and injustices. 
In a law review article one of the Louisiana code's 
draftsmen stated that most of the defendant's constitutional objections 
in the Pete case were "far-fetched" and had never cau3ed any concern among proponents of the code. Nevertheless, he said: 
2. 
3. 
There was one basis of attack on the code's 
validity, however, which was more to be 
feared ••• The all too familiar requirement 
under the Louisiana Constitution that a 
legislative act must have but one object and 
State v_, Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20 So. 2nd 368.372 (1944). 
Morrow, "The 1942 Louisiana Crimina 1 Code in 1945: A Sma 11 Voice 
from the Past, 11 19 Tulane Law Review· 483, 485 (1945). 
- 86 -
that its title must be 'indicative of such 
object' had always been a source of concern during 
work on the code. (Cf. Colo. Const. Art. V, § 21.) 
The Louisiana Law Institute accepted the 
recommendation of the draftsmen that as simple 
a title as could be devised should be employed, 
and the wisdom of this step has been thoroughly 
vindicated by·the decision· in the Pete case. 
When the new criminal code definitions of crimes were 
adopted in 1942, the legislature also amended the Code of Criminal 
Procedure by specifying simplified forms which could be followed in 
informations and indictments. In State~- Pete, the information 
followed the new statutory form precisely by charging, "the theft of 
an automobile, of the value of ••• ($1,200) ••• the property of 
Gordon's Drug Store, Inc. " 
The defendant attacked the information as invalid on 
the grounds (a) that it failed to charge any recognized crime in 
that it failed to state the element of intent to deprive the owner 
of his property permanently, and (b) that it violated the defendant's 
constitutionally guaranteed right to be fully appraised of the charge 
against him. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court dealt with contention 
(a) by noting that the information followed the form set out in the 
new statute and that the form was adequate. In rejecting contention 
(b), the court stated that another provision of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure protected the defendant's right to a bill of particulars 
where appropriate, and held that the latter provision adequately 
prot4cted his constitutional right to fair notice of the charge against him. 
When the special simplified form of charging theft, 
as prescribed by the 1942 amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure 
was not followed, and it was not clear from the indictment which of 
the prior crimes consolidated in the new theft statute had been 
charged, the supreme court upheld a trial court's action in quashing 
the indictmsnt on the ground it failed sufficiently to charge a crime, 
and fell short of satisfying the constitutional requirement that the 
accused be informed of the nature of the accusation. It was held not 
sufficient merely to charge the crime in the language of the statute 
defining the crime -- as under the pre-1942 code procedure -- for under 
the prior law each criminal statute specifically defined a single 
crime -- whereas the 1942 theft statute combined several crimes in one 
general statute. 5 
A 1948 Louisiana Supreme Court opinion noted that under 
the present code a theft from the person is not always a felony as 
under prior Louisiana law. The prior statute, like the present Colorado 
4. State y_. Pete, Q_Q_. cit. 
5. State y_. Kendrick,203 La. 63, 13 So. 2nd. 387 (1943). 
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statute, 40-5-2 (6) Berm. Supp. 1960, had declared it a felony to 
steal from the person of another without regard to the value of the 
property stolen, The new code provision makes theft from the person 
a felony only where it involves property of such value that the theft 
would have been a felony if not from the person.6 
In another case the defendants were charged with theft 
allegedly committed by taking and hauling away 20 steel rails. When 
taken, the rails were integral parts of a highway bridge across a 
stream. One defendant was in the scrap iron business and had a market 
for the rails. The defendants contended that since the rails were 
affixed to realty they were not property subject to theft. Such a 
contention would have been sound if the charge had been common law 
larceny, for that crime could be committed only by taking and carrying 
away the personal property of another with intent to deprive him 
permanently ot it. This common law requirement was strictly enforced 
and therefore most American jurisdictions adopted soecial statutes 
declarinq the stealing of fixtures to be larceny (e.g., Colo. Rev. 
Stat. 40-5-7, 40-5-8- .fI95~7). The Louisiana court held, as the code's 
draftsmen clearly intended, that the .broad phrase "anything of value" 
was intended to eliminate such common law subtleties and embrace all 
possible objects of theft within a single, simple phrase. 7 
The meaning of "anything of value" was involved in a 
case in which an attorney was charged with theft allegedly committed 
by fraudulently inducing a client to sign a 20 per cent contingent fee 
contract. The question was whether the 20 per cent interest thus 
acquired in the client's case, a tort claim, was "anything of value" 
within the theft statute. The court held that the tort cause of action 
was not within the phrase, "anything of value," because a cause of 
action8has no present value as distinguished from mere potential value. 
Prior to the 1942 Louisiana Criminal Code, one who 
obtained property by false representations as to future facts was 
not criminally responsible under Louisiana law. The new 1942 theft 
provision defined the false pretenses type of crime broadly to include 
any taking by "fraudulent conduct, practices or representations." 
A used car dealer was charged with theft in acquiring 
three cars. He obtained the cars in exchange for a draft payable two 
days after the date of purchase, knowing at the time of purchase 
that he did not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the draft. 
His defense to the theft charge was that the· draft constituted merely 
a promise to pay in the future and therefore he committed no theft 
at the time he acquired the cars. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that 
the defendant had committed theft within the new statute even though his 





State y. Ambrose, 34 So. 2nd 883 (1948). 
St~te v. Mills,214 La. 979, 39 So. 2d. 439 (1949). 
State v. Picou,236 La. 421, 107 So. 2d. 691 (195~). This inter-
pretation was critized as being unreasonably restrictive in a law 
review article, 19 Louisiana b~ Review 872 (1919). 
State v. Dabbs, 228 La. 960, 84 So. 2d. 601 (1956). 
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Wisconsin 
The 1955 Wisconsin Criminal Code, which took effect 
July l, 1956, has consolidated into its Chapter 943 nearly all crimes 
against property. This chapter is subdivided into the three main 
types of property offenses under the headings of "Damage," "Trespass," 
and "misappropriation." 
Under the subdivision "Damage" are set out five sections 
defining property crimes which cover causing physical injury to pro-
perty, malicious mischief, and arson. 
Under the subdivision "Trespass" are set out five sections 
dealing with property crimes which cover unlawful entry into or upon 
another's property, including burglary; entering locked motor vehicles; 
and trespass to land or dwellings. 
The major subdivision of property crimes, which contains 
seventeen sections, is "Misappropriation." This subdivision sets out 
definitions of the theft type offenses, of various forms of obtaining 
property by fraud, forgery, bad checks, extortion, and robbery. In 
addition it contains the section 011 receiving stolen property. 
The following discussion will deal only with the 
Wisconsin statutes a,10 case law on property crimes ot "Misappropriation." 
It will first treat separately the general "Theft" provision (§ 943.20) 
then set out the stxteen other statutes covering specific forms of 
misappropriation. 
General Theft Statute. The 1955 Wisconsin Criminal Code 
defines the er ime of "Mi sappropr ia tion" in the form of "Theft" in three 
subsections. The first subsection in four paragraphs defines the conduct 
punishable as theft; the second subsection defines the four key terms 
used in the section; and the third subsection sets out the penalties 
which apply to various forms of theft: 
~ 943. 20 Theft. 
(l) Whoever does any of the following may 
be penalized as provided in subsection (3}: 
(a) Intentionally takes and carries away, 
uses, transfers, conceals, or retains 
possession of movable property of another 
without his consent and with intent 
to deprive the owner permanently of 
possession of such property. 
(b) By virtue of his office, business or 
employment, or as trustee or bailee, having 
possession or custody of money or of a 
negotiable security, instrument, paper 
or other negotiable writing of another, 
intentionally uses, transfers, conceals, 
or retains possession of such money, 
security, instrument, paper or writing 
without the owner's consent, contrary 
to his authority, and with intent 
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to convert to his own use or to the use 
of any other person except the owner. A 
refusal to deliver any money or a 
negotiable security, instrument, paper or 
other negotiable writing, which is in 
his possession or custody by virtue of 
his office, business or employment, or 
as bailee, upon demand of the person entitled 
to receive it, or as required by law, 
is prima facie evidence of an intent 
to convert to his own use within the 
meaning of this paragraph. 
(c) Having a legal interest in movable 
property, intentionally and without consent, 
takes such property out of the possession 
of a pledgee or other person having a 
superior right of possession, with intent 
thereby to deprive the pledgee or 
other person permanently of the possession 
of such property. 
(d) Obtains title to property of another 
by intentionally deceiving him with a false 
representation which is known to be false, 
made with intent to defraud, and which does 
defraud the person to whom it is made. 
"False representation" includes a promise 
made with intent not to perform it if it 
is a part of a false and fraudulent scheme. 
(2) Definitions. In this section: 
(a) "Property" means all forms of tangible 
property, whether real or personal, 
without limitation including electricity, 
gas and documents which represent or 
embody a chose in action or other 
intangible rights. 
(b) "Movable property" is property whose 
physical location can be changed, without 
limitation including electricity and gas, 
documents which represent or embody 
intangible rights, and things growing on, 
affixed to or found in land. 
(c) "Value" means the market value at the 
time of the theft or the cost to the victim 
of replacing the property within a reasonable 
time after the theft, whichever is less, 
but if the property stolen is a document 
evidencing a chose in action or other 
intangible right, value means either 
the market value of the chose in action 
or other right or the intrinsic value of 
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the document, whichever is greater. 
If the thief gave consideration for, or 
had a legal interest in the stolen 
property, the amount of such consideration 
or value of such interest shall be 
deducted from the total value of the property. 
(d) "Property of another" includes property 
in which the actor is a co-owner and property 
of a partnership of which the actor is a 
member, unless the actor and the victim 
are husband and wife. 
( 3 ) Pe n a 1 tie s • Pe n a 1 t i e s for v i o 1 a t ion 
of this section shall be as follows: 
(a) If the value of the property does 
not exceed $100, a fine of not more than 
$200 or imprisonment for not more than six 





If the value of the property exceeds 
but not $2,500, a fine of not more 
$5,000 or imprisonment for not more than 
years or both. 
(c) _ If the value of the property exceeds 
$2,500, a fine of not more than $10,000 or 
imprisonment for not more than 15 years or 
both. 
(d) If the value of the property is less 
than $2,500 and any of the following 
circumstances exist, a fine of not more than 
$5,000 or imprisonment for not more than 
five years or both: 
1. The property is a domestic animal; or 
2. The property is taken from the person 
of another or from a corpse; or 
3. The property is taken from a building 
which has been destroyed or left 
unoccupied because of physical 
disaster, riot, bombing or the 
proximity of battle; or 
4. The property is taken after physical 
disaster, riot, bombing, or the 
proximity of battle has necessitated 
its removal from a building. 
(Note: Subsection (1) (b) was amended by 
Wisconsin Law 1959 c. 193 which added the final 
clause of the first sentence, reading "or 
to the use of any other person except the owner.") 
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Case Law. Several cases have construed the new 
general theft provision of the 1955 Wisconsin criminal code, 
but only one is significant in determining the meaning of the 1955 
statute. 
In this case, the defendant appealed a conviction on 
several counts of larceny and burglary of gasoline service stations. 
The prosecution's case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence. 
This evidence showed that when the defendant was arrested in his car, 
the auto contained several tools which had been taken from burglarized 
service stations. Moreover, other property taken during the burglaries 
was found hidden under and about the cottage where the defendant lived 
alone. The defendant, who twice had been convicted of other felonies, 
did not testify, nor did other witnesses testify in his behalf. 
On appeal of his conviction by a judge without a jury, 
the defendant contended that the evidence that the stolen merchandise 
was found in his sole possession was insufficient to support a con-
viction. In UP£8lding the conviction, the majority of the Wisconsin 
court declared: 
Mere possession of stolen property raises 
no inference of guilt, but Wisconsin from 
early times has followed the rule that 
unexplained possession of recently stolen 
goods raises an inference of greater or 
less w~ight, depending upon the circumstances 
that the possessor is guilty of the 
theft and also of burglary if they were 
stolen in burglary. Such inference 
being in the nature of a presumption of 
fact calls for an explanation of how the 
possessor obtained the property ••• 
The nature of the possession of the 
stolen goods is important, whether it 
is open and unconcealed and whether 
the goods are such as the person found 
in possession thereof would probably be 
possessed of in an unlawful way. This 
is what is meant by an inference of 
greater or less weight depending upon 
the circumstances. 
Since the defendant had failed to rebut the "presumption 
of fact" by explaining sufficiently his possession of the recently 
stolen items, the presumption remained sufficient to support his 
conviction. 
10. State v. Johnson, 11 Wisconsin 2d 130, 104 N.W. 2d 379 (1960). 
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Law Reyiew Comment. In a 1956 article, one of the 
code's authors wrote: 
A major achievement of the code is the 
drawing together of the crimes of larceny, 
larceny by bailee, embezzlement, obtaining 
property by false pretenses and the 
confidence game into a single offense 
labeled "theft." The old crimes are 
not as fully amalgamated as they were in the 
1953 draft, since the various ways in 
which "theft" can be committed correspond 
roughly to the old crimes and many of 
their distinguishing characteristics 
are preserved. Yet most of the ditticulties 
which have been encountered in the past 
are eliminated. The reduction in the 
number of statute sections is alone a 
great boon; yet the law is much more 
fully stated in fewer words than in 
the previous statutes. And the inclusion 
of "promissory" fraud will make it possible 
to deal with a class of swindles which 
have heretofore gone unpunished because 
a promise made with intent not to pertorm 
it was not a "false pretense" under the 
old law. The code sentence changing 
the rule is, "'False representation' 
includes a promise made with intent 
not to perform it if it is a part of 
a false and fraudulent scheme." The 
italicized clause will prevent any 
tendency to prosecute ordinary breaches 
of contract. 
The concept of theft of services has been 
dropped, except if they are obtained by 
putting a slug in a coin box (s 943.22), 
which is a minor part of the problem. 
Why, one may ask, if it is theft to 
obtain property by false pretenses, is 
it not equally reprehensible by like 
means to get someone to perform labor? 
A later article points out that§ 943.20 (l) (a) 
contains an ambiguity. That is, the sentence may be construed to 
mean that the act prohibited by it always includes a "taking." This 
would result by reading the series as one following "takes and" --
thus arriving at the result that one who "takes and carries away," 
11. Platz, "The Criminal Code," 1956 Wisconsin Law Review, 350, 374,375. 
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"takes and uses," "takes and transfers," etc., commits the forbidden 
act. Yet the sensible and plainly intended meaning seems to be one 
which would limit the requirement of "taking" to cases where one 
"takes and carries away." This would include the classic cases of 
common law larceny where there was a trespass in the taking together 
with an asportation. Thus the prosecution would not have to prove a 
taking when it is alleged that this subsection was violated by use, 
transfer, concealment or detention of another's property. This 
ambiguity could have been avoided by a different drafting technique. 12 
Professor Baldwin pointed out in his article that the 
term "property" as defined in§ 943.20 (2) (a) was intended to bring 
the broadest possible range of subjects within the theft provision. 
Such a broad definition of "property" (in some recent statutes the 
term used is "anything of value") makes it possible to eliminate 
numerous sections, each enacted to bring within the ambit of property 
subject to larceny a particular form of property or evidence of 
property not subject to larceny at common law. Even items which are 
contraband may be subject to larceny if within this broad definition. 
Services and labor are not included in "property." But any tangible 
thing is made subject to theft, "including negotiable notes, commercial 
paper, and the like. 11 13 
In theft the thing misappropriated must be the property 
"of another." Professor Baldwin noted that the definition of "property 
of another" (found in ! 939.22 (28) ) is: "property in which a person 
other than the actor has a legal interest which the actor has no right 
to defeat and impair, even though the actor may have a legal interest 
in the property." Thus, he asserts, property which has been abandoned 
is not the subject of theft, for it is not the property "of another." 
But the term includes, "property in which the actor is a co-owner and 
property of a partnership of which the actor is a member, unless the 
actor and the victim are husband and wife." Note that although a 
spouse may not steal property co-owned with the other spouse alone, 
there may be theft of property co-owned by the thief, his spouse, and 
a third person. Moreover a spouse may be convicted for theft of 
property solely owned by the other spouse.14 
Even though abandoned property may not be the subject 
of theft in Wisconsin, property merely lost may be. The mere finding 
of lost property is not a crime, but if the finder retains the property 
with required criminal intent theft may be committed. Conviction of a 
finder would require a showing that the finder knows or by reasonable 
efforts could learn the identity of the owner and the finder purposely 
omits taking reasonable measures to restore the p~operty to its 
owner. The criminal conduct in this instance is an omission to act 
after lawful conduct gives rise to a duty to act. The new section 
has eliminated the common law rule that to hold a finder of lost 
property guilty of larceny with respect.to.that property it was 
necessary to find that he had a criminal intent at the time of finding 




Baldwin, "Criminal Appropriation in Wisconsin -- Part I," 44 




The mental element requisite to theft under§ 943.20 (1) 
(a) requires both (1) that the act be done "intentionally" and 
(2) that it be done "with intent to deprive the owner permanently of 
possession ••• " The first requirement is satisfied by showing that 
the defendant knew the property belonged to another and that his 
actions with respect to the property were without the owner's consent. 
The second requirement is the traditional element of common law laiceny 
and could be negatived by the defendant's showing that he intends to 
return the property. An intention to return the propert~ however, 
does not preclude conviction of theft in the nature of embezzlement 
under§ 943.20 (l} (b). Moreover, § 943.23 defines as a separate 
theft offense the operation of a vehicle without15he owner's consent, without regard to intent to deprive permanently. 
Professor Baldwin also made several other comments on the 
meaning intent of the Wisconsin geoeral theft statute which shows 
the intent of the code's drafters: 10 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid. 
The act required to support a conviction under 
943.20 (1) (b) is an intentional "use, transfer, 
concealment or retention" of the kind of property 
covered. Such acts amount to "dealing with 
property as if it were the actor's own. It is 
the purpose of the criminal code to proscribe 
such a conflict with the right of the true 
owner. Wisconsin case law has established 
that the .test is not the benefit to the 
defendant, but the use by him of another's 
property. Thus if a defendant uses the 
property of "O" for the benefit of a 
third party, "X," rather than for the defendant's 
own benefit, he may nevertheless be 
convicted. 
The mental element under§ 943.20 (1) (b) is guite 
different from that required by§ 943.20 (1) \a). 
Under (1) (b) the intent is "to convert to 
his own use or to the use of any other person 
except the owner." Because the property 
covered by (1) (b) is peculiarly susceptible 
to loss by theft, the law accords it special 
protection by (1/ (b) generally and by 
eliminating the defense of an intent 
to repay or return it later. Thus the 
bank teller who surreptitiously "borrows" 
money from his employer -- intending to repay 
it from huge anticipated profits in a racetrack 
venture -- may be convicted. This is in 
accord with prior law in Wisconsin as 
e 1 sewhere. 
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LAlthough fraud is not ex~ressly stated as an 
element of the§ 943.20(1J(b) offense, it was 
required by the prior Wisconsin code provision 
and the cases thereunder.? ••. fraud is still 
required and a mere civiT conversion of the 
property would not suffice for conviction under 
( l ) ( b ) • "The e l em en t of fr a u d wa s rec it e d in the 
prior law and in cases because of the natural 
unwillingness of courts to make an ordinary 
breach of contract the basis for criminal liability." 
Thus mere conversion is not enough without showing 
it was an intentional conversion; mere use is not 
enough without showing it was an intentional use. 
The jury must consider all the facts and circum-
stances before finding that there was an 
intentional conversion or use. Thus the mental 
element is recited 11 in a manner more precise, but 
no different in effect, than the common law." 
Confusion arising from the phrase 'fraudulent 
and felonious' is eliminated. 
Subsection (1) (c) proscribes the conduct of 
a person who having a legal interest in movable 
property, takes it out of tne possession of 
another with superior right of possession. 
He must act witn intent to defeat the other's 
interest in the property, or must believe 
that his act will effect a permanent 
deprivation of another of a superior right 
of possession. 
An illustration of how this section might 
work is supplied by a Minnesota decision, 
State y. Cohen (196 Minn. 39, 263 N.W. 
922 (1935) }. The defendan·t was the owner of 
a Hudson seal fur coat which was delivered to 
the complainant, a furrier, for alterations. 
A fictitious name was given by the owner's 
husband at the time of delivery, and 
when the coat was ready the defendant refused to 
pay. The furrier refused to deliver the 
coat without payment, and there matters stood 
for several weeks. After repeated efforts to 
get paid the furrier took the coat to the 
defendant's home. The defendant took the 
coat for the announced purpose of trying it 
on before a mirror; the furrier was left 
waiting at the door. The defendant in 
response to repeated requests refused to pay 
for the alterations or return the coat to 
the furrier. On this evidence, the court 
sustained a conviction for larceny on the 
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ground that the evidence could disclose an 
intention to deprive the furrier of his lien, 
Hence a person can be guilty of larceny where 
the object taken is his own property if 
another has a superior right to possession, 
and if the taking is intended to result 
in a deprivation of that right. 
The requisite act under~ 943.20 (1) (c) is a 
taking of unauthorized control by taking 
possession. The common law is in accord 
because of the definition given to property 
"of another." "Of another" has referred 
to possession rather than to title or 
ownership. 
Subsection 943.20 (1) (d) covers the common 
law crime of obtaining property by false 
pretenses. Here the theft is accomplished 
by deceit, as distinguished from theft by 
stealth -- the classic case of larceny. 
Hence, the element of trespass, a requisite 
of common law larceny, is not present. Absent 
also is the lawful possession or custody 
present in ••• embezzlement. 
To be guilty under (1) (d), the defendant 
must have acquired title to another's property. 
"This requirement is a carry-over from the old 
law which required that the victim relinquish 
property intending to transfer not only 
possession but title also. Accordingly, 
a person might or might not be guilty of a 
crime if he obtained the property b¥ a false 
promise, depending on whether he obtained title 
to the property or only possession of it. 
The crime of false pretenses required that 
the actor obtain title to the property." But 
this does not mean that to be convicted one 
must have obtained absolute or clear title; 
any title obtained by fraud is voidable. 
Generally acquisition of bare legal title is 
the means of violating this subsection, but 
even that is not required in Wisconsin • 
.{rhi~7 requirement refers to obtaining title 
to property. Hence it is not criminal under 
this subsection to induce another to render 
personal services by false representation, 
or to induce another to extend credit. 
Criminal liability, if any, must be founded on 
other sections of the code or statutes. 
- 97 -
Another requisite of the s 943.20 (l) (d) crime 
is that the victim must have been in fact 
deceived. If he was deceived, the fact that 
he was utterly careless or very stupid and that 
a reasonable man would not have been deceived 
is no defense. In addition to the fact of 
deception there must be a showing that the 
victim was deprived of his property as a 
result of the deception, but the facts 
misrepresented need not have been the sole 
matter on which the victim,relied. 
Subsection (l) (d) has substantially enlarged 
the crime of theft through false pretenses by 
including as a false representation sufficient 
to support conviction, a promise made with 
intent not to perform it if it is a part of 
a false and fraudulent scheme. The general 
rule, previously followed in Wisconsin, was 
that a misrepresentation as to a future act 
or fact was insufficient. The promise of 
future action must be made with intent not 
to perform it. 
The mental element under (1) (d) is an intention 
to deprive the owner of title. Thus an intent to 
return the property is a defense. Moreover, 
the defendant must deceive his victim 
"intentionally" by a representation "known" 
by defendant to be false, and there must be 
an "intent to defraud." 
Value of the property lost by theft is to be 
determined, under the Wisconsin code, according 
to the rules set out in § 943.20 (2) (c). 
Generally the value to be taken is the lesser of 
(a) market value at the time of the theft, or 
(b) cost of replacement within a reasonable 
time after the theft. If the thing taken is 
a document evidencing a chose in action 
or intangible right, its value for purposes of 
theft is the greater of the document's 
intrinsic value or the market value of the 
chose or right it represents. The value of 
any consideration given by the thief or of any 
property interest he had in the item is to be 
deducted. The fact that the property is 
contraband does not preclude its having a 
market value, but it is to be considered 
in establishing what the market value is, 
for illegality of the victim's possession 
certainly affects usefulness and salability. 
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Proposed Le9islation for Colorado 
The foregoing discussion of general theft statutes in two 
of the states in which they have been adopted indicates some of the 
problems involved in application and interpretation. For this reason, 
further study and consideration of proposed general theft legislation 
is needed and no recommendation is being made at this time by the 
Criminal Code Committee. 
Text of Proposed Legislation 
The Illinois criminal code was followed in preparing proposed 
general theft legislation for consideration by the Criminal Code 
Committee for the following reasons: 
1) The Illinois code follows the Model Penal Code quite 
closely, so that benefit is obtained not only of the thinking of the 
American Law Institute, but also of the six years of intensive study 
and work by the combined Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations' 
Joint Committee to Revise the Illinois criminal code. 
2) Following the Illinois code will retain, for whatever 
benefit it may have, the historical tradition of Colorado statutory 
law being based upon Illinois law. 
3) Following a code already enacted in a heavily populated 
state should make available, at an early date, numerous court interpre-
tations of the code's provisions. 
4) The Illinois code seems the best model, simply because 
of its great clarity of expression, simplicity of terminology, 
logical organization, and unification of the several kinds of crimes 
conceptually within individual subdivisions of the code. 
This proposed legislation was designed to provide a starting 
point for further study and not as a final product for adoption. Much 
research is needed to determine its effect on present Colorado sub-
stantive law. 
The text of this preliminary proposal follows: 










Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of 
Obtains by deception control over property of the owner; 
Obtains by threat control over property of the owner; or 
Obtains control over stolen property knowing the property 
stolen by another, and 
1) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the 
use or benefit of the property; or 
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2) Knowingly uses, conceals or abandons the property 
in such manner as to deprive the owner permanently 
of such use or benefit; or 
3) Uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing 
such use, concealment or abandonment probably 
will deprive the owner permanently of such use 
or benefit. 
Section 2: Penalty. 
A person first convicted of theft of property not from the 
person and not exceeding $150 in value shall be fined not to exceed 
$500 or imprisoned in a penal institution other than the penitentiary 
not to exceed one year, or both. A person convicted of such theft a 
second or subsequent time, or after a prior conviction of any type of 
theft, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary from one to 5 years. A 
person convicted of theft of property from the person or exceeding 
$150 in value shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary from one to 10 
years. 
Section 3: 
An indictment or information charging the crime of theft is 
sufficient if it alleg·es that the defendant committed theft by 
unlawfully dealing with the property of another. 
Section 4: Theft of Lost or Mislaid Property. 
· A person who obtains control over lost or mislaid property 
commits theft when he: 
a) Knows or learns the identity of the owner or knows, or 
is aware of, or learns of a reasonable method of identifying the 
owner, and 
b) Fails to take reasonable measures to restore the property 
to the owner, and 
c) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or 
benefit of the property. 
Penalty. 
A person convicted of theft of lost or mislaid property 
shall be fined not to exceed $500 or double the value of such property, 
whichever is greater. 
Section 5: Theft of Labor or Services ..2! Use of Property. 
a) A person commits theft when he obtains the temporary use 
of property, labor or services of another which are available only 
for hire, by means of threat or deception or knowing that such use is 




A person convicted of theft of labor or services or use of 
property shall be fined not to exceed $500 or imprisoned in a penal 
institution other than the penitentiary not to exceed one year, or 
both. 
Section 6: Offender's Interest in the Property. 
a) It is no defense to a charge of theft of property that 
the offender has an interest therein, when the owner also has an 
interest to which the offender is not entitled. 
b) Where the property involved is that of the offender's 
spouse, no prosection for theft may be maintained unless the parties 
were not living together as man and wife and were living in separate 
abodes at the time of the alleged theft. 
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CRIMINAL INSANITY 
Brief History and Discussion of Criminal Insanity Tests and Procedures 
Early English Tests 
Insanity was not a defense to a criminal charge in England 
until the fourteenth century. Prior to that time the mentally 
incompetent were held fully accountable for their criminal acts. 1 
In 1724, a leading case established the ''Wild Beast Test" to be 
applied by the jury in drawing a line between mental illness serious 
enough to constitute a defense in a criminal case and that which 
would not. In that case, the trial judge instructed the jurors as 
follows: "It is not every kind of frantic humor or somefuing unaccount-
able in a man's actions that points him out to be such a madman as to 
be exempted from punishment; it must be a man that is totally deprived 
of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, 
no more than an infant, than a brute, or wild beast, such a one is 
never the object of punishment; therefore I must leave it to your 
consideration, whether the condition this man was in, as it is 
represented to you on one side, or the other, doth show a man, who 
knew what he was doing, and was able to distinguish whether he was 
doing good or evil, and understood what he did." 2 
In 1812, in the murder trial of one Bellingham who suffered 
under a delusional mental disorder causing him to believe that the 
government owed him large sums of money and who shot and killed a 
treasury official who refused to pay him, the "right and wrong" test 
was set out in the following words (which seem to eliminate consideration 
of a mere insane delusion): "If such a person were capable, in other 
respects, of distinguishing right from wrong, there was no excuse for 
any act of atrocity which he might commit under this description of 
derangement ... The single queston was whether, when he committed the 
offense charged upon him he had sufficient understanding to distinguish 
good from evil, right from wrong, and that murder was a crime not only 
against the law of God, but against the law of his Country." 
M'Naghten's Rule 
The most important English case on criminal insanity is the 
M'Naghten Case. Daniel M'Naghten labored under an insane delusion 
that he was being harassed by personal enemies, including Sir Robert 
Peel. In that condition he shot and killed Sir Robert Peel's private 
secretary, believing him to be Sir Robert. In his murder trial, the 
1. Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense (1954) p. 53. 
2. Arnold's Case, 16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724). -
3. Weihofen ~cit. p. 58. 
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defendant submitted medical evidence that he was affected by morbid 
delusions robbing him of self-control and leaving him without an 
appreciation of right aad wrong. The jury found him not guilty on 
the ground of insanity. The public clamor at the acquittal of one 
who had killed such a popular figure and had attempted to take the 
life of Sir Robert Peel caused the House of Lords to submit five 
questions concerning the existing law on the defense of insanity in 
criminal trials to the fifteen judges of England. Two of the questions 
dealt with cases in which defendants labored under insane delusions. 
In answer to those questions the judges declared that one suffering 
an insane delusion must have his act judged as if the facts with 
respect to which the delusion existed had been real. "For example, 
if under the influence of his delusion he supposed another man to be 
in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, 
as he supposes, in self defense, he would be exempt from punishment. 
If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury 
on his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such 
proposed injury, he would be liable to punishment. 11 5 
The second and third questions asked the judges what instruct-
ions might be given a trial jury regarding the test of insanity. In 
reply, the judges stated that "The jury ought to be told in all cases 
that every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient 
degree of reason and to be responsible for his crimes, until the 
contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that, to establish a 
defense on a ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at 
the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under 
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the 
nature and quality of the act that he was doing, or if h~ did know it 
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. • . . 110 
The "right and wrong" test has been amplified by explaining 
that the knowledge of right and wrong refers to such knowledge with 
respect to the very act charged, rather than knowledge of right and 
wrong in the abstract. Furthermore it refers not only to knowledge 7of legal right and wrong, but also knowledge of moral right and wrong. 
The M'Naghten Rule has been severely criticized by both legal 
and medical authorities. Professor Weihofen has summarized the most 
significant criticisms as follows: 
1) The concepts of 11 right 11 and "wrong" are ethical or moral 
concepts and have no proper place in a scientific or legal test of 
mental disorder. Society's moral standards of right and wrong change 
from one era to the next, as certainly our morals have changed somewhat 
5ince 1843 when the M'Naghten Case opinion was written. A legal test 
of insanity based on a moral standard of right and wrong lacks the 
precision that such a test should have. 
2) The "right and wrong" test was based on psychopathological 
notions which are now dated and fail to conform to present day 





10 Clark and Fin. 200 






and ignores the role played by the emotions in personality disorders. 
Modern psychiatry emphasizes the importance of the emotional rather 
than the intellectual genesis of crime. Moreover, the test ignores 
the role of the unconscious, since it predated the work of Sigmund 
Freud by ~O years. The concept of attenuated responsibility is not 
recognized, and the psychopathic personality is entirely ignored. 
3) The "right and wrong" test provides a defense only for 
those whose mental disorder affects the cognitive or intellectual 
phase of the mind and makes no allowance for disorders causing deficiency 
or destruction of will power. Thus one who has no control over his 
instinctive urgings and impulses because of mental deterioratio_n would 
not be accorded the defense of insanity because he would be able to 
understand the
8
wrongness of his act, aithough unable to resist 
performing it. 
British Royal Commission 
In 1953 the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 
recommended substituting for the M'Naghten Rule the following test: 
"The jury must be satisfied that, at the time of committing the act, 
the accused, as a result of a disease of the mind or mental deficiency 
a) did not know the nature and quality of the act orb) did not know 
that it was wrong or c) was incapable of preventing himself from 
committing it. 11 9 The effect of this, of course, would be to add to 
the present M'Naghten test that "irresistible impulse" test. A 
majority of the Royal Commission would have preferred to eliminate the 
M'Naghten test entirely and substitute the simpler test, to be 
determined by the jury, "Whether at the time of the act the accused 
was suffering from a disease of the mind or mental defici5ncy to 
such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible." 
Irresistible Impulse 
The M'Naghten test is still used in England and Canada. In 
the United States the M'Naghten formula is the sole test of criminal 
responsibility in most states and in nearly all of the others it is 
the main test but is supplemented by.,the ''irresistible impulse" test. 
Colorado is one of the minority of states recognizing both tests. The 
leading Colorado case, Ryan y. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756, 
(1916), established the dual standard still followed in this state. 
The language of the Ryan case has been adopted in statutory form 
together with a legislative mandate that this form be used in instructing 
the jury in any case where insanity is claimed as a defense. 
8. Ibid. ,p. 66. 




Colorado law provides, "The applicable test of insanity in 
such cases shall be, and the jury shall be so instructed: a person who 
is so diseased in the mind at the time of the act as to be incapable 
of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to that act, or being 
able so to distinguish, has suffered such an impairment of mind by 
disease as to destroy the will power and render him incapable of 
choosing the right and refraining from doing the wrong,· is not account• 
able; and this is true howsoever such insanity may be manifested, 
whether by irresistible impulse or otherwise. But care should be 
taken not to confuse such mental disease with moral obliquity, mental 
depravity, or passion growing out of anger, revenge, hatred or other 
motives, and kindred evil considerations, for when the act is
1
lnduced 
by any of these causes the person is accountable to the law." 
Durham Rule 
In 1954 the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia, which until that date had adhered to a combination 
M'Naghten - irresistible impulse test of insanity similar to that 
now used in Colorado, decided to simplify· the legal test of insanity 
so that the trier of fact would be free to consider all pertinent 
testimony from relevant scientific di2ciplines. The court criticized the right and wrong test as follows: 
The fundamental objection to the right-wrong 
test, however, is not that criminal irresponsibility 
is made to rest upon an inadequate, invalid or 
indeterminable symptom or manifestation, but that 
it is made to rest upon~ particular sympton. 
In attempting to define insanity in terms of a 
symptom, the courts have assumed an impossible 
role, not merely one for which they have no 
special competence. As the Royal Commission 
emphasizes, it is dangerous to abstract particular 
mental faculties, and to lay it down that unless 
these particular faculties are destroyed or gravely 
impaired, an accused person, whatever the nature of 
his mental disease, must be held to be criminally 
responsible .... In this field of law as in others, 
the fact finder should be free to consider all 
information advanced by relevant scientific disciplines. 
Moreover, the same court criticized the "Irresistible Impulse" 
test as carrying "the misleading implication that 'diseased mental 
conditions' produce only $Udden, momentary or spontaneous inclinations 
to commit unlawful acts. 11 13 The court illustrated its point that a 
11. 39-8-1, C.R.S. 1953. 
12. Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862, 872 (D.C. Gire. 1954) 
13. Ibid. 
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diseased mental condition may bring about or cause criminal action 
which is recognized as wrong and yet is not the result of the sudden 
impulse, by quoting from the findings of the Royal Commission: "In 
many cases .•. this is not true at all. The sufferer 
for example) experiences a change of mood which alters the whole of his 
existence. He may believe, for instance, that a future of such 
degradation and misery awaits both him and his family that death for 
all is a less dreadful alternative. Even the thought that the acts he 
contemplates are murder and suicide pales into insignificance in 
contrast with what he otherwise expects. The criminal act, in such 
circumstances, may be the reverse of impulsive. It may be coolly and 
carefully prepared; yet it is still the act of a madman. This is 
merely an illustration; similar states of mind are likely to lie 
behind the criminal act when murders are committed by persons who 
suffer from schizophrenia or paranoid psychoses due to disease of the 
brain." 
Summarizing, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
declared: "We find that as an exclusive criterion the right-wrong test 
is inadequate in that a) it does not take sufficient account of psychic 
realities and scientific knowledge, and b) it is based upon one symptom 
and so cannot be applied in all circumstances. We find that the 
"irresistible impulse" test is also inadequate in that it gives no 
recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and reflection 
and so relegates acts caused by such illness to the application of the 
inadequate right-wrong test. We conclude that a broader test should 
be adopted. 11 14 
the court then declared a new test of criminal insanity for 
the District of Columbia: "It is simply that an accused is not 
criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of mental 
disease or mental defect." Further elucidating the terminology of 
this test, the court declared: "We use 'disease' in the sense of a 
condition which is capable of either improving or deteriorating. We 
use 'defect' in the sense of a condition which is not considered 
capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may be either 
congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a 
physical or mental dise~se.15 
Without purporting to formulate an instruction appropriate 
or binding in all cases, the court stated that any instruction under 
the new test should in some way convey to the jury the sense and 
substance of the following: "If you the jury believe beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused was not suffering from a diseased 
or defective mental condition at the time that he committed the 
criminal act charged, you may find him guilty. If you believe he was 
suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition when he 
committed the act but believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the act 
was not the product of such mental abnormality, you may find him guilty. 
Unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt, either that he was not 
l4. Ibid.,p.874. 
15. Ibid., p. 875. 
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suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition, or that the 
act was not the product of such abnormality, you must find the accused 
not quilty by reason of insanity. Thus, your task would not be 
completed upon finding, if you did find, that the accused suffered 
from a mental disease or defect. He would still be responsible for 
his unlawful act if there was no causal connection between such mental 
abnormality and the act. These questions must be determined by you 
from the facts which you find to be fairly deducible from the testimony 
a n d the ev id enc e i n th i s ca s e . " 16 
New Hampshire and Maine 
The test laid down by the Durham case is strikingly similar 
to the test which has been in effect for over 80 years in New Hampshire 
and which was established in State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870). The 
same basic test has been adopted by-statute in Maine. 
Criticism of Durham Rule 
In a recent article, a professor of psychiatry severely 
criticized the Durham rule. He pointed out that the M'Naghten rule 
requires that the jury be told that a man is to be presumed sane until 
the contrary, i.e., his insanity, has been proved to their satisfaction. 
"This is a doctrine of responsibility and one which places the burden 
upon the defendant to establish a defense, not the court to prove him 
sane. 1111 
Doctor Scher added: "To my mind the Durham rule contains 
several questionable aspects, some of which have been discussed 
elsewhere. The ambiguity of the terms "product", "mental disease", 
and "mental defect" has been remarked upon. One area which has perhaps 
not received sufficient ·attention is, I believe, the negative approach 
in the.charge to the jury, which instead of asking them to pass on 
whether the defendant has adequately demonstrated his defense of 
insanity, reverses this situation. The jury is given the burden of 
determining 'the act was not the product of •.. mental abnormality. 
beyond a reasonable doubt--:--W- This reversal of the roles whereby the 
burden is thrown to the jury to accept the plea, places the jury in a 
very difficult position indeed. It is difficult enough for the 
psychiatrist as expert to make such a determination and undoubtedly 
impossible for the jury to do so. Neither psychiatrists nor jurors 
can be mind readers or antegnosticians. Furthermore, much as I would 
not wish to state it, I think that we must face the fact that there 
are psychiatrists, like many another in our society, who see their 
testimony as something to merchandise, rather than something to be 
expended only with the greatest of caution and censure. 11 18 
Doctor Scher appears to suggest that the insanity issue be 
tried by a panel of medical experts rather than by a jury. This 





Scher, "Expertise and the Post Hoc 
Northwestern Law Review (1962). 
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Judgment of Insanity", 
by jury would be denied. Under Doctor Scher's proposal, a person who 
successfully pleaded insanity would be sentenced to treatment for an 
undetermined period until his recovery could be certified by a competent 
board of qualified psychiatrists.19 This would of course raise a 
question whether one could be "sentenced" after having been found 
not guilty by reason of insanity. Doctor Scher would obviate this 
problem by holding the insane defendant legally responsible but merely 
substituting psychiatric treatment for imprisonment. (Serious 
constitutional problems are obvious.) 
Model Penal Code 
In 1955 the American Law Institute published a tentative 
draft of the proposed provisions of the Model Penal Code relating to 
the test for mental disease or defect which would exclude responsibility 
for crime:20 
1) A person is not responsible for criminal 
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a 
result of mental disease or defect he lacks 
substantial capactiy either to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law. 
2) The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not 
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated 
criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct. 
The Model Penal Code test {in the first paragraph at least) 
follows closely the Durham test. The words "substantial capacity" 
are intended to provide a certain amount of leeway for a psychiatrist 
called upon to testify. Thus, it would not be necessary for a 
psychiatrist to find that a defendant claiming insanity was, at the 
time of the act, entirely incapacitated to appreciate the criminality 
of his conduct or conform that conduct to law. 
The portion of the test concerning capacity'to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct deals, as does the "right and wrong" 
test, with the cognitive aspect of mental illness. The portion 
pertaining to capacity to "conform his conduct" to the requirements 
of law deals with the "volitional" aspect of mental illness. The 
phrase "irresistible impulse" is not used, for it tends to imply that 
there must be suddenness or spontaneity in the urging to commit the 
criminal act and tends to eliminate very common cases accompanied by 
brooding or reflection where the defendant is, nevertheless, not a 
free agent. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Model Penal Code, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, The American Law 
Institute, Philadelphia, Pa., April 24, 1961, p. 4. 
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This test really amounts to a simplification and modernization 
of the present combination of "right and wrong" and "irresistible 
impulse" tests. The draftsmen intended that, in applying the 
11 Volitional11 aspect of the test, the fact finder must make a distinction 
between incapacity to conform one's conduct to legal standards and mere 
indisposition to do so. Obviously it is not intended that the latter 
be excused. 
Psychopathic Personality. Paragraph 2) of the Model Penal 
Code's test is designed to exclude from the concept of "mental disease 
or defect" the cases commonly known as "psychopathic personality" or 
"sociopathic personality." This follows the recommendation of the 
British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in its 1953 report 
which noted that psychopathy "is a statistical abnormality; that is to 
say, the psychopath differs from a normal person only quantitatively 
or in degree, not qualitatively; and the diagnosis of psychopathic 
personality does not carry with it any explanation of the causes of 
the abnormality." 
There is considerable dispute among American psychiatrists 
on the question whether or not psychopathy should be considered a 
mental disease. Some leading psychiatrists have strongly criticized 
paragraph 2) as making it possible for the wealty psychopath to rely 
on the defense of insanity but rendering the defense inaccessible to 
the psychopath without sufficient funds to obtain private psychiatric 
examination. This criticism is based on the opinion that it is 
possible to find through psychiatric testing and examination some 
mental disease or defect in nearly every psychopathic personality, in 
addition to the mere abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal 
conduct. 
Paragraph 2) has been adopted by statute in Maine as a 
modification of the statutory Durham rule in effect there. In addition, 
the Maine statute excludes drug addicti~~ and alcoholism from the 
definition of mental disease or defect. All of the psychiatrists 
who partici!ated in drafting the Model Penal Code provision repudiated 
paragraph 2 ~ The criticisms of this paragraph have been summarized 
as follows: L. 
Then why not do what the American Law Institute 
recommends ... and exclude the sociopath an~ his 
ilk from the benefits of mental irresponsibility? 
The answer is that such special restrictive 
clauses aimed at excluding certain specified 
categories of individuals from exculpation 
simply do not make any psychiatric sense. They 
are as arbitrary and capricious as excluding 
defendants with red hair or blue eyes or Negro 
blood from the benefits of the law of criminal 
responsibility. They define by legislative fiat 
21. Maine Revised Statutes Annotated, Chapter 49 §3PA (1961 Supp.). 
22. Diamond, "From M 'Naghten to Currens and Beyond, 11 57 California 
Law Review, 189 (May 1962). 
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what is and what is not a psychiatric condition. 
Further, they grossly discriminate against the 
defendant who is poor. In practically any case 
where the crime itself, or alcoholism or drug 
addiction is supposedly tn~ only evidence of 
mental disease, a skilled, competent and interested 
psychiatrist who spends sufficient time could 
discover other manifestations of mental abnorm-
ality sufficient to exculpate under the A.L.I. or 
Maine rules. But the routine case, superfluously 
examined by court appointed psychiatrists devoting 
a wholly inadequate time to the study of the 
defendant, would seldom end in acquittal. It 
costs a good deal of money for a defendant to 
engage psychiatric experts to make a full study 
of his case. The defendants who have such money 
would have no difficulty in demonstrating to 
the trier of fact that their behavior was not the 
only thing that troubled them. In all likelihood, 
defendants without such funds would be routinely 
passed by as II sane. 11 Thus a type of economic 
discrimination, which is bad enough under our 
present rule of M'Naghten would become much worse. 
Currens Case 
On May 1, 1961, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit laid down a new test of insanity in the case of United 
States~- Currens, 290 F. 2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). Currens had been 
convicted of violating the Dyer Act by interstate transportation of a 
stolen automobile. He had pleaded "not guilty'' and also "not guilty 
becau~e of insanity." At the trial, the_ psychi'atrist who had examined 
him on behalf of the government described Currens as a "sociopathic 
personality possessing an emotional instability reaction but that he 
knew the difference between right and wrong but would not adhere to 
the right." Doctor Bowers, the psychiatrist, examining wo~ld not say that 
Currens was subject to irresistible impulses which caused his criminal 
behavior but stated rather that he reacted without due regard for 
consequences and that his illegal and antisocial conduct was repetitive 
and an outgrowth of his type of personality. Doctor Bowers testified 
that it was his opinion that Currens' theft of the car, ... was the 
result of Currens' sociopathic personality and that a person with such 
a personality cannot be considered to be 'a mentally healthy person'. 
When asked if the 'sociopathic condition' was itself a mental disease, 
Doctor Bowers replied, "We consider it under the classification of 
mental illness but we do not consider them (persons possessing psycho-
pathic personalities) in the legal sense 'insane•.23 
23. United States v, Currens , 290 F. 2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1961). 
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The defendant's attorney asked the court to charge the jury 
using the test of insanity approved in the Durham case. The trial 
court, however, refused this request and charged the jury according 
to the M'Naghten test and the II irresistible impulse" rule. The jury 
found the defendant guilty. 
Insanity Defense for Psychofiaths. Chief Judge Biggs of the 
Third Circuit faced the question whet er the defense of insanity should 
in all cases be made unavailable to the psychopath or sociopath. After 
reviewing the psychiatric literature and noting the conflict of opinion 
among psychiatrists whether or not a psychopath can be considered a 
victim of mental illness, the court noted that the chief objection to 
including psychopaths among those entitled to raise the defense of 
insanity as sum es a particular definition of psychopathy: 11 the term 
psychopath comprehends a person who is a habitual criminal but whose 
mind is functioning normally." The court continued, "Perhaps some 
laymen and, indeed some psychiatrists, do define the term that broadly; 
and insofar as the term psychopathy does merely indicate a pattern of 
recurrent criminal behavior we would certainly agree that it does not 
describe a disorder which can be considered insanity for purposes of a 
defense to a criminal action. But, we are aware of the fact that 
psychopathy, or sociopathy, is a term which means different things to 
experts in the fields of psychiatry and psychology. Indeed, a confusing 
wealth of literature has grown about the term causing some authorities 
to give up its use in dismay, labeling it a "waste basket category. 11 24 
The court concluded, however, that there were "two very 
persuasive reasons why this court should not hold evidence of psychopathy 
as insufficient, as a matter of law, to put sanity or mental illness 
in issue. First, it is clear that as the majority of experts use the 
term, a psychopath is clearly distinguishable from one who merely 
demonstrates recurrent criminal behavior. 11 25 
Chief Judge Biggs noted that a leading authority, Doctor 
Winfred Overholser, superintendent of Saint Elizabeth's Hospital in 
the District of Columbia, and his staff, have taken the unequivocal 
position that sociopathy is a mental disease. Moreover, Chief Judge 
Biggs noted, in 1952 the American Psychiatric Association altered its 
nomenclature to remove sociopathic personality disturbance and psycho-
pathic personality disturbance from a non-diseased category and place 
them in a category of "mental disorders 11 .26 
Chief Judge Biggs also relied heavily on Doctor Hervey 
Cleckley's definition of psychopathic or sociopathic personality. 
Cleckley rules out those cases in which social standards are rejected 
only in respect to some one particular kind of behavior: for example, 
alcoholism or deviant sexual behavior in a person otherwise adapted to 
social demands. He also rules out those cases in which delinquency 
and crime have been adopted as a positive way of life - in which the 
person is an enemy of society but is capable of being a loyal and 
stable member of a delinquent gang. There remains a group characterized 
by a diffuse and chronic incapacity for persistent, ordered living of 
any kind. These are, in Cleckley's point of view, the true psychopathic 




personalities. They need not be diagnosed negatively, by exclusion 
of other possibilities. They constitute a true clinical entity with 
a characteristic pattern of symptoms.27 
From his review of the medical authorities Judge Biggs 
concluded that in many cases the term "psychopath" is applied by medical 
experts to persons who are very ill indeed. Thus, he asserted, "it 
would not be proper for this court in this case to deprive a large 
heterogeneous group of offenders of the defense of insanity by holding 
blindly and indiscriminately that a person described as psychopathic 
is always criminally responsible. 11 28 
The Third Circuit's second reason for refusing to hold that 
psychopaths are sane as a matter of law is that the term itself is too 
indefinite. Rather the court felt, "in each individual case all the 
pertinent symptoms of the accused should be put before the court and 
jury and the accused's criminal responsibility should be developed 
from the totality of his symptoms. A court of law is not an appropriate 
forum for a debate as to the meaning of abstract psychiatric classifi-
cations. The criminal law is not concerned with such classifications 
but with the fundamental issue of criminal responsibility. Testimony 
and arguments should relate primarily to the subject of the criminal 
responsibility of the accused and specialized terminology should be 
used only where it is helpful in determining whether a particular 
defendant could be held to the standards of the criminal law. 11 29 
Noting that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
has applied the Durham test to all types of mental illness, including 
psychopathy or sociopathy, the court held that the question whether a 
particular sociopath is insane within the meaning of the law is a 
question .of ultimate fact for the jury. In the instant case, the court 
concluded that there was sufficient evidence on which a reasonable 
jury might find that Currens did not possess the requisite guilty mind 
when he committed the alleged crime. 
Criticism of M'Naghten Rule. Next, addressing attention to 
the question of the proper test of insanity in a criminal case, the court 
traced the history of the M'Naghten rule and concluded that it was 
actually over 375 years old, having first been published "in a year in 
which belief in witchcraft and demonology even among well educated men 
was widespread. 11 30 Summarizing, the court concluded that the M'Naghten 
is also unworkable for many reasons, among them the following: 
One who violates a criminal law will be held responsible even in 
instances where he may believe his act to be morally right. For 
example, one who is sane as to most matters but suffers under a delusion 
as to a particular matter might well be found sane under the right and 
wrong test of M'Naghten. Our institutions for the mentally ill today 
contain many patients who are fully cognizant of the difference 
between right and wrong. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid. 
29. 1Qid., p. 763. 
30. Ibid. 
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the basic aims, purposes and assumptions of the criminal law." 36 
Criminal law is based on the assumption that a person has the capacity 
to control his behavior and choose his own course of conduct. Thus, 
Judge Biggs said, "where there exists a reasonable doubt whether a 
defendant possessed capacity of choice and control there is a reasonable 
doubt whether he possessed the necessary guilty mind to justify conviction. 
An adequate test of insanity should make clear to the jury that the fact 
that a defendant was suffering from a mental disease is not determinative 
of his criminal responsibility in and of itself, but is significant 
only in so far as it indicates the extent to which he lacked normal 
powers of control and choice when the allegedly criminal conduct was 
committed. In other words the test must provide the jury with a verbal 
tool by which it can relate the defendant's mental disease to his total 
personality and by means of which it can render an ultimate social and 
moral judgment."37 
The court found the Durham formula failed to meet these 
requirements. Under the Durham test, the prosecution has the burden 
of proving that the act committed was not the product of a mental 
disease or defect. "The test stresses, to the complete exclusion of 
all other considerations, a possible causal connection between the 
mental disease with which the defendant is afflicted and the act which 
he committed. When considering this test it is natural to think of 
the mental disease as a distinct vital force in the defendant's mind. 
producing some acts but not others. In so far as it has this effect, 
the test is, in much the same way as the M'Naghten rule, subject to 
the criticism that it wrongly assumes that the mind can be broken up 
into compartments, one part sane and the other part insane. Moreover, 
the test, limited as it is to a supposed causal connection between 
mental 0 diseases and criminal acts omits the most important step in 
deciding the issue of criminal responsibility, namely that of determining 
the total mental condition of the defendant at the time he committed the 
act, and providing the jury with a standard by means of which an ultimate 
social and moral judgment can be rendered."38 
The following formula was then adopted as the test for insanity 
in the Third Circuit: "The jury must be satisfied that at the time of 
committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental 
disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated."39 
This test borrows heavily from the first paragraph of the 
Model Penal Code test. However, the court deleted the phrase "to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct." A footnote to the opinion 
explains the court's feeling that this deleted phrase would "over-
emphasize the cognitive element in criminal responsibility and thus 
distract the Jury from the crucial issues while beinq little more than 
surplusage. 114 Moreover, the court expressed its full agreement with the 
36-: Ibid. 'p. 773. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Ibid. ,p. 774. 
40. IEia. 
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Model Penal Code test's second paragraph, excluding from the definition 
of "mental disease or defect" abnormalties manifested only by repeated 
criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct. 
To assist trial courts, the opinion formulated the following 
jury charge which would have been acceptable in the Currens case: 4 1 
If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant, Currens, was not suffering 
from a disease of the mind at the time he committed 
the criminal act charged, you may find him guilty. 
If you believe that he was suffering from a disease 
of the mind but believed beyond a reasonable doubt 
that at the time that he committed the criminal 
conduct with which he is charged he possessed 
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law which he is alleged to have 
violated you may find him guilty. Unless you 
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Currens 
was not suffering from a disease of the mind or 
that despite that disease he possessed substantial 
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of the law which he is alleged to have violated, 
you must find him not quilty by reason of insanity. 
Thus, your task would not be completed upon finding, 
if you did find, that the accused suffered from 
a disease of the mind. He would still be responsible 
for his unlawful act if you found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that at the time he committed the act, the 
disease had not so weakened his capacity to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of the law which he 
is alleged to have violated that he lacked substantial 
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of that law. These questions must be determined by 
you from the facts which you find to be fairly 
deducible from the evidence in this case. 
Critique of Currens Test 
Dr. Bernard L. Diamond, a California psychiatrist, has 
recently published a critique of the Currens formula. Doctor Diamond 
asserts that both the Durham rule and the Currens rule are far superior 
to the M'Naqhten and "irresistible impulse'' tests. Furthermore he 
states: 42 
Currens is superior to Durham, if for no other 
reason, than because it omits the troublesome 
'product' clause of both the Durham and the New 
Hampshire rules. Criminal b7havior is_not the "product" of mental disease in the strict ca~se 
and effect relationship that the law would like 
41. Ibid.,p. 77~-.-
42. Diamond, op. cit.,pp. 189-191. 
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There is no reason why the law should be wedded to the state 
of psychological knowledge in 1843. These rules cannot "be rationally 
justified except by a process of interpretation which distorts and 
often practically nullifies them •••• " Judge Biggs then quoted 
from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's testimony before the British Royal 
Commission, "The M'Naghten rules are in large measures shams. That 
is a strong word, but I think that the M'Naghten rules are very difficult 
for conscientious people and not difficult enough for people who say, 
'We'll just juggle them•. 11 31 
Judge Biggs then asked: "How, conceivably, can the criminal 
responsibility of a mentally ill defendant be determined by the answer 
to a single question placed on a moral basi 9? 113 2 He concluded that all 
that the M'Naghten rules accomplish is to put the testifying psychiatrist 
in a verbal straight jacket.33 
Furthermore, the court voiced the criticism that the "right-
wrong" test places the psychiatrist in a position where he must state 
a moral judgment and cannot avoid usurping, to some extent at least, the 
function of the jury. The court noted that many European nations have 
adopted legal rules relating to criminal responsibility of offenders 
suffering from mental disorder or weaknesses which bear no relation to 
the "right and wrong" test. The administration of criminal justice in 
those countries has not suffered by these improvements. Finally, the 
court concluded that the M'Naghten rules are not only unfair to the 
defendant but are dangerous to society, because instead of resulting 
in the isolation and treatment of those who are dangerously mentally 
ill until such time as it is safe for society to release them, the 
present rules result in imprisonment of these persons for definite 
periods after which they are released and frequently commit criminal 
conduct in the very community where they have been thrown back "untreated, 
and uncured. 11 34 
Formulation of Modern Test. The Currens opinion next dealt 
with the problem of formulating a modern test of criminal insanity for 
jury trials. First, said the court, an effective test must make it 
possible for the experts to present the entire picture of the defendant, 
including all of his symptomatology, before the court and to allow a 
full explanation. "The way must be cleared in any case, in which the 
mental condition of the defendant is at issue, for the psychiatrist to 
explain the condition of the defendant to the jury in understandable 
terms. 11 35 Second, an adequate test must provide the jury with a 
standard or formula by means of which it can translate the mental 
condition described by the psychiatrist into an answer to the ultimate 
question of whether the defendant possessed th~ necessary guilty mind to 
commit the crime charged. The test must make it possible "to verbalize 
the relationship between mental disease and the concept of 'guilty mind' 
in a way which will be both meaningful to a jury charged with the duty 
of determining the issue of criminal responsibility and consistent with 
31. Ibid. ,p. 766. 
32. Ibid.,p. 767. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Toid. ,p. 772 
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to believe. The vast majority of mental illnesses 
result in no criminal behavior of any kind. But 
certain psychological abnormalities in certain 
individuals so affect the motivational, ideational, 
and volitional psychology of those individuals 
that, under special environmental circumstances, 
aggressive, destructive, or immoral anti-social 
behavior occurs. In most of these instances the 
psychiatrist can say with probability, but never 
with certainty, that if it were not for the mental 
illness, the overt act would not have occurred. 
The essential phrase of Currens, 'lacked substantial 
capacity to conform,' should, I think, be much 
simpler for both the psychiatric expert and the lay 
juror to ponder over. Further, it provides an 
opportunity for the expert to describe any aspect 
of the defendant's psychology that he thinks may 
have some relevancy to his capacity to conform, 
whether it is a lack of knowledge of the wrongful-
ness of his act, or of its nature and quality, as 
required under M'Naghten or whether it is the 
defect of volitional control specified by the 
irresistible impulse test, or the "product" 
relationship of Durham. 
Currens is thus more inclusive than any other 
previous rule of responsibility. This will make 
Currens more appealing to those who believe the 
·existence of mental illness of any kind should be 
given the fullest possible consideration in a 
criminal trial. But for all those who believe 
that mental illness and what they regard as the 
fantasies of psychiatrists and humanist reformers 
already receive more attention than what they 
deserve in our courts of law, Currens will be a 
threat and vigorous opposition is to be expected. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
recently expressed its views on the various proposed legal tests of 
insanity as follows:43 
It is sufficient to say here that_ if the issue 
were now before us /comprising this particular 
panel of the Eighth-Circui!7, which it is not, 
we would hesitate to reverse a case where the 
trial court had employed instructions on insanity 
which this court has heretofore approved and 
henceforth we would be loath, indeed, to reverse 
where, as here, the trial court has used instructions, 
whether based theoretically on a M'Naghten variation 
or on the test set forth in the Model Penal Code ..• 
or on that form revised as suggested by the Third 
43. Dusky v. United States, 295 F2d 743, 759 (8th Cir. 1961). 
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Circuit in Currens, or whether couched in still 
other language, if the charge appropriately 
embraces and requires positive findings as to 
three necessary elements, namely the defendant's 
cognition, his volition, and his capacity to 
control his behavior. If those three elements--
knowledge, will and choice--are emphasized in 
the court's charge as essential constituents of 
the defendant's legal sanity, we suspect that 
the exact wording of the charge and the actual 
name of the test are comparatively unimportant ... 
Court Decisions and Tests in Other Jurisdictions 
Since the Currens decision, the highest appellate courts of 
Maryland and Pennsylvania have expressly rejected the suggestion that 
the "right-wrong'' test be abandoned in their respective jurisdictions 
in favor of the Durham rule or the Currens standard.44 
New Hampshire. Since 1870 New Hampshire courts have applied 
a simple test requiring the jury to find only whether or not the 
defendants at the time of the allegedly criminal act had a mental 
disease, and if so whether that act was a product of his disease. 
Within that test an uncontrollable, insa·ne impulse to commit the act 
would render the act a product of mental disease.45 
Alabama. In 1887 the Alabama Supreme Court declared that the 
"right and wrong" test had been repudiated by modern and advanced 
authorities, both legal and medical. The Alabama court then laid down 




First. Was the defendant at the time of the commission 
of the alleged crime, as matter of fact, afflicted 
with a disease of the mind, so as to be either 
idiotic, or otherwise insane? Second. If such be 
the case, did he know right from wrong, as applied 
to the particular act in question? If he did not 
have such knowledge, he is not legally responsible. 
Third. If he did have such knowledge, he may never-
theless be not legally responsible if the two 
following conditions concur: 1) If, by reason of 
the duress of such mental disease, he had so far 
lost the power to choose between the right and 
wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as 
that his free agency was at the time destroyed; 
2) and if, at the same time, the alleged crime was 
so connected with such mental disease, in the 
relation of cause and effect, as to have been the 
product of it solely. 
Armstead v. State, 227 Md. 73, 175 A. 2d 24 (1961); Commonwealth v. 
Melton, 406 Pa. 343, 178 A. 2d 728 (1962). 
Statev. Jones, 50 N.H. 399 (1871). 
Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 866-867 (1887). 
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1J.liD2.J~. The new Illinois criminal code insanity test 17 based on the Model Penal Code, The Illinois Code section follows: 
§ 6-2. Insanit1, 
(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at 
the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental 
defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the crim-
inality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law. 
(b) The terms "mental disease or mental defect" do not include 
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct. 
Vermont. In 1957 Vermont adopted a new test of insanity as 
follows:48 
~ 4801. Test of insanity in criminal cases. The test when 
used as a defense in criminal cases shall be as follows: 
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at 
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he 
lacks adequate capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 
(2) The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an 
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct. The terms "mental disease or defect" shall include 
congenital and traumatic mental conditions as well as disease. 
Virgin Islands. The new Virgin Islands Code of 1957 
declares:4~ 
All persons are capable of committing crimes or offenses 
except--
(4) Persons who are mentally ill and who committed the act 
charged against them in consequence of such mental illness .•. 
(This provision was suggested to the Advisory Committee on 
the V.I. Code by Chief Judge Biggs of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit. Note, however, that when Chief Judge Biggs wrote the 
Currens opinion he did not adopt for the Third Circuit this test which 
he had recommended to the Virgin Islands.) 
47. Illinois Revised Statutes. c. 38, ~ 6-2 (1961). ) 
48. V~rmont Statutes Annotated, Title 13, § 4801 (1958. 
49, Virgin Islands Code, 14 § 14 (1957). 
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Cause for Concern in Colorado 
There has been much recent concern in many jurisdictions, 
as shown in the previous section, over the tests, definitions, and 
procedures for determining criminal insanity. This concern has been 
shared in Colorado for several reasons: First, there has been 
constant criticism over the continued use of the M'Naghten and 
irresistible impulse tests. Second, there has been a general feeling 
that a plea of no{ guilty by reason of insanity is offered in many 
cases only as a delaying tactic. Third, it is believed generally that 
many such pleas are made and that often criminals escape capital 
punishment or lengthy imprisonment by being found insane. Fourth, a 
finding of'not guilty. by reason of insanity might lead.to almost 
immediate release, because the state hospital at Pueblo may find an 
alleged offender sane and the jury finds him insane. He is committed 
to the hospital where he has already been considered sane, so he is 
released. Fifth, there is a need for a special institution for the 
criminally insane and potentially dangerous offenders. 
Insanity as a Defense 
The apparent general public impression that many alleged 
offenders are avoiding "punishment" by making a successful plea of not 
guilty by reason of insanity is not borne out by a study of the use and 
success of this plea in5genver District Court during the five years from 1957 through 1961. 
. The statistics in this study cover the criminal indictments 
and informations for murder, burglary, larceny, forgery, and rape filed 
in the Denver District Court. These figures are based upon the number 
of indictments and informations filed and not upon the number of cases. 
(For example, a single case may involve three defendants, each separately 
charged with larceny and larceny by bailee. This situation would be 
counted as one case and six counts of larceny.) 
MURDER 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 Total 
Charges 14 24 33 24 26 121 
Insanity plea 6 8 12 7 8 41 
Defense withdrawn before trial 2 2 5 3 2 14 
Insanity issue submitted to jury 4 6 7 4 6 27 
Found insane and committed to 
hos pi ta l 3 4 6 3 5 21 
so-: These data were presented to the Criminal Code Committee at its 
September 21, 1962 meeting by Dr. Hans Schapire, Chief of 
Psychiatric Services, Department of Institutions, and were 




1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 Total 
Charges 
Insanity plea 
Defense withdrawn before trial 
Insanity issue submitted to jury 

































1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 Total 
Charges 
Insanity plea 
Defense withdrawn before trial 
Insanity issue submitted to jury 
Found insane and committed to 



























1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 Total 
Charges 
Insanity plea 
Defense withdrawn before trial 
Insanity issue submitted to jury 
Found insane and committed to 










Defense withdrawn before trial 
Insanity issue submitted to jury 
Found insane and committed to 




















































51. Included statutory rape, but not assault to commit rape, indecent 
liberties, or unnatural copulation. 
52. Included larceny by bailee and larceny of mortgaged property, not 
conspiracy to commit larceny or petty larceny. 
53. Did not include conspiracy to commit burglary, attempted burglary 
or breaking and entering a motor vehicle. 
54. Did not include no account check charges or conspiracy to commit 
forgery. 
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As shown by these tables, insanity was used as a defense in 
murder 33.8 per cent of the time. It was withdrawn 34.l per cent of 
the time. ·rt was successful 17.3 per cent of the time. 
Insanity was used as a defense in rape 7.3 per cent. The 
defense was withdrawn 60 per cent of the time. It was successful 2.8 
per cent of the time. 
Insanity was used as a defense in larceny 5.4 per cent. The 
defense was withdrawn 71.4 per cent of the time. It was successful 
1.1 per cent of the time. 
Insanity was used as a defense in burglary 6.8 per cent. 
The defense was withdrawn 71 per cent of the time. It was successful 
1.4 per cent of the time. 
Insanity was used.as a defense in forgery 10. 7 per cent. 
The defense was withdrawn 70 per cent of the time. It was successful 
1.4 per cent of the time. 
These percentages seem to indicate that, except in murder 
cases,this defense is used infrequently and is rarely successful when 
based on the total number of indictments and informations filed. 
Perhaps the infrequency of the plea is the reason why the public 
believes the opposite, because when the defense is used the newspaper 
coverage is usually"complete and perhaps this may be what creates the 
erroneous impression. 
Criminal Code Committee Meeting, September 21, 1962 
At the September 21, 1962 meeting of the Criminal Code 
Committee, several psychiatrists discussed the problems connected with 
present criminal insanity procedures. Dr. John MacDonald assistant 
director, Colorado Psychopathic· Hospital,the -following remarks: 
1) A major problem is that psychiatrists are not asked to 
give a medical opinion about a defendant's mental condition, but are 
asked to give an opinion as to whether the defendant knew right from 
wrong, which is a moral concept and not subject to verification by 
medical standards. 
2) The present tests used in Colorado are inadequate as is 
the Durham rule. Perhaps, the best test devised thus far is Currens. 
3) No person who has shown anti-social tendencies should be 
release from custody until he is no longer a danger to society. In 
this connection, there is a great need for research on how to treat the 
psychopathic offender. 
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4) Trial attorneys try to lump all of an alleged offender's 
irrational actions together, so that the jury may be given an unbalanced 
picture of the person being adjudged. This practic~ often leads to 
acquittal on the grounds of insanity. Conversely, many alleged offendexs 
who are severely psychotic are found to be sane by juries because of 
their appearance and deportment in the co~rtroom. 
5) Colorado needs a separate and adequately staffed facility 
for the criminally insane. 
Dr. James Galvin, Director of Institutions, aareed with Dr. 
MacDonAld on the nee~ for a separate facility for the criminally insane. 
Dr. Galvin also said that under the present circumstances the M'Naghten 
rule probably works as well as anything else. He added that he would 
prefer having the determination of sanity made by a three-judge panel, 
if such procedure would be constitutional. 
Dr. Hans Schapire,_Chief of Psychiatric Service~, and Dr. Mark 
Farrell, psychiatric consuitant, Colorado State Penitentiary, both 
stressed the need of a separate facility for the criminally insane. 
Dr. Farrell recommended the creation of a full-time parole board and 
the adoption of a one day to life indeterminate sentence for all 
offenders. Dr. Schapire Ufged the adoption of the Massachusetts statute 
which allows the court to have any person examined and evaluated who 
is charged with a crime of violence or who has a history of aggressive 
anti-social behavior and crime. Both of them agreed that present 
procedures were not satisfactory, but had no specific suggestions on 
the test which should be used or the procedures which should be 
followed. 
Recommendations for Colorado 
Several recommendations, some including drastic changes in 
present procedures, have been made for changes in the present procedures 
for determining criminal insanity. 
Elimination of Plea 
Following is the outline of a proposal presented to the 
Criminal Code Committee by Senator Edward J. Byrne at its October 11, 
1962 meeting. 
The statutory plea of ''not guilty by reason of insanity" 
would be repealed and the common law plea of "not guilty by reason of 
insanity" would be specifically abolished by statute. Instead there 
would be the following statutory provision: 
"No information shall be filed or an indictment returned by 
a grand jury wherein the defendant at the time of the alleged offense 
because of mental disease or defect lacked substantial capacity to 
conform his conduct to the requirement of the law which he is alleged 
to have violated, provided that evidence of mental condition may be 
offered in a proper case, as bearing upon the capacity of the accused 
to form the specific intent essential to constitute a crime." 
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When an information is filed or an indictment returned, 
the defense may make a motion to quash as provided in 39-7-7,C.R.S., 
19~3,on the grounds that the information or indictment should not have 
been filed because the defendant had a mental disease or defect and 
lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirement 
of the law which he is alleged to have violated. Following the motion 
to quash but prior to a hearing on the motion, the court would commit 
the defendant (as at present) for observation and evaluation. 
After the period of observation and evaluation, a hearing 
would be held on the motion to quash the information. A three-judge 
panel would preside at this hearing, and there would be no jury. The 
three judges would be designated by the departmental justice of the 
supreme court upon petition from the presiding judge in the district 
where the case is to be tried. 
It would be the duty of the defense attorney to put the 
question in issue in the first instance by offering evidence to show 
that the defendant was mentally diseased or defective to the extent that 
he substantially lacked capacity to conform his conduct to the require-
ment of the law he is alleged to have violated. It would then be the 
function of the district attorney to prove that the defendant was 
competent within the above definition at the time of the alleged 
offense. 
The psychiatrists who examined the defendant and other 
professional witnes~es, if -desired by the court, would be required to 
give expert testimony regarding the defendant's mental condition. The 
test to be used in the special proceedings on the motion to quash is the 
same as the Currens rule: 
"The •• •Lcour_!_7 must be satisfied that at the time of 
committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental 
disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated." 
If the court finds that the defendant was not mentally 
diseased or defective within the test as defined, the motion would be 
denied, and the prosecution could proceed on the information. If the 
court determines that the defendant was suffering from mental disorder 
which resulted in his lacking capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law, the court would quash the indictment or 
information, enter one of the two following findings, and commit the 
defendant to the director of institutions: 
1) mentally diseased and not accountable for the crime as 
charged; or 
2) mentally defective and not accountable for the crime as 
charged. 
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After rece1v1ng the patient, the director of institutions 
would be required to study and evaluate him and place him in the 
appropriate state institution. Such person would remain in the custody 
of the state until such time as he or the director of institutions shall 
petition the committing court for release. Such petition would include 
a complete report on the patient's current condition and would set forth 
specific -information on why the patient may be considered a safe risk 
back in society. The petition would be heard by another three-judge 
panel, and this panel would have the authority to engage psychiatrists 
to make an independent study. If the petition is rejected, there would 
be a time limitation before another petition could be presented. 
If the patient is released, the court would still have 
the authority (in its discretion) to exercise supervision over the 
patient for a maximum of five years. The court could (in its discretion) 
make an arrangement with the state department of institutions or any 
other public agency to provide such supervision under the court's 
direction or to assist the court in providing such supervision. 
Comments. By abolishing the plea of not guilty by reason of 
insanity, the constitutional need for a jury trial on the question may 
be eliminated. The proposed procedures, while generally similar to 
those used now, differ in several important respects. The M'Naghten rule 
and "irresistible impulse" would be eliminated as tests and would be 
replaced by a test which: 1) is more in keeping with modern psychiatric 
thought; and 2) does not include the moral question of right and wrong. 
The psychiatrists testifying at the special proceeding would not be 
straight-jacketed by outmoded rules and definitions; therefore, they 
would have a chance to offer a freer expression of their findings. 
The commitment procedure would assure that a person who is 
found to be mentally diseased or defective would not be set free. The 
procedure for release provides adequate safeguards for society, while 
at the same time affording a defendant a means for release, so his rights 
are protected. The court's authority to extend supervision after 
release is an added safeguard for society. 
Research is currently underway to determine the constitution-
ality of Senator Byrne's proposal. The main questions to which 
answers are sought are: 
1) Can the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity be 
abolished? 
2) Under the procedures outlined in this proposal, can a 
jury trial be elimiflated? 
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Modification of Present Procedures 
Representative Roy Romer and Representative Roland Mapelli 
have also presented several recommendations concerning criminal 
insanity procedures to the Criminal Code Committee. These include 
the following: 
1) A maximum security unit designed specifically for the criminally 
insane should be constructed as soon as possible. 
Explanation: The present facility for the criminally_ 
insane at Pueblo is only a temporary answer and is not an adequate 
"maximum security'' facility. The more dangerous of the criminally 
insane now have to be confined at the penitentiary in Canon City. 
The number of escapes from Pueblo in the past few years is evidence 
of the need for this unit. It should be a separate unit designed 
spec~fically for the criminally insane, incorporating the necessary 
facilities required for adequate security and treatment. 
2) An individual committed to the Colorado State Hospital as being 
criminally insane should not be released.until (1) he is determined 
to be restored to sanity, and (2} until it is also determined 
that he is no longer a danger to society. 
Explanation: Under present procedure, a person may be 
found to be insane by a jury and committed to the State Hospital at 
Pueblo to be held there until he is restored to sanity, even though 
the psychiatrists at the hospital have already testified under oath 
that the individual is now sane. Therefore, when his release is 
requested, the hospital must certify that he is sane and he may be 
released within a short time even though there has been no significant 
change in his mental condition. Yet the person, though legally sane, 
may by medical standards be a menace to society because of a mental 
disease or mental disorders which do not amount to legal insanity. 
The public would be better protected if the institution were permitted 
to hold the individual not only until he is determined to be restored 
to sanity but also until it is determined that he is no longer a 
danger to society. The present procedures relating to the confinement 
of sex offenders may serve as a guide. A person given an indeterminate 
sentence for a sex offense may be held by the institution until the 
parole board determines that it is safe to release him on parole. 
Consideration should be given to the establishment of some similar 
"review board'' for those committed as criminally insane. On request 
for a person's release, this board would evaluate not only the question 
of ''legal insanity" but also would evaluate the evidence concerning 
other mental disorders, not amounting to strict legal insanity, but 
which may cause the person to be a danger to society. 
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The board would then report to the court whether or not it 
is safe to release the individu~l an parole or otherwise.· Prematu1 
release of the criminally insane could be lessened and the public 
given better protection under this changed procedure. A similar 
recommendation has been made by a study commission in California to 
the Qovernor and legislature of that state. 
3) The legal definition of what constitutes criminal insanity should 
be modified or clarified to permit the psychiatrist to testify 
accurately in the area of his professional competence, namely, 
the medical or mental condition of the accused and the degree of 
his mental illness or disorder, thus leaving to the jury the moral 
question whether in light of this evidence the accused should or 
should not be held responsible for this act. 
Explanation: The combined efforts of the medical and legal 
professions should be enlisted to develop more adequate standards to 
assist the jury in its deliberations. These standards or the legal 
test, should clearly separate the role of the psychiatrist (to testify 
concernin~ the degree of mental illness or disorder) and the role of 
the jury {to determine the moral question of whether the accused 
shall be held accountable). 
4) A panel or commission of competent psychiatrists should be 
established from which the court could appoint one or more 
psychiatrists, depending on the nature of the case, to report 
concerning the accused's sanity, with procedures which would 
permit the psychiatrists appointed in a particular case to 
adequately share with each other the information and facts upon 
which they base their opinion of sanity and which would permit 
the appointed psychiatrists to have adequate access to police 
files and other information relevent to this determination. 
Explanation: Under present procedures, a part of the reason 
for the great divergence of psychiatric opinion in any one case is 
due to the fact that the various psychiatrists that testify do not 
have available to them the same information or facts concerning the 
case. The court-appointed psychiatrists often have access to more 
complete information than do the defense psychiatrists, for example. 
With better sharing of the information concerning the accused and the 
circumstances surrounding the crime between and among the psychiatrists 
who testify, the wide variance in the opinion of the various psychiatrists 
should be reduced. The establishment of such a commission or panel of 
competent psychiatrists, and its use by the court, might cut down on the 
number of psychiatrists hired independently by the accused, although this 
alternative would still be available to the defense. 
5) An accused should be denied bond, if the plea of not guilty by 
reason of insanity is entered, until that issue is determined. 
Explanation: By the nature of the plea, the accused is 
contending that he is not responsible for his actions and is asking 
for commitment and observation until such time as there shall be a 
judicial determination of his sanity. Therefore, it is dangerous to 
subject society to the risk of this individual until the question of 
his sanity is d~termined. 
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6) There has been considerable discussion concerning the pros and 
cons of changing the burden of proof so that an accused who 
claims to have been insane at the time of the crime would have 
the burden of proving his insanity rather than to have the state 
prove his sanity beyond reasonable doubt. This suggested change 
raises constitutional questions that should be investigated 
in order that further discussion of this proposal will fully 
consider the problem of protecting the constitutional rights 
of the accused and of protecting the public. The attorney 
general has been asked to comment on the constitutional questions 
involved in this question. 
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ROBBERY AND NARCOTICS VIOLATIONS 
AND INCARCERATED OFFENDERS 
Introduction 
The Criminal Code Committee appointed a five-member sub-
committee in July 1961 to study robbery and narcotic offenses
1
and the 
characteristics of convicted robbers and narcotics violators. This 
subcommittee was charged with the responsibility of developing 
factual material on the following: 
l) incarcerated offenders -- previous record, use of 
alcohol and narcotics, family background, education and employment, 
mental condition, and related matters; 
2) number of unsolved offenses; and 
3) number of offenders before the courts and disposition 
of their cases, including dismissal, probation, and sentence. 
This information was desired by the Criminal Code Committee 
as background for considering statutory changes related to robbery 
(particularly aggravated robbery) and narcotics violations. 
The characteristics of incarcerated offenders convicted of 
various degrees of robbery and narcotics violations were summarized 
from an analysis of the case histories of all offenders in these 
categories in the state penitentiary. The data on unsolved cases and 
offenders- before the courts were compiled from questionnaires sent 
by the subcommittee to selected ·police departments, district attorneys, 
probation departments, and courts. 
The subcommittee made its ·report.to the C~iminal Code Com-
mittee on September 22, 1961 and the chairman of the subcommittee 
reported the following findings: 
1) The courts in Colorado are performing their jobs well. 
In particular, sentences have been heavy for aggravated robberies. 
2) In many cases, the aggravated robber graduates from 
burglary to his present offense. 
3) Probation has been granted sparingly, if at all, to 
aggravated robbers, and probation has been quite successful in these 
cases, although for some the time on probation has been too short 
to determine the results. 
4) There is a particular problem with the aggravated robber 
who recognizes that he can realize more money from taking narcotics 
than emptying the till in drug store holdups. He is usually not a 
user but sells the narcotics he acquires through robbery to a pusher. 
1. Members of the subcommittee were: Representative Robert Eberhardt, 
chairman; Senators Edward J. Byrne and Paul Wenke; and Represent-
atives Frank Evans and John Kane. 
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5) The living pattern among the various categories of 
robbers and narcotics violators is quite similar. These men are 
usually young -- in their twenties; have limited or no occupational 
skills; dull normal I.Q.'s and an eighth grade education or less; 
poor military service records, if any; and almost all have been 
characterized as having deep-seated emotional problems, making adjus1-ment to society difficult and offering a very poor future prognosis. 
In accepting the subcommittee report, the Criminal Code 
Committee decided unanimous~y that it should be included in the 
committee's final report to the General Assembly.3 Accordingly, the 
subcommittee's.report is presented ·below. 
Characteristics of Incarcerated Offenders 
Armed Robbers 
As a rule, the armed robber is young -- between 20 and 22 
years of age. In approximately 65 per cent of the cases, his ethnic 
background is Anglo, as opposed to Negro, Spanish-American, Indian, or 
combinations thereof. If he is a member of a minority group, that 
group is more likely to be Spanish-American than Negro. As for 
marital status, the probability of his being single (with no marriage 
history) is strong (10 cases out of 17). Cases of divorce or 
separation are few (two out of 17). If he does have children, the 
number ranges from one to three. 
Seldom is the armed robbery which led to his present 
incarceration his initial offense or arrest. If he does have a police 
record, the number of entries (e.g., previous arrests) is likely to be 
four. On the average he has committed one felony and one juvenile 
offense. However, in nearly half the cases, there is no juvenile 
record, and in 29 per cent of the cases, no history of previous felony 
convictions can be found. 
The intelligence quotient of the armed robber is likely to 
fall within the "dull normal" range (90-92). Rarely does his I.Q. 
exceed 105, and in 14 per cent of the cases it is below 70. 
Educational achievement appears to be closely related to the degree 
of intelligence. On the average, the armed robber has completed eight 
grades, and only in isolated instances has he continued his education 
beyond ninth grade. From a vocational standpoint he is poorly equipped 
for life; occupational skills, as such, are strikingly absent. In 
approximately 65 per cent of the cases, he has been employed as a 
laborer, and the incidence of short-term employment is quite high (71 
per cent). In half of the cases he has not served in the armed forces, 
and where there is a record of military service, the discharge, in 
only one out of two cases, is honorable. 
2. Legislative Council Criminal Code Committee, Minutes of September 
22, 1962. 
3. Legisla\ive Council Criminal Code Committee, Minutes of October 
27, 1962. 
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In practically all cases the armed robber is emotionally 
disturbed. The chances are three out of four that he has been 
identified as a neurotic or psychopathic personality. In a number of 
instances, his "reality ties 11 are strained; he can withstand pressure 
or stress only to a point, and beyond this point he lashes out at the 
world. In effect, he translates his inner conflicts into aggressive, 
antisocial acts. Perhaps some correlation can be established between 
emotional disturbance and home environment. It is interesting to note 
that in more than half of the cases, the environment in which the 
inmate was reared can be classified as "poor. 11 On the other hand, 
the number of 11 900d" home environments should not be minimized (five 
out of 17 cases). Surprisingly enough, perhaps, 44 per cent of the 
11 poor" home environments are ones in which the marital union remained 
relatively intact (both parents} during the inmate's childhood and 
adolescence. On the average he has three siblings. 
The armed robber is probably a moderate or "social'' drinker. 
In only 12 per cent of the cases can his consumption of alcoholic 
beverages be regarded as ''heavy," and in slightly less than 25 per 
cent of the cases, use of alcohol is excessive only on occasion. There 
are no instances of alcoholism. In addition, the armed robber is 
seldom a narcotics user (only five cases out of 17}. Where a drug is 
used, the chances are excellent that it is marijuana. 
Aggravated Robbers 
While it is difficult to draw a picture of an aggravated 
robber which covers all offenders incarcerated for this crime, certain 
generalities may be made and a composite picture of the most usual 
characteristics may be developed. 
The composite aggravated robber is likely to be young --
between 23 and 27 years of· age. In more than one-half the instances, 
he is Anglo rather than a member of a minority group. If he is a 
member of a minority group, the chances are almost two to one that he 
is a Spanish-American rather than a Negro. He is most likely to be 
single -- either never having been married or is presently divorced. 
If he does have married status, the chances are one in two that the 
marriage is common law. It is also unlikely that he has any children 
(if married}. If he does have children, it is usually only one. 
His intelligence quotient is around 95 or dull normal; only 
rarely will he have an I.Q. of more than 110. Rather than an I.Q. 
above 95, he is more likely to have one between 75 and 95. His 
educational attainment reflects very much his I.Q. Generally, he 
will be found to have completed the 8th grade. Seldom has he attended 
high school, and the chances are one in three that he left school some-
where between the third and eighth grades. His occupational skills 
or lack thereof are about on a par with his I.Q. and educational 
attainment. Generally, he has no occupation or has been employed only 
as a laborer. It is very unlikely that he worked very long at one 
job or for one employer. Either he has never been employed, or his 
work experience has consisted of a number of unskilled jobs at low 
pay for short periods of time. His military history approximates the 
same pattern. If he has been in service (and less than one in two . 
have}, he will probably have been discharged for the good of the service, 
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under conditions other than honorable, or have received a dishonorable 
discharge. While he may have received an honorable discharge, his 
military record shows a number of minor violations and perhaps a court 
martial or two. 
His ability to stay out of trOJble in civilian life is no 
better than it was in military service. He probably has had one 
previous felony conviction. The chances are also good that he has a 
juvenile record. In addition. he has been arrested at least four 
times for investigation, drunkenness, vagran~y, or some other misdemeano:r. 
All in all, he has had contact with law enforcement officials for one 
reason or another at least seven times. 
From the foregoing it would appear that the composite 
aggravated robber has not learned from experience and has had consider-
able trouble adjusting to society. He has not been very successful 
at those things upon which our society places high value, such as 
educational achievement, occupational skills, steady employment, and 
satisfactory military service. It should come as no surprise that he 
has a considerable number of emotional problems, some of which are 
very serious and some of which make him potentially very dangerous. 
Being unable to compete and gain recognition on society's terms, he 
seeks another way to achieve gratification of his needs and to gain 
status. Often, he takes out his frustrations through assault on others 
and feels his weapon is an equalizer in his battle against society. 
The chances are 50-50 that he has been identified as a psychopathic 
personality, although he may exhibit either neurotic or psychotic 
tendencies as well. He is unsure of himself and has little respect 
either for himself or his fellow man. But he is not even successful 
in the.role he has .chosen to play. His crimes are not well thought out, 
even those involving considerable violence and large sums of money. 
More often than not, the amount of money involved is small. His 
emotional problems may have been identified as far back as his first 
arrest or his first commitment, but no one has done anything about it. 
He has been without help for so long that the prognosis is very 
dubious. 
He is likely to drink, although moderately in 50 per cent of 
the cases. If he is a heavy drinker, his drinking has usually been 
involved in his criminal activity. He drinks to compensate for his 
inability to get along, takes on false courage, acquires a weapon, and 
sets forth to redress grievances. It is much less likely that he uses 
narcotics. If he is a narcotics user, it is probable that he only uses 
marijuana, although in a number of instances he has been a user both of 
marijuana and heroin. In only a few cases will he both drink and use 
narcotics. Usually in these circumstances, he is a moderate drinker. 
There are a few instances, however, where he is both a heavy drinker 
and a "main liner." It is in these few instances that psychiatric 
evaluation indicates an extremely troubled and potentially dangerous 
pyschopathic personality. 
He is more likely to come from a poor home environment, usually 
from a broken home. It is surprising, however, how often his home 
background is either good or average, the same being true of the 
family's financial situation. He probably has three siblings. A 
family background with five or more brothers or sisters is not unusual 
but not as prevalent as might be expected. It is interesting to note, 
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too, that usually he is the only one in the family to have gotten into 
trouble repeatedly with the law. In most cases, his brothers and 
sisters have made some kind of an adjustment and accept society. 
They may also have emotional problems, but these problems have not 
brought them as often in conflict with society. 
Narcotics Violators 
The narcotics violator tends to be a man in his late twenties 
(28 to 30 years of age). In approximately eight cases out of ten, he 
shares membership in a minority group: Spanish-American, 44 per cent; 
Negro, 37 per cent; and Indian, one per cent. He is likely to have 
some matrimonial record: either. he is legally married or involved in 
a common-law relationship (26 cases out of 70); or· he is divorced 
or separated (22 cases). The average number of children born to the 
inmate and his partner is one. 
Among narcotics violators, 93 constitutes the average I.Q., 
and in 16 out of 56 cases the degree of intelligence falls below 90. 
It should be noted, however, that in 27 per cent of the cases, the 
intelligence quotient lies somewhere between 100 and 110. It would 
appear that very low intelligence is partially offset by scores in the 
"bright normal" category. The I.Q. of the composite narcotics violator 
is an index to his educational attainment -- a median of nine grades. 
In only scattered instances has he earned a high school diploma, or 
the equivalent thereof (three out of 69 cases). In 18 cases his 
education has not extended beyond the seventh grade. His employment 
record tends to be sketchy; in the majority of cases he has worked as 
a laborer, and as a rule, jobs are of short duration. As for service 
in the armed forces, no history can be found in 42 cases. Where the 
inmate has served in a military branch, the discharge, in more than 
half the cases, is one of the following types: honorable, with a 
court martial or courts martial record (three cases); conditions other 
than honorable (six); dishonorable or "bad conduct" (two); and 
undesirable (two). 
Serious emotional problems are common among narcotics 
violators. The personality of the violator, in one out of three cases, 
is marked by a psychopathic disorder. As might be suspected, he is 
very likely to use drugs in some form (56 out of 70 cases), especially 
marijuana l31 cases), and frequently he is addicted to narcotics 
(26 cases). As for alcohol, moderate consumption is the rule. Only 
four per cent of narcotics violators are alcoholics. 
In more than half the cases (33 out of 65) the home 
environment can be characterized as "poor." There appears to be some 
correlation between the "one-parent" home and an undesirable environment. 
In 29 per cent of the cases the environment can be described as "good." 
The median number of siblings is four. 
In nearly all cases the narcotics violator has run afoul of 
the law prior to his present offense. The chances are almost one out 
of two that he has a juvenile record, and in approximately 69 per cent 
of the cases there is a history of felony convictions. Of those 48 
inmates with prior felony records, 14 (or 29 per cent) have commit!ed 
a previous felonious act involving the possession or use of narcotics. 
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In each case of narcotics violation, the individual involved 
was charged with "possession of narcotics" or "possession of narcotic 
drugs." Nothing else (such as use of drugs) was specified. However, 
other information reveals that at least five of the violators who 
used drugs were also peddlers of narcotics. 
Simple Robbery 
The robber is likely to be an individual in his middle 
twenties (25 to 27). In the majority of cases the ethnic background 
is Anglo (54 per cent), as opposed to Spanish-American (31 per cent) 
and Negro (15 per cent). As for marital status, the probability of 
his being single (with no marriage record), or divorced or separated, 
is strong (66 per cent). In 40 out of 123 cases he is either legally 
married or involved in a common law relationship. Where children have 
been born to the inmate and his partner, the number ranges from one 
(in 26 cases) to five (in three cases). 
Among robbers 94 is the median intelligence quotient, and 
in only two cases out of 92 does the level of intelligence fall within 
the II superior" range ( above 120) . However, 35 inmates are clustered 
in the 100-120 bracket. It appears that scores of "normal," "bright 
normal, 11 and "superior·" are balanced against scores below 91. The 
I.Q. of the composite robber serves as a clue to his educational 
achievement -- usually eighth grade. In 32 cases out of 122, his 
education has been discontinued at the end of seventh grade, or before. 
Yet, it is noteworthy that six inmates have completed twelve grades, 
and that two have attended one year of college. Because of lack of 
occupational skills, the robber is ill-equipped for life; in only 20 
to 25 per cent of the cases does he possess what could be labeled a 
"skill." No occupation can be listed in 18 of the 123 cases, and in 
52 of the remaining 105 cases, he has been employed as a laborer. Jobs, 
in the majority of cases (57 per cent), have been on a short-term 
basis, although 21 per cent have a record of relatively steady employ-
ment. · 
As for membership in the armed forces, no service history 
can be found in 57 cases out of 121. Where the inmate has served in 
a military branch, the discharge, in 84 per cent of the remaining 64 
cases, is one of the following types: honorable, with a court 
martial recordt or violation of the 104th Article of War (11); honorable, 
inaptness (twoJ; convenience of the government (two); unsuitability 
(two); conditions other than honorable (17); dishonorable or "bad 
conduct" ( 12); and undesirable (six). 
In most cases the behavioral pattern of the robber points 
to emotional disturbance. In 51 cases out of 111, a psychopathic 
disorder characterizes his personality; and in 29 cases he has been 
identified as neurotic. Only in nine cases is there no evidence of 
emotional problems. It would appear that the robber's emotional 
condition can be related, in part at least, to the type of home 
environment in which he was raised. In 57 of 121 cases, the environment 
can be classified as "poor. 11 Of these homes 18 were headed by one 
parent. On the other hand, 44 of the home environments can be 
described as "fair," and 20 as "good." On the average. the inmate has 
three to four siblings. 
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The robber, in 108 out of 122 cases, consumes alcoholic 
beverages. In nearly half of these cases (108), such consumption is 
moderate, but in 27 cases, the drinking is heavy, with 11 identified 
as alcoholics. As a rule, the robber refrains from the use of 
narcotics (93 cases in 122). If a drug is used, the chances are 
excellent that it is marijuana alone, or marijuana combined with other 
narcotics (e.g., heroin, morphine, dilaudid). 
Rarely is the robbery for which he is now serving time the 
inmate's first offense or arrest. On the average he has collided with 
the law eight previous times (i.e., prior arrests, juvenile offenses, 
felonies). The average number of felony convictions is one; juvenile 
offenses, one. In only 19 of 122 cases has he been convicted of a 
felony or felonies in the same category as the present offense. 
Summary of Questionnaire Responses4 
Narcotics 
The questionnaire responses indicate that narcotics 
violations are not a serious problem anywhere but Denver, although 
they have been on the increase in Pueblo. Westminster was the only 
other metropolitan area city to report a narcotics violation. Only 
three cities (Denver, Aurora, and Pueblo) reported aggravated robberies 
involving narcotics, with Denver having both the highest number and 
incidence. There were fewer aggravated robberies involving narcotics 
in 1960 than in 1959, but the increase during the first half of 1961 
indicated that 1961 would be the highest of the three years. Of the 
total aggravated robberies reported, 6.5 per cent involved narcotics. 
Aggravated Robberies 
The number of aggravated robberies reported by eiggt cities 
increased from 516 in 1959 to 555 in 1960 (or 7.5 per cent). The 
largest increase was in Pueblo -- from nine to 26 (or 188.9 per cent). 
Denver's aggravated robberies increased from 482 in 1959 to 497 in 
1960 (slightly more than three per cent). It was estimated that Denver 
would have almost 600 aggravated robberies or almost a 20 per cent 
increase over 1960. A large increase was anticipated in Aurora and 
a decrease in Pueblo, with no significant change in other cities. 
The incidence of aggravated robbery (number per 100,000 
population) for the eight cities was 69.2 in 1959 and 74.5 in 1960. 
Denver had the highest incidence followed by Aurora, Westminster, and 
Grand Junction. Slightly more than 40 per cent of those arrested for 
aggravated robberies in Denver were released without charges during 
the two and a half years covered in the study.6 Westminster was the 




Replies from police departments, district attorneys, courts and 
probation departments. 
Aurora, Denver, Englewood, Fort Collins, Golden, Grand Junction, 
Littleton, µueblo, and Westminster. 
Denver was also the only city to have narcotics violators released 
without charge -- (54.4 per cent in two and a half years). 
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Over-all, almost 59 per cent of the aggravated robberies 
reported were unsolved in 1959, 1960, and the first half of 1961. 
Westminster had the highest proportion unsolved (83.3 per cent), 
followed by Grand Junction (77.7 per cent), Fort Collins (66.6 per 
cent), Denver (59.8 per cent), and Aurora (52.4 per cent). 
Aggravated Robbers Before the Courts 
It is difficult to make a precise analysis of aggravated 
robbers before the courts because of variations in the charge as 
indicated on the court dockets. 40-5-1, C.R.S. 1953, defines three 
different kinds of robbery: a) armed robbery -- weapon, no injury, 
death, or violence; b) aggravated robbery -- injury, assault, violence 
in connection with the robbery; and c) robbery -- all other. Charges 
are filed, however, and cases docketed to include four categories --
simple robbery having been added. From the examination of penitentiary 
case histories, it appears that many inmates incarcerated for 
robbery committed crimes which were more likely within the definition 
of armed or aggravated robbery. There is also no apparent difference 
between robbery and simple robbery.7 It is also possible that charges 
on some defendants may have been reduced prior to filing, so that an 
analysis of charges reduced after filing may not present an accurate 
or complete picture. 
With these reservations, the following findings were made: 
1) During the two and a half year period, charges were 
reduced in at least 28 per cent and perhaps as many as 36 per cent of 
the cases.8 
2) Charges were dismissed in approximately 12 per cent of 
the cas~s.8 
3) The highest proportion of dismissed charges for judicial 
districts with a significant number of cases was the 1st, followed by 
the 10th, 17th, and 2nd. 
4) The highest proportion of reduced charges during the two 
and a half years was in the 2nd District (Denver), followed by the 
17th, 10th, and 1st. 
Narcotics Violators Before the Courts 
Almost 20 per cent of the charges of narcotics violations 
were dismissed, not including those charges dismissed before filing. 
In the 1st District, 36 per cent of the cases were dismissed; in the 
10th District, 18 per cent were dismissed; and in the 2nd District, 
17 per cent were dismissed. 
7. For example, Denver's criminal docket shows that in 1959 only 13 
aggravated robbers were docketed and 105 robbers; in 1960 the 
totals were 18 aggravated robbers and 128 robbers. 
8. The proportion may have been higher after action was taken in the 
sizeable number of cases which had been filed in 1961, but were 
still pending at the time the questionnaires were returned. 
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In only 15 per cent of the cases were charges reduced. 
Again the 1st District had the highest proportion of cases in which 
charges were reduced (36 per cent}, followed by the 17th (25 per cent) 
and the 2nd (13 per cent). 
Probation 
It appeared from the limited information available, that 
probation is granted sparingly to aggravated robbers and narcotics 
violators and that there are surprisingly few instances of probation 
violation, although many of these probationers have not finished 
their terms of probation and have considerable time left, so that it 
is likely that the number of violations would increase. 
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NARCOTICS CONTROL 
Colorado's statutes on narcotics offenses and control were 
last amended in 1960 when much more severe penalties were adopted and 
addiction was made a misdemeanor offense. Despite these recent 
changes, narcotics legislation was included among the subjects listed 
in Senate Joint Resolution No. 14 (1961) for study by the Criminal 
Code Committee. The Criminal Code Committee began consideration of 
narcotics problems at its March 9, 1962 meeting at which time the 
committee heard from William B. Eldridge, American Bar Foundation, 
who was staff director for the foundation's recently published study 
entitled Narcotics and the Law, A Critique of the American Experiment 
in Narcotic Drug Control. A summary of Mr. Eldridge's discussion of 
narcotics problems follows:l 
Scope of Study 
After the joint committee of the American Bar Association 
and the American Medical Association completed its report on narcotics 
control and problems, it recommended five additional research projects. 
Two of these were medical, two were legal, and the other was 
sociological,which dealt with education. The two legal research 
proposals were given to the American Bar Foundation for its consideration. 
They were extremely large, sweeping proposals, and the foundation did 
not feel at the time that the areas were well enough defined or that 
money or personnel were available to go into them to the degree that 
these two proposals suggested. So it was decided to take these 
projects piecemeal and try to provide some useful information to the 
people concerned about narcotics control. 
It's an area which is ripe with division and dissension among 
the people who espouse one method or another for controlling narcotics, 
and the most clearly defined area and the sharpest division occurs 
over the effectiveness of current policies. Consequently, the study 
was directed primarily at an empirical examination of the administration 
of narcotics drug laws throughout the United States to determine how 
well they are working, i.e., leaving aside for a moment all questions 
of humanity, sociology and everything else -- do they work? 
Seven states and the District of Columbia were selected for 
intensive study and the laws of all the states were examined. New York, 
Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, Missouri, California, New Jersey, and 
the District of Columbia were examined in depth, including the reports 
of all the agencies that could be contacted and interviewed in those 
states. In addition to this, of course, the staff talked extensively 
with Federal Narcotics Bureau personnel and examined reports made 
available by the commissioners. 
(Now, before I go any further, I want to say that any 
assistance I can offer this committee is limited. I am not an expert 
on narcotics drugs or narcotic addiction. If I am an expert on any-
thing, it is what people know about it. I can tell you something 
1. ixc~rpted from Legislative Council Criminal Code Committee, Minutes 
of Meeting of March 9, 1962. 
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about what people know and what they don't know. This is the first 
study that we have been able to find that is based purely on empirical 
use of reports and statistics. We put aside, for the most part, 
studies and reports on addict population in this country, because they 
are largely based on opinion.) 
Narcotics Census. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics keeps an 
addict census. It is based on who reports what to the Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics, and I am sure that most of you are aware that when you 
have to take things at face value from a reporting agency, you have to 
accept the fact that the things are not accurate. The Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics only holds them out as reported statistics. However, 
very dangerous comparisons are made in justification of narcotics 
control policies by using the figures which are based on reported 
addicts. Currently, there are something like 45,000 addicts known by 
name. This figure is often used to balance against estimates from the 
early nineteen hundreds. Estimates at that time ranged from 100 to 
200,000, and in some cases, up as high as a million. In using estimates, 
let's take the most conservative one of 100,000 and compare it with 
44,000 now, and it is highly impressive. But 44,000 is not an estimate, 
it is an enumeration, and there is no factor added to it. 
In these seven states people were contacted who either had 
the statutory responsibility for narcotics control or whose names were 
given us by people connected with narcotic drug control. Information 
was requested on the number of narcotic offenses, the sentences which 
were imposed, the length of sentences actually served, recidivism, and 
narcotic-associated crimes. • 
.· The replies to these initial inquiries were unbelievably 
disappointing. In most places the bureau or division or department 
charged by statute with maintaining .information or with responsibility 
of the administration of drug laws had no idea what was going on. 
Other places, especially where records were kept, tried to do very, 
very little to enlighten us on what was going on. The statistics which 
can be marshalled can support any view you wish to take. If I were 
hired as a statistical consultant by this committee and I knew which 
way the committee was leaning, I could provide you with whatever kind 
of information you wished, and someone else could provide the exact 
opposite. It is one area where there is a wealth of statistical 
information, and very little of it is any good. 
I think this is an extremely important point for all of you 
to keep in mind when you are considering modification in your own 
narcotic laws -- that almost all the information which can be 
provided to you is subject to rebuttal. 
Ohio and Michigan 
Ohio is frequently cited as the model jurisdiction in 
narcotics, supposedly having the stiffest law in the country. We have 
been told that narcotic addiction has fallen off at some dramatic 
rate in Ohio, but there is no way to prove or disprove this. The number 
of narcotic arrests has declined in Ohio, but not nearly so markedly 
as the supposed decline in addiction. Remember the tie-up between 
narcotic addiction and crime everywhere; the toll of narcotics addiction 
is said to provide 50 per cent of the crime in the large cities and 
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25 per cent of the crime throughout the United States. Narcotic 
addiction in Ohio is supposed to have declined something like 80 per 
cent since it enacted its harsh legislation, but the crime normally 
associated with narcotics has not. Larceny, robbery, burglary, 
forgery, and prostitution have not declined at all. 
Now it seems to me that one must come to one of two 
conclusions on this kind of evidence. Either addiction has not 
declined in Ohio, or addiction does not promote the crime to the extent 
we are told it promotes. This is the confused picture all over the 
country. 
Now, the next thing to keep in mind when examining the results 
of particular legislative efforts is that there is a world of difference 
between writing harsh legislation and having it applied. Michigan has 
a 20-year minimum mandatory penalty for the sale of narcotics. That's 
fine, but hardly anyone gets convicted in Michigan for the sale of 
narcotics, something less than three per cent. The charges are usually 
reduced to possession. This happens because the judges just will not 
impose the mandatory penalty. The ~nerican Bar Foundation has undertaken 
an extensive study of the administration of criminal justice, and this 
study has been going on for six years. When the staff was working in 
Detroit, it was fbund that people were not convicted for sale of 
narcotics, and there the answer they were given was that the judge 
would not allow it, because they would not impose 20-year minimum 
sentences on these people. 
The California Narcotics Commission went to Michigan to talk 
with the judges, and their answer was that the juries would not convict. 
Whatever it is, they don't do it. Now, because of this, the proponents 
of heavy penalties for narcotics addicts will suggest (despite the 
fact that Michigan comes closest to their ideal of stiff sentences) 
that you must have cooperation from district attorneys and from the 
judiciary to make the law work. This is quite true, and I don't know 
how you are going to get it, unless you conduct an education program 
to convince the judges and the juries that such sentences are desirable. 
Let us assume now that a state has severe penalty legislation 
and a cooperative judiciary and prosecuting body. Suspension, 
probation, and parole aren't stopped~ they are going to get out. I 
could not find out from the course of this study very satisfactory 
answers on how many months people convicted of various narcotic offenses 
actually spent in prison. I could find it out in the federal system. 
There is no parole for narcotic addicts and there is a minimum five-
year penalty, so they spend it all in prison. In examining these 
matters, we all need a lot more information than is available. One of 
the greatest services any state legislature could provide now is 
(regardless of whatever kind of control measures you feel are necessary) 
the development of some system for checking the effectiveness of these 
controls over a period of time; there is no way to do this now. Also 
the information that you need to know now about people charged and 
convicted of narcotics offenses is very extensive. 
What causes addiction? Doctors state that many people can 
spend a long time in the hospital under severe pain. During this time 
they are being administered morphine or some less potent drug, and when 
the pain subsides, they are not addicted; another individual, however, 
under similar circumstances is addicted. Why? If it's true in 
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hospitals, it'll be true in prisons. When one individual starts using 
narcotics drugs, if he is removed from the source by imprisonment, he 
may come out fine and never need it again. The majority apparently 
do not. This does not mean, however, that addiction is not curable, 
that it cannot respond adequately to treatment. But the difficulty 
thus far in developing treatment and rehabilitation procedures in 
penal and medical institutions is that nobody (legislatures, 
appropriation committees, public health services, and such) has provided 
the funds to conduct follow-up studies to find out what happened. 
I was really moved with great pity when I went to the 
Lexington Narcotics Hospital, which is staffed by an extremely 
dedicated group of people, but their job seems to be like that of a 
surgeon who operates on a patient for cancer today and never knows 
whether the man lived or died. Tomorrow he has to perform the same 
operation again, and he doesn't know whether to modify his procedure 
because he knows nothing about its success. If you are going to 
provide facilities to aid narcotics addicts, they will be valueless 
unless you provide additional facilities to find out what happened to 
them; and they have to be fairly extensive facilities. 
In New York, a few studies have been conducted, and some of 
them have been most gratifying, particularly those on intensive parole 
care with narcotics patients. And when you remember that it costs 
something like $350 a year per parolee for this intensive care as 
compared to the $250 for a regular parolee, it sounds a little bit high 
at first, but in New York it costs about $2,000 a year to keep a person 
in prison. It costs money to support his dependents while he is there 
(they usually don't have any income), plus, we are told, millions and 
millions ·of dollars in depredation by narcotics addicts. Intensive 
care for parolees and rehabilitation services in penal institutions 
are really a small investment in comparison to what it costs without 
it. 
Solutions to the Narcotics Problem 
Now, let us turn for a moment to the proposed solutions to 
the narcotics problems. Generally, there are about five major ones. 
First, and the most important is the one now followed, that of applying 
criminal sanction. The proponents of criminal sanction as a method of 
control argue that for practical reasons you cannot make distinctions 
about people who have narcotic drugs in their possession. I can cite 
you an exampl~ I thin~ which points up most of the criticism of the 
approach: I can have 10 pounds of uncut heroin in my possession 
and you can have one capsule, and under the federal laws we both go 
to prison for the same length of time. Now, it may be practical to 
administer such a law, but it is also justifiably unrealistic. There 
are severe problems about allowing and making distinctions in the 
amount of drugs possessed. It has been tried in New York. New York 
policemen tell me that the narcotics pushers carry one grain less 
than the statutory minimum for a misdemeanor, and their business 
flourishes. This may very well be true. 
I don't see, myself, why the discretion that has been vested 
in judges for years in all sorts of criminal offenses has to be_den~ed 
in this particular area. Judicial discretion allows the determ1nat1on 
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of the sentence according to what the conditions are in the particular 
case, what the background of the defendant is, and what hi~ prospects 
for recovery are. But the proponents of stiff penalty leg1slati~n . 
apparently lose all their confidence in the judiciary. They ma1nta1n 
that the criminal sanction system will not work without uniform, severe 
application of sentences and contend there are always soft-hearted 
judges who let some go. 
The converse of this is the fact that the statute is 
unyielding; there are always promising people who go to jail for five 
years, and who come out in worse condition than when they started. 
If you are going to operate on the assumption that the judges cannot 
be given the discretion to sentence in the area of narcotics as they 
are in other areas, then there is nothing to do except to impose a 
severe statutory minimum mandatory penalty without benefit of suspension, 
probation, and parole, which is done in several jurisdictions. If you 
can operate on the assumption that your judges can apply discretionary 
sentences with an eye to correcting the problems of particular 
individuals, then you are well on the way toward bringing together 
some of the best aspects of all of the proposals. 
Narcotic Clinics. The antithesis of the criminal sanction 
approach is the narcotic clinic, which was tried in this country in the 
1920's immediately after the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act began to produce 
some chaos for a while because thousands of narcotic addicts who had 
been getting drugs freely before suddenly didn't, and they were 
apparently in very distressing circumstances. There are a lot of 
various methods proposed in connection with narcotics clinics. One 
proposal is that they be operated by the state on a 24-hour day basis, 
where the addict has to come and get every shot one at a time. Obviously 
this is unrealistic; a man who has to go to the hospital every four 
hours cannot hold a job. Another proposal is that he be given a one-
day's supply or up to a two-days' supply. Of course, these proposals 
are all connected with registration requirements, photographs, 
fingerprints, etc., in order to prevent, insofar as possible, diversion 
of the drugs by the people registered. 
The biggest advantage which the proponents of the narcotic 
drug clinics espouse is that it will cut into the illicit traffic. 
Doubtless it will; I don't think it will eliminate it. There is 
considerable evidence that narcotic addicts are associated with 
criminal activity in other ways than using narcotic drugs. Is this 
the cause or an effect? Which comes first, addiction or criminal 
activity? Here again various statistics are open to speculation. 
But there are going to be people who for reasons of their criminal 
activity are not going to register and are going to seek to continue 
to get drugs from illicit sources. 
There is also a good possibility that if narcotic drug 
clinics are established where confirmed addicts can get their supply, 
there will be more active proselytizing by pushers. If this business 
is worth all we are told it's worth to the pushers, they are probably 
going to try and continue to develop new markets. I might say, right 
here, that certainly there is evidence of this. Most of the intensive 
investigation, like the senate and house hearing in this connection, 
indicate that proselyting to induce people into addiction is really 
not a very large problem. Certainly, addiction is a contagious 
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thing, but most people appear, as far as can be determined, to take 
it up like we take up smoking, because some of their friends did, or 
it was a clever thing to do. The first thing they know, they smoke 
all the time and cannot help it, but not because somebody came out 
and induced them to do it behind the barn or in the corn field. 
There is a strong possibility, however, that if legitimate 
supplies are provided to existing addicts, then the pushers might 
turn to this kind of development. If one state sought to establish 
narcotic clinics before all states did, it probably would become an 
Eden for addicts. If they were established uniformly everywhere, 
there might be a different result. 
British System. This same kind of problem arises in 
connection with the employment in the United States of something like 
the British system. The British system was something we were told 
for years didn't exist. This is because the British dangerous drug 
act reads very much like the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act. Both of them 
have the usual terms that are subject to much interpretation, such as 
"in the course of the doctor's professional practice," "in good 
faith," and "for the relief of pain," etc. In Great Britain when the 
question of proper professional practice arose, a committee of doctors 
was formed to determine what proper professional practice was, or is. 
In the United States it was determined by non-medical arbiters. 
On paper there are three things which distinguish the 
British system. (I mention the British system because it is widely 
advocated in this country.) This committee set forth three 
circumstances under which drugs could be administered to addicts: 
1) when -the patient is under treatment by a gradual withdrawal method 
with a view toward cure; 2) when, after attempts at cure, it appears 
that the drug cannot be completely discontinued because of the 
severity of withdrawal symptoms; and 3) when it has been demonstrated 
that the patient is capable of leading a relatively normal life if 
given drugs and that he cannot lead such a life without drugs. 
Many American authorities say there is no such thing as 
this third condition, where a person can function successfully 
with drugs and cannot function without it. A number of others say 
that there are many such circumstances. The British say that they 
find them fairly often. Great Britain with a population of 50 million 
people has about 400 reported narcotic addicts. The United States, 
with something less than 200 million people, has a reported 44,000 
narcotic addicts and an estimated 60,000, which is a very conservative 
estimate. Without doubt, the British reporting techniques are not as 
good as ours. I think that their addict population is doubtless 
higher than 400. But it requires the application of a pretty high 
error factor to raise that 400 up to a level comparable to our 
60,000. 
Recent studies in Great Britain have shown opposite 
conclusions. Two doctors sent by Governor Rockefeller to study the 
program in Great 8ritain came back and reported that addiction in 
Great Britain is not the result of their system, but their system is 
the result of the fact that they do not have a large addict problem. 
Mr. Scheerer, who has written a new book on the subject, reports the 
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opposite, that the British law has been instrumental in the shaping 
of public attitude about narcotics addiction and that public 
attitude in combination with the laws and the freedom of the doctors 
to treat addiction has resulted in their low addiction rate. 
Now, if any attempt were made in this country by each 
state to adopt the British system, there would be some of the same 
problems that would occur with narcotics clinics, unless there was 
excellent cooperation from the medical society. 
Medical Practice and the Harrison Act 
After the enactment of the Harrison Act and the closing 
of narcotic clinics, many doctors continued to administer drugs to 
their patients (their addicted patients); some in an attempt to cure, 
some doubtless because it was easier and they were faced with no 
trouble as long as they kept giving the patient his morphine tablets, 
and some to make money. But the law enforcement authorities started 
putting doctors in jail at a fantastic rate, and the doctors 
immediately backed off from the problems of narcotic addiction. It 
is still basically a medical problem. 
Today, in most places a sincere narcotic addict who wished 
to kick his habit would probably get politely turned away from the 
offices of most doctors because: 1) they are afraid of prosecution; 
and 2) because they have avoided the problem so long that they don't 
know how to treat narcotics addiction. The problem of the role of 
the doctor is basic and elemental in narcotics control statutes, 
administration, and policy. Right now there are some states where the 
doctor has virtually no discretion in treating an addict who, comes to 
him for care. In California, ambulatory treatment is absolutely 
forbidden or addicts must be treated in prison or a medical institution 
approved by the state. And the required treatment, of course, is set 
forth in the statutes. "He shall not have more than X grains of 
morphine for 15 days, on the 16th day he shall be reduced to a smaller 
amount which continues on for another 15 days, and thereafter nothing." 
I think that this represents the extreme of intervention in medical 
practice by the legislatures. It allows for no variation by the 
doctor. The question of ambulatory treatment, of course, I think 
is an area in which legislatures have substantial interest because 
of their responsibility to protect the public. I think, however, 
that legislatures should examine very closely the improvements which 
have been made in narcotic addiction treatment, largely through 
psychiatry and through after-care provisions of parole facilities. 
Legislatures should determine anew whether it is really necessary 
for addicts to be locked up in order to be treated. 
I would like to point out this fact about treatment. I 
know when I started this study I had what I believe was a typical 
view, that when a person becomes addicted to narcotic drugs, 
there is no way to stop the addiction without going th~ough horrible 
ordeals, some of which may kill. Apparently, from what I have been 
able to discover, this isn't so under the withdrawal techniques now 
available at Lexington Hospital and at other treatment facilities. 
In most cases a narcotic drug user can be taken off narcotic drugs 
relatively painlessly in a matter of 10 days to two weeks, so that 
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his body does not require them any more. His psyche probably 
continues to require them in most cases thereafter, but this is 
where rehabilitation can bring about some dramatic changes in some 
people. 
Talking with federal correctional institution people, 
however, I have been informed that their rehabilitation responsibilities 
have been completely undermined by mandatory minimum penalties. 
Psychiatric care and counselling services and parole and probation 
techniques, which have proven themselves in so many areas of general 
activity, require a motivation of some kind, and obviously the best 
kind of motivation when you are in prison is to get out. But the 
narcotic addict in the federal prison and the narcotic offender 
(and all addicts are offenders if possession is implicit in use) 
know that no matter how well they perform, how well they respond to 
treatment, how promising their future is, not one single solitary 
thing they can do can get them out one day earlier. You don't get 
very good cooperation in a rehabilitation program this way. And it's 
not a willful refusal to cooperate; you've just got to have a 
motivation, and it's not there. 
Now a few comments about a couple of other suggestions 
and approaches: one is isolation, to put everybody away in a leper 
colony. There have been also recent suggestions (especially in 
New York and in other places) to create mass institutional facilities. 
In New York City, it was suggested that the facilities should have in 
excess of .10,000 beds for narcotic addicts to be taken off the streets 
and placed in medical-penal facilities for a period of a year or so 
for attempts at rehabilitation and then in long-term facilities 
thereafter. Obviously, this has a lot of merit to it, but the cost 
would be enormous, and in view of other oroblems that states are 
faced with, they are not justified in spending this amount of money 
on a problem as small as addiction. 
Report Recommendations 
I have suggested three things basically in the conclusion 
to my report: First, in the absence of compelling considerations, 
which I did not find in the course of the report, people who are 
charged with the responsibility of dealing with narcotic addicts 
ought not to be denied the means which have been found to be effective 
in other areas of criminal activity. And in this category I include 
judicial discretion in sentencing and the use of probation and 
parole procedures in the same way in which they are used in other 
criminal activities. There may be compelling considerations, but 
I think that they should be examined very carefully· in light of what 
you are attempting to do, what the cost to the community is of main-
taining people for extensive periods of time in prison, and what the 
result is when the people finally get out. 
The second large conclusion I offered is that the adoption 
of new and untried approaches to narcotics problems should be post-
poned until additional information has been systematically gathered 
which will enable cnlighted planning and avoid tragic steps: I have 
also prepared in the conclusion a statement of what I consider t~e 
minimum information which must be gathered in order to make a valid 
evaluation of narcotic rehabilitation, treatment, and correction 
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programs. These should be amplified by consultation with sociologists, 
psychiatrists, medical men, correctional people, and law enforcement 
officers. The ones that I have offered have been submitted to people 
representing all of these disciplines and have been generally accepted 
by them as important ingredients in such a plan. 
Without bringing together for the purposes of study the 
kind of information I have suggested at the end of this report, people 
will continually be able to do as I am able to do right now, offer 
you a rebuttal to any kind of authority you quote for any kind of 
proposition. I don't believe that the proponents of harsh penalty 
legislation, who have had 20 to 40 years of experience, can prove 
their claims that it deals effectively with the narcotic problem. I 
feel quite sure that if they had incontrovertible demonstrative 
evidence, they would have offered it. And they didn't offer it, and 
I couldn't find it. 
Mr. Eldridge provided the following additional information 
in answer to questions from committee members: 
1) No state attempts to control addiction by confinement 
and treatment. Some states even make addiction a crime. A number 
of states, however, have some kind of provision for confinement of 
narcotic addicts if they don't commit a crime, but this is unrealistic 
because most of them don't have any facilities to treat these people. 
2) Most officials and others concerned with narcotic 
problems agree that a) the pusher for profit should be penalized very 
heavily; and b) the addict should be provided with care. But there 
is considerable disagreement about what to do about the people in 
between, those who just sell enough dope to support their habit. 
I don't have a satisfactory solution to offer for the 
people in between, because they present problems. The only suggestion 
I can offer is that this is best left to judicial discretion. When 
an addict is brought before a judge under circumstances that indicate 
that he is not really a profit-motivated pusher, even though he may 
have sold small quantities of drugs, let the judge determine whether 
he should be committed for treatment and care or whether he should be 
confined as a seller. It has been our experience that statutes alone 
which try to detail everything on this subject are not satisfactory, 
and they don't allow for exceptional conditions. 
3) Narcotic addiction is a medical problem and the British 
regard it as such, but we don't. Sometimes, lip service is paid to 
this concept by law enforcement people and by legislators, who then 
go right ahead and legislate on medical matters. I think that the 
medical profession should be encouraged to participate again in 
efforts to cope with the problem. Today, the only thing medicine 
has to do with narcotics addiction, essentially, is through the 
public health service at the two federal hospitals. I would say 
that if we were to adopt the British system effectively in this 
country, we would not get the same results the British get, probably. 
And I say too, that this is not all due to the sociolooicial 
differences, which are so often offered. One major difference is the 
amount of money that is available in this country as compared with 
Great Britain and other countries. We are the prime target for 
internationdl nurcotics sellers. 
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4) If a·clinic program is something more than a dope 
cafeteria, I think you might also accomplish perhaps an even more 
important objective of educating the public about narcotic addiction 
and what kind of a threat it really offers. Despite the fact that I 
say that physical and moral problems are not so bad, there is some-
thing basically wrong with addiction from my ethical point of view, 
and I think mine is fairly typical. The addicts are people who have 
to depend on a crutch in order to live, in order to orient themselves 
to their community. Of course, we all have crutches of one sort or 
another, but addiction is a particularly dangerous one because there 
is no realism involved with people who are under the influence of 
drugs. With the clinic you could strike at illicit traffic, you 
could remove serious health problems that result from the way in 
which some people use drugs rather than from the use itself, things 
such as absesses and perforated navels and emaciation because they 
spend all their money on drugs, etc. These things could be reduced 
through the clinic, and if you add some real treatment facilities, 
you could accomplish a good deal. 
5) The New York Academy of Medicine has proposed a plan 
for dealing with addiction problems through the establishment of 
treatment clinics. These clinics would have the power to dispense 
narcotic drugs in connection with treatment. Addicts would be 
registered, photographed, fingerprinted, etc.; they would receive a 
three days' suppiy during the time they are trying to work with them. 
Their view is one that I have expressed earlier: an effective cure to 
addiction must be based on real life circumstances, and you must 
persuade the addict to give up drugs of his own free will. Clinic 
personnel would try to diminish the narcotic dose gradually, 
establishing, if necessary, a stabilized dose while they continue to 
work with him on some cure. You must realize that some people will 
not respond to any kind of treatment, blandishment, coercion or 
anything else, and they recommend that these people be given a 
stabilized dose. 
Now, one of the things that is wrong with this approach 
is the problem about the amount of the stabilized dose. They have found 
thus far no maximum toleration that an addict can develop. Seventy-
five grains is the highest I have heard of, but this man apparently 
could have gone on indefinitely taking more and more and more; the 
body will adjust to it. It is easy, however, to establish a dosage 
at which withdrawal symptoms can be forestalled. For most confirmed 
addicts, the experiments at Lexington suggest that 10 grains a day 
will take care of most everybody. The problem is that a stabilized· 
dose, as the body becomes accustomed to it, produces no real kicks 
anymore; the euphoria is gone. All addicts are not necessarily after 
euphoria. Here you get into arguments with the psychiatrists and 
physicians about what the addicts are really after. Some say that 
their real motivation is to stave off withdrawal symptoms, which are 
very acute. In most cases, a stabilized dose will do it, but if they 
are really after euphoria, a stabilized dose will not do it. If there 
is any kind of ambulatory arrangement where the addict is to be 
supplied with drugs, either on a permanent basis or as part of the 
treatment, you will have a problem, with some of them at least. They may 
have to be given ever increasing doses· or they may continue to turn 
to underworld traffic in order to achieve euphoria. 
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6) The majority of addiction occurs in areas not so much 
characterized by poverty as characterized by dislocation, for example, 
East Harlem in New York and the south side in Chicago are areas where 
people live who have come to the city recently from some place else. 
They are people without stability, who are transients, live in 
crowded conditions, and are not established in the community. Currently, 
they are mostly Negroes and Puerto Ricans. Sometimes certain areas are 
always a problem. We know that in Chicago, for instance, the south side 
has always been the area of addiction. Before the Negroes and the 
Puerto Ricans, who live in this area now, it was the Irish, because 
they were the people who were displaced, immigrants who left a 
community with which they were familiar and oriented and whose lives 
were disturbed and torn up, and they turned to narcotics too. 
7) Usually, the only determinant as to whether the state or 
federal government prosecutes narcotics offenders is who has the 
stiffest penalty. Federal authorities, if there is a favorable 
situation in a given state (for example, if the penalty is high 
enough and/or if the judges are harsh), will let these offenders be 
tried before the state court. If it is a federal addiction offense 
such as possession or sale, and they think the local climate is not 
good enough, then they will try them in a federal court. As a 
general rule the Federal Bureau of Narcotics says it is not interested 
in little people. Its aim is to strike at the traffic itself, and 
it assists the local people a great deal in finding little pushers 
and the end men, while it works on the big promoters. 
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES 
The Colorado Supreme Court adopted the rules of criminal 
procedure on September 1, 1961. These rules were originally drafted by 
the Criminal Law Committee of the Colorado Bar Association. Since 
the adoption of the rules, a subcommittee of the bar association's 
criminal law committee has been examining the rules and Colorado's 
criminal statutes to determine: 1) which statutes should be repealed 
or amended; and 2) which rules should be amended or added. This 
subcommittee submitted the following report to the Legislative Council 
Criminal Code. Committee: 
Report to the Criminal Code Committee 
on 
Effect of Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure 
on Existing Colorado Statutes 
Existing Colorado statutes which parallel the 
Colorado rules, whether the language is exactly 
the same or not, should be repealed as creating 
unnecessary duplication and confusion. Existing 
statutes which are inconsistent with the rules 
must be repealed to avoid the even greater con-
fusion involved in the question of which law to 
·follow. Some statutes should be amended rather 
than re pea led. 
The search for statutes to be repealed or amended 
led to some discoveries of matter contained in 
the statutes which might properly be added to the 
rules. A list of suggested amendments to the rules 
is attached for the consideration of the Supreme 
Court. It will in some instances be quite 
important to amend the rules at or before the 
time when the statutes are repealed. 
Portions of the original report of this subcommittee 
were allocated to members of the C.B.A. Committee 
on Criminal Law for careful checking before sub-
mission to the Criminal Code Committee of the 
Legislative Council for submission to the 1963 
Legislature. 
Since Colorado criminal procedure is now principally 
a compound mixture of Colorado Supreme Court rules 
and Colorado statutes, and because the rules do not 
purport to cover all phases of criminal procedure, 
it is recommended that the section numbers and 
titles of statutes which are repealed should be left 
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on the statute books, to which should be added a 
reference to the applicable Rule of Criminal 
Procedure, as was done by Congress in the case of 
the United States Code, title 18, part II 
(Criminal Procedure). Thus when the text of 
39-2-3 of C.R.S. '53 (as amended) is repealed, 
what would remain in C.R.S. '53 would be: 
39-2-3. Warrants on suspicion -- commitment -- bail. 
See Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, rules 
3, 4, 5, 9, 46. 
On the other hand, 39-2-1 and 39-2-2, which deal with 
topics not covered by the rules, would remain as 
they now are. 
Subcommittee on Repeal of Statutes 
William L. Rice 
Austin W. Scott, Jr. 
The portion of the report enumerating the statutes to be 
amended or repealed was reviewed by the Legislative Reference Office 
and after a meeting with the bar association, further changes were 





Statutes to be Repealed or Amended 
Covered by Rules 3, 4, 5, 9 and 46. And perhaps add 
bail bond terms concerning appearance in court to 
Rule 46. 
39-2-4 " Rule 7(b)(l), providing for names of witnesses when 
information is filed, is inconsistent witn 39-L-4 on 
naming witnesses at preliminary examination in the 
case of those not admitted to bail. 
39-2-5 Repeal, but amend Rule 5 to allow defendant in custody to 
demand names of witnesses before the filing of the 




because covered by Rules 4 and 5(a)(l), all but last 
sentence, which concerns hot pursuit across county 
lines by officers with warrant. This part of statute 
should be reenacted and include Chapter 103, Laws of 
'61 on hot pursuit of traffic violator across county 
or municipal lines. If is recommended that a statute 
be enacted as to who can execute a warrant or summons, 
e.g., authorizing police officer of X County to arrest 
on warrant issued by JP of Y County and sent to or 
communicated to him. 
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39-2-8 Repeal, upon amending Rule 4(a) to permit issuance of warrant 
to a named person, as in 39-2-8, as well as to any 
officer authorized by law. 39-2-8 on taking arrestee 
before issuing JP must be repealed as inconsistent 
with Rules 4(a)(l)(ii) and 5(a)(l) on taking him 

















Re pea 1. 
II 
II 
because inconsistent with Rule 5(b)(2) and Rule 9 
requiring taking arrestee before nearest JP. 
Covered by Rule 4(b)(l)(v). Second sentence of 39-2-11, 
that technical mistakes in arrest warrant do not 
require release, though not mentioned in Rules, is in 
the spirit of the Rules. 
Covered by Rules 5(d) and 46, which by implication 
provide that one for whom bail is fixed who cannot 
raise it till later is entitled to release when he 
later raises it. 
Covered by Rule 46(a)(2). But perhaps Rule 46 should 
be amended to provide for return day on the bond. 
Covered by Rules 9(b)(l)(second sentence) and 46. 
(Perhaps Rule 46(c) should be amended to provide 
specifically for a return date on the bond.) 
Covered by Rules S(a) and 13. 
Covered by Rules 8(a) and 13. 
Covered by Rule 7. (But as Rule 7(b)(l) limits 
requirement of witnesses' names to informed-against 
defendants, Rule 7 should be amended to provide that 
indicted defendants are also entitled to names of 
witnesses. Perhaps Rule 10 should be amended to 
provide that a defendant at arraignment, or as soon 
thereafter as the jury panel is drawn and the list of 
those chosen compiled, be supplied on request with the 
list of names making up the jury panel.) 
F i rs t sentence c ov ere d by R u le s 12 ( b ) ( 2 ) a n d 12 ( b ) ( 3 ) , 
the balance by Rule 7(c). See Rule 52 on harmless 
error. 
It is important to keep 39-4-1, since Colorado 
Constitution, Art. II, 5 8, provides that "until 
otherwise provided by law" felony prosecutions require 
indictment, and "law" here probably means statutory law. 
Covered by Rule 7(b)(l), Rule 7(b)(3) and Rule 7(c). 
First sentence covered by Rule 7(c), second sentence 
by 8 (a ) . 
Covered by Rule 7(c) and Appendix of Forms, form 6. 















































First sentence is covered by Rule 7(b)(2), and the 
second sentence by Rule 7(b)(3). 
Covered by Rule 5(d), last sentence. 
Covered by Rule 17. 
Covered by Rule 15(b). 
Covered by Rule 15(b) and (d). 
Covered by Rule 15(d) and (e). 
Covered by Rule 15(f). 
Covered by Rule 9. Sentence in 39-7-1 on transporting 
prisoner through counties is not necessary, though not 
provided for in Rules. 
Covered by Rules ll(a) on arraignment and 55(a) on the 
criminal docket. 
Covered by Rule 12(a) and Rule 47. 
Covered by Rules 12(a) and 47. 
First sentence covered by Rule ll(a), second by 
Rule 32(b). 
Covered by Rule ll(a). 
Covered by Rule 48(a). 
Covered by Rules 8(b) and 14. 
Covered by and inconsistent with Rule 48(b). 
Covered by Rule 52 requiring disregard of immaterial 
variances and of defects and irregularities (including 
those at trial or in judgments or in informations and 
indictments) not affecting substantive rights. 
Covered by Rule 30. 
Covered by Rule 30. 
Covered by Rule 3l(a)(2). 
Covered by Rules 37 and 51. 




Colo. L. '55 





Should be retained, bacause of Rule 39(a) on continuing 
present writ-of-error procedure, until C?lorado Supr7me 
Court rewrites Rules 37, 38 and 39 on writ of error 1n 
criminal cases. (The Supreme Court has this rewriting 
task under advisement.) 
Inconsistent with Rule 39(c). 
Same comment as for 39-7-24 applies here. 
but only after Rule 38 is amended to provide (as 39-7-28 
now provides) that the trial court may, at the time of 
sentence, stay a sentence of imprisonment on motion of 
a dependant wh~ wishes to secure S~preme Court review 
on -?rror. 
39-7-29 Repeal. Covered by Rule 44. (But perhaps add to Rule 44 that in 
misdemeanor case an attorney may, not shall, be appointed 
to represent an indigent defendant.) 
39- 7-30 Amend. This might read: "When a court of record appoints an 
attorney to represent an indigent defendant, it shall 
be the duty of the appointing court to allow the 
attorney a fee, to be fixed by the judge of the court, 
and to be paid out of the county treasury of the county 
wherein the indictment or information is found. At the 
conclusion of the proceedings in the trial court the 
clerk of the appointing court shall give the attorney 
a certified copy of the order appointing him counsel, 
on which the judge of the court shall endorse the 
amount of the fee allowed, upon the presentation of 
which the county commissioners of the county shall 
order a warrant drawn upon the county treasurer in 
payment of such fee. If the trial court appoints an 
attorney to represent an indigent defendant for 
purposes of review by the Colorado Supreme Court, the 
trial court upon conclusion of such review shall allow 
the appointed attorney a fee as herein provided." 













Covered by and inconsistent with Rule 17(b) because 
Rule is not limited to judicial district or 100 miles. 
C ov ere d by Ru 1 e 11 ( b ) . 
C ov ere d by R t 11 e s 18 ( b ) a n d 21 ( b ) . 
Covered by Rule 2l(a)(2)(first sentence). 
Inconsistent with Rule 2l(a)(2) on selection of the new 






























C ov ere d by Ru 1 e 21 ( a ) ( 1 ) . 
Covered by Rule 2l(c)(l); inconsistent as to number of 
a f f i da v it s . 
Inconsistent with Rule 21, which does not and should 
not limit number of venue changes. 
Covered by Rule 2l(c)(3). 
Covered by Rule 21 ( c) (4). 
Covered by Rule 21 ( c) (4). 
Covered by Rule 21 ( c) (4). 
Covered by Rule 2l(c)(6). 
Covered by Ru 1 e 21 ( c ) ( 6 ) . 
Covered by Rule 2l(c)(5). 
Covered by Rule 21 ( c) (6). 
C ov ere d by Ru 1 e 21 ( c ) ( 2 ) . 
Covered by Rule 2l(c) (2). 
Covered by Rule 2l{a)(3). 
39-9-19 Amend, first sentence to read the same as Rule 2l(c)(7). 
Retain second and third sentences of 39-9-19. 







78-2-13 Re pea 1, 
Covered by Rule 32{a)(l) and Rule 32{a){2). 
Covered by Rule 18(b). No need for specific statute 
on murder, for Rule 18(b) covers all crimes (including 
murder) committed across county lines, e.g., A in X 
County shoots BB gun through glass window in Y County. 
No need for special statute on death in another 
county or state. 
Covered by Rule 41. It is suggested that all other 
special search and seizure statutes be repealed, so 
that rules on search and seizure will be uniform. 
because covered by Rule 24(c). As to civil trials, 
the matter is covered by Colorado Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 47. 
78-5-1 Amend, by deleting from 78-5-1 the provision found in Rule 
24 {a)(3) on petit jury in criminal case. But leave 
the part on grand jury now in 78-5-1. 
78-5-2 Keep, because although the criminal aspect is covered by 
Rule 24 (a)(2)(iv) (second clause), it must be kept 
for purposes of civil trials, no Civil Rule covering 
the matter. 
78-5-3 Repeal. Covered by Rule 24 (a)(2)(vi). (78-5-3 is a purely 
criminal statute.) 
78-5-4 II Covered by Rule 24 (b)(l). (78-5-4 is purely criminal.) 
because although the criminal aspect is covered by 78-5-5 Keep, 
Rule 24 (a)(4), it must be retained for purposes of 








Suggested Amendments to Rules 
Amend Rule 4(a) by adding in line 4 after "execute it" the words: 
"or to any other person named in the warrant to execute it." 
Amend Rule 5(d) by inserting after next-to-last sentence and before 
la st sentence this new sentence: "If the justice of the peace 
commits the defendant, either because the offense is not bailable 
or because the defendant is unable to procure bail, he shall endorse 
upon the warrant of commitment the names and addresses of the 
prosecution witnesses who testified at the preliminary examination 
and shall furnish the defendant with a copy of the warrant so 
endorsed." 
/-\mend Rule 7 (a) by adding a new sentence at the end: "The indictment 
shall be returned in open court and shall have endorsed thereon 
the names of witnesses in the same manner and with the same effect 
as in the case of the endorsement of witnesses upon an information." 
Amend Rule 10 by adding a new subsection (f) at the end: "{f) As 
soon as the jury panel is drawn which will try the case, a list of 
the names of the jurors on the panel shall be made available by 
the Clerk of the court to defendant's counsel, and if the defendant 
has no ~ounsel the list shall be served on him personally or by 
certified mail." 
Amend Rule 2l(a)(3) by inserting in line 4, after the word "any" 
and before the word "cause," the word "other." 
Amend Rule 35(b) by adding the following sentence at the end: 
"The order of the trial court granting or denying the motion is 
a final order reviewable on writ of error." 
Amend Rule 38(a)(2) by inserting the following sentence after "(2) 
Imprisonment": "The sentencing court sha 11 on writ ten motion of a 
defendant stating that he intends to seek review on writ of error 
stay a sentence of imprisonment." 
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8) Amend Rule 44 by inserting at the end thereof the following new 
sentence: "In any misdemeanor case, upon such a showing of 
indigency, an attorney may be assigned to represent the defendant 
at every stage of the tria 1 court proceedings." 
9) Amend Rule 46(c) by adding to the end of the first sentence the 
following: "in court on a designated day, or on the first day of 
the next term of court and from day to day thereafter, as the 
court may deem appropriate." 
10) Amend Rule 2l(c)(4) by changing the word "Recognizance" to read 
"Bail Bond" in the title and "bond" elsewhere. 
11) Amend Rule 46 by striking the present 46{e) and adding the following: 1 
"(e) Forfeiture. 
"(l) Declaration. If there is a breach of condition of a bond, 
the court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail. 
11 (2) Setting Aside. The court may direct that a forfeiture be 
set aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears 
that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture. 
"(3) Enforcement. When a forfeiture has not been set aside, the 
court shall on motion enter a judgment of default, and execution may 
issue thereon. By entering into a bond the obligor submits to the 
jurisdiction of the court. His liability may be enforced without the 
necessity of an independent action. The court shall order the issuance 
of a citation directed to the obligor to show cause, if any there be, 
why judgment should not be entered against him forthwith and execution 
issue thereon. Said citation may be served personally or by certified 
mail upon the obligor directed to the address given in the bond. 
Hearing on the citation shall be held not less than 20 days after 
service. The defendant's attorney and the prosecuting attorney shall 
be given notice of the hearing. 
"(4) Remission. After entry of such judgment, the court may remit 
it in whole or in part under the conditions applying to the setting 
aside of forfeiture in paragraph (2) of this subdivision. If a bond 
forfeiture has been paid into the general fund of the county, the com-
missioners thereof shall be notified of any application for remission. 
"(f) Exoneration. The obliger shall be exonerated as follows: 
1. When the condition of the bond has been satisfied; or 2. When the 
amount of the forfeiture has been paid; or 3. Upon surrender of the 
defendant into custody before judgment upon an order to show cause, 
upon payment of all costs occasioned thereby. The obliger may seize 
and surrender the defendant to the sheriff of the county wherein the 
bond shall be taken, and it shall be the duty of such sheriff, on such 
surrender and delivery to him of a certified copy of the bond by which 
the obliger is bound, to take such person into custody, and by writing 
acknowledge such surrender. 
1. These provisions are also included in the recommended bail bond 
statute and should be deleted from the proposed statute, if the 
Colorado Supreme Court decides to incorporate them in the rules 
as set forth here. 
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11 (9} Continuation of Bonds. In the discretion of the trial 
court and with the consent of the surety or sureties, .the same bond 
may be continued until the final disposition of the case in the trial 
court to pending disposition of the case on review." 
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ADDENDUM 
Proposed Revision of Criminal Insanity Statutes, 
Procedures, and Test: Some Constitutional Considerations 
This analysis of the revision in criminal insanity statutes and 
procedures proposed by Senator Edward J. Byrnel was prepared at the 
request of the Criminal Code Committee by Professor Jim R. Carrigan, 
University of Colorado Law School and legal consultant to the committee. 
The committee asked Professor Carrigan to make this study because of the 
far-reaching changes proposed by Senator Byrne and the constitutional 
questions raised by these changes. Senator Byrne did not have the 
opportunity to review this analysis prior to its inclusion in this 
report because of time limitations resulting from the provision in 
Senate Joint Resolution No. 14 (1961) directing the Legislative Council 
to report the findings and recommendations of the Criminal Code Study 
no later than the convening of the Forty-fourth General Assembly in 
1963. For this reason, Senator Byrne has not added his comments on 
the findings made by Professor Carrigan. 
Features of the Proposed Revision 
The proposal made by Senator Byrne has six salient features: 
l) repeal of the present statutory plea of 11 not guilty by 
reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of .the crime," 
(C.R.S. 39-8-1 (1) (Supp. 1960) and statutory abolition of the common 
law defense of insanity; 
2) substitution of an immunity from prosecution on the ground 
of insanity at the time of the alleged crime for the present and 
common law defenses of insanity; 
3) substitution of a three-judge panel to try the fact of 
insanity on the defendant's motion to quash the indictment or information 
for the present jury trial of the insanity plea; 
. 4) substitution of the new, broader test adopted in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. 
Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961) for the present legal test 
of insanity {C.R.~. 39-8-1 (2)); 
5) adoption of a greatly improved procedure for commitment and 
treatment following a finding of insanity constituting a ground for 
immunity from prosecution; and 
6) adoption of a standard for release after commitment calculated 
to protect society while assuring the defendant reasonable means of 
obtaining his release upon successful treatment of his mental condition. 
1. See pp. 122-124 of this report. 
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This analysis covers these features of the proposal in the order 
presanted above. 
Abolition of the Defense of Insanity 
An attempt by the legislature to abolish the defense of insanity 
entirely in substance as well as in form -- and to treat the insane 
as fully responsible to the criminal law for their actions would no 
doubt be unconstitutional. (I Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure 
83 (Anderson ed. 1957)). Nevertheless, such an attempt to abolish 
the insane defendant's immunity from punishment for his act while 
insane must be distinguished from statutes merely subjecting that 
defense to procedural restrictions, while leaving the essence of the 
defense intact. "Statutes which are merely reasonable regulations of 
procedure do not destroy the right to raise the defense and are 
constitutional." (Ibid.) Thus, it was held that the due process 
guarantee of the United States Constitution, applied against the states 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, was not violated by an Oregon statute 
which imposed the burden of proving his defense of insanity beyond a 
reasonable doubt on a defendant charged with crime. The court declared 
that due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment require that a 
state's criminal procedure not offend "some principle of justice so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental. ... " (Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952)). 
It would seem that the idea that an insane man cannot be punished 
by criminal prosecution for his act while insane is deeply enough rooted 
in the traditions of common law countries to be ranked as fundamental 
to our concept of fair procedure. The whole fabric of our criminal law 
is contrived on the premise that men are responsible for their actions. 
It is not a new idea that: "An involuntary act, as it has no claim 
to merit, so neither can it induce any guilt; the concurrence of the 
will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid the fact in 
question, being the only thing that renders human actions either 
praiseworthy or culpable. Indeed, to make a complete crime cognizable 
by human laws, there must be both a will and an act." (4 Blackstone, 
Commentaries 20, 21.) 
If it be argued that the purpose of the criminal law is not 
punishment but deterrenc~ the rejoinder may be that an insane man's 
inclination to commit crime will not be deterred either by the example 
of punishment meted out to others or the threat of punishment to him-
self. Nor can it be said that the many examples of modern statutes 
defining certain conduct as criminal without regard to specific intent 
or knowledge have established de facto that the legislative branch may 
make acts criminal without regard to the state of the defendant's 
mind when the act is committed. Even where the crime itself requires 
no wrongful intent (e.g., the sale of impure food or sexual relations 
with a girl under the statutory age of consent while fully believing 
she is of age) the act must be voluntary to be a crime. Thus, if one 
is forced to drive his car over the speed limit, he would have a defense. 
although no specific intent is required. His act was not his. it was 
not v0lationa~ and therefore he is not criminally responsible. All 
crime presuppos~s a sane mind capable of directing volun!ary muscular 
action. The act of will is as much an element of tho crime as the . 
physical act which is prohibited. The legislature could no more abolish, 
- 158 -
in the crime of selling liquor to minors, the mental element than it 
could abolish the requirement that to support a conviction the evidence 
ba required to show a sale of liquor to a minor. 
"An act done by me without my will, or in the absence of my 
will, is not my act.'' (State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac.1020, 
1024 (1910)). "It is not at all certain that the courts would consider 
th~mselves powerless to question the constitutionality of legislation 
which undertook to eliminate the element of intelligent intention or 
volation as a requisite to criminal liability." (Weihofen, 1v1enta1 
Disorder as a Criminal Defense 478 (1954).) A 1928 Mississippi statute 
abolishing the defense of insanity in murder cases but allowing insanity 
at the time of the offense to be shown in mitigation was held 
unconstitutional as depriving the insane defendant of his life or 
liberty without due process. (Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 
So. 581 (1931).) Four of the six Mississippi Supreme Court Justices 
who held the statute unconstitutional also felt that it amounted to 
imposing "cruel and unusual punishment," and deprived the insane 
defendant of the constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard by 
himself or his counsel, which right could not be intelligently exercised 
by one not sane. (Id. at 587) This last argument is closely related 
to the right of the defendant to be present in person at his trial, a 
right which presupposes a mental presence as well as a physical presence. 
At this point it is well to recall that the Colorado Constitution 
forbids deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law (Art. It §25), guarantees the right of the accused in a criminal 
case to ilppear and defend in person (Art II, sl6), and prohibits 11 cruel 
and unusual punishment." (Art. II, 620.) In addition, the state 
constitution guarantees the defendant the right ''to meet the witnesses 
against him face to face ... ," a right which would be of no value to the 
insane. (Art. II, §16). In State v. Strasburq, supra, Chief Justice 
Rudkin of the Washington Supreme Court felt that all of these 
guarantees were probably violated by a statute purporting to abolish 
the defense of insanity. (110 Pac. at 1028, concurring opinion.) In 
addition,he asserted that the defendant's right to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation was denied, for the insane defendant 
could not be effectively informed. (Cf. Colo. Const. Art. II, §16). 
In summary, it seems clear that the legislature could not 
wholly abolish the defense of insanity. Even though the United States 
Supreme Court has never expressly so held, it is likely that the 
court would hold such a statute to violate due process. (See Wharton, 
Criminal Law and Procedure 83, note 1, and the cases there citedJ 
The only attempts by state legislatures to abolish the defense have 
been rejected by state appellate courts in Mississippi and Washington 
(Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. SRl (1931); State v. 
Strasburg. 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910).) 
It appears that the statute can be upheld only by finding that 
it is intended not to abolish the plea in substance, but merely to 
provide a new and different procedure for presenting the plea and 
trying the defense. Of course, any such new procedure must conform 
to state and federal constitutional requirements governing procedures 
in criminal cases. 
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The New Immunity dnd the New Procedure 
Points (2) and (3) as set out above will be discussed together 
und8r this headir1~ The core of the proposal is to abolish both the 
common law dnd stdtutory defenses of insanity and substitute in their 
place an immunity from prosecution for one who meets the new test of 
insanity as of the date· of the alleged offense. The procedure for 
determining whether the immunity is available in a particular case is 
by a motion to quash the indictment or information on the ground the 
defendant was insane when the acts on which the prosecution is based 
were committed. After psychiatric observation and examination similar 
to that under present procedure~ a hearing on the motion to quash would 
be held before a panel of three judges. 
Three-Judge Panel. The three-judge panel is ingenious in several 
respects. First, it would spread the responsibility for what could be 
a most unpopular decision to three judges. This is especially significant 
in view of the fact that our judges are popularly elected. It is 
apparently thought that the three-judge panel would provide a fact 
finding tribunal less susceptible of being swayed by emotional arguments 
and one which would be more capable of weighing the relative quality 
of conflicting m~ical testimony than a jury which now determines the 
fact of insanity. Moreove~ the tribunal which would try the issue of 
insanity would apparently be entirely separate and different from the 
tribunal which would try the case on a not guilty plea iri th~ event 
that the defendant should be found to have been sane at the time of 
the offense. Obviously this would allow the defense much greater freedom 
in presenting facts which would indicate insanity, but which might also 
tend to prejudice a jury against a defendant. Furthermore, the proposed 
new legal test of insanity would free the experts to testify far beyond 
the usual range of such testimony under the present "right-wrong" plus 
irresistible impulse tests and thus provide the tribunal a basis for 
decision more consonant with expert medical opinion on the defendant's 
mental condition. 1he real issue in such a •trial would be whether the 
defendant should be inst.itutiondlized for a mental disease or defect, 
be imprisoned or otherwise punished for a voluntary anti-social act. 
Proc edura 1 Chang c~. The nub of the procedural change would be to 
eliminate the defendant's present right to trial of his insanity defense 
by J jury. This is candidly stilted in the Criminal Code Committee 
memorandum of October S, 196~: "By abolishing the plea of not guilty 
by reason of insanity, the constitutional need for a jury trial on the 
question would be eliminated." It appears incontrovertible that the 
denial of jury trial on an issue now and traditionally tried by jury 
is the net effect, if not. the chief purpose, of the proposul. Whether 
or not such a change would be wise or desirable is a matter of policy 
for the General Assembly: however, whet.her or not such a change would 
bE-1 within the constitutionul power of the Gencrul /\ssembly is a 
quest.ion of law for the courts. 
Before turning to the constitutional issue, it should be noted 
thul the proposal would dlJ.ow a defendant who has been found sane at 
th() hearing before the~ three-judge punel to offer evidence of mental 
condition i•in iJ _proper cusc, as bearing upon the capacity of the accused 
to form the specific intc~nt essential to con.,_;titute a crime. 11 Pre~umably 
this evidence would be offered before a trial jury, and therefore it 
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might be argued with prima facie plausibility that the right of jury 
trial is not being dffected. The obvious answer is that unless the 
defendant is accorded substantially the same opportunity to contest the 
fact of insanity at the time of the offense before a jury as he now 
has, then his right of j1Jry trial has been obliterated, at least in 
part. 
lhe legislature has no more power to abolish constitutionally 
guaranteed rights piecemeal than it has to abolish them entirely. If 
it is contended, on the other hand, that the intent of the proposal 
is to retain the defendant's right to try the insanity issue fully 
before the trial jury, as that right exists now and existed immediately 
prior to adoption of the Colorado Constitution, then the proposal 
simply gives a criminal defendant two opportunities to escape via the 
insanity route. If it is contended that the proceeding before the 
three-judge panel is civil in nature -- and not a criminal proceeding 
required to be tried before a jury -- then there is no need for it. since 
adequate civil commitment procedures presently exist under which the 
district attorney could obtain a determination of status of a defendant 
thought to be insane. Moreover, the Colorado Supreme Court has held 
that an insanity hearing in a criminal case is not a civil, but a 
criminal proceeding. (Castro v. People, 180 Colo. 493, 503; 346 P. 2d 
1020 (1959) .) Finally, it should be noted that the provision reserving 
to the def2ndant his right to present evidence of mental condition at 
the main trial applies, by its terms, only to crimes including as an 
element a 11 specific intent." Many, if not most, modern statutory 
definitions of crimes require only a general criminal intent or merely 
require that the forbidden act has been done consciously and voluntarily; 
yet insanity is a defense. The saving provision would not reserve 
any jury trial rights except in specific intent crimes. 
Constitutional Guarantees. Does the proposal violate federal 
or state constitutional guarantees of jury trial in criminal cases? 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "trial 
by an impartial jury" in all criminal prosecutions. 
It is fundamental that the first eight amendments were aimed 
~t restricting the power of the federal government, not that of the 
states. Further, it has been uniformly held that the due process clause 
of the fourteenth Amendment does not automatically apply against the 
states all the restrictions contained in the first eight amendments, 
but only those which the United States Supreme Court by a case by case 
process of exclusion and inclusion determines to be so fundamental 
as to be part of due process. (Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124, 
125 (1959).) The Sixth Amendment rights have not been incorporated in 
tot □ against the states by the Fourteen Amendment. (Betts v. Brady, in 
316 U.S. 455. 461-62 (1941).) Thus the federal constituion would not 
be offended by the feature of the instant proposal denying jury trial, 
unless the United States Supreme Court would consider this feature a 
denial of due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Federal 
due process has been interpreted as flexible enough to give the states 
considerable latitude in establishing their own procedural rules governing 
the insanity plea in criminal cases. (Leland v. Oreoon, 343 U.S. 
790 (1952) upholding the requirement that the defendant prove insanity 
beyond reason~ble doubt.) In conclusion it may be said that it is not 
at all clear that federal constitutional rights would he denied by 
eliminating the right of jury trial on the issue of insanity in criminal 
CdS<JS. 
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A more serious question is whether the Colorado Constitutional 
provisions regarding trial by jury would be violated by the proposed 
procedure. The state constitution provides in Article II, ~ection 16 
that "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to.,. 
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury .... " This guaran~ee is repeated 
in Article II, Section 23, which declares: "The right of trial by 
jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases .... " These provisions 
should be read in the light of Article II, Section 24 which provides: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." 
It is possible to rationalize the proposed procedure as not 
depriving the defendant of his right to jury trial by arguing that a 
jury will here the case on the general plea of not guilty and therefore 
provides the "jury trial" guaranteed by the state constitution. This 
argument assumes that what was once a single trial covering the issue 
of insanity as well as all other issues may be divided into two or 
more trials, leaving some issues for trial by the jury while turning 
other issues over to a judge or judges for trial. At first glance it 
would seem that the present Colorado procedure for a bifurcated trial 
when insanity is pleaded would support the "two trials" analysis. But 
the Colorado Supreme Court has held that even though the present procedure 
makes possible the separate trial of the insanity plea and the not 
guilty plea, this procedure constitutes only one trial, albeit in two 
sections. ( Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 543; 322 P. 2d 674 ( 19~)8).) 
Moreover it must be remembered that the defendant is entitled to a jury 
trial in each section of this single trial. 
Could not the legislature provide that all questions except the 
defense of insanity are triable to a jury? It has been held that to 
take from the jury determination of the defense of self defense is a 
denial of the constitutional right to jury trial. (Young v. People, 
47 Colo. 352, 107 Pac. 274 (1910).) How is the defense of insanity 
different? Addressing itself to this very point, the Washington Supreme 
Court declared that the "mental responsibility of the accused is 
a fact entering into the question of his guilt, upon which he has a 
right of trail by jury, the same as upon any other fact inherent in that 
question, even as the fact that the muscular action of his physical body 
did or did not commit the physical act charged as a crime against 
him." (State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020, 1021 (1910).) 
In holding unconstitutional as a deprivation of the right to jury trial 
a statute providing for determination of the defendant's insanity 
plea by a commission of experts, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded: 
that where "the offense itself is triable, under the Constitution, 
by jury, the accused has the constitutional right to have his defense 
of insanity tried by jury." (State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 
639, 642 (1929).) There is no authority to the contrary. 
It may be contended that the General Assembly could rationalize 
taking determination of the insanity issue from the jury on the ground 
that the proposed procedure -- abolishing the defense of insanity --
merely provides a conclusive presumption of fact that all persons are 
sane for the purpose of criminal trials. In effect this would be a 
conclusive presumption that anyone charged with crime had the requisite 
mental capacity, to commit the crime at the time of commission, unless 
he filed the motion to quash as provided. This would be tantamount to 
presuming conclusively that an infant two years of age has capacity to 
commit crime, a presumption which would be equally contra to common 
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law and to common sense. Such a presumption would violate both federal 
due process (Heiner v. Donnan, 258 U.S. 312 (1932) and state due 
process (Garcia v. People, 121 Colo. 130, 213 P. 2d 387 (1949)). 
It would be no more valid than a presumption abolishing the defense of 
alibi and thus conclusively presuming that d defendant was at a place 
where 100 witnesses swear he was not at the time of the offense. (See 
Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (l93l)(concurring opinion).) 
It may be argued that the proposed change merely alters procedure 
without injury to the substance of the defendant's jury trial right. So 
long as the substance of the right to jury trial is preserved, the 
procedure or means by which the result is reached is wholly within the 
legislature's dlscretio~ and the courts may not declare a statute 
un~onstitutional merely because the procedure is different from that 
followed at common law. (Walker v. Southern Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593 
596 (1897)); People v. Troche, 273 Pac. 767, 770 (Calif. 1928) .) 
Thus, the test to be met by a statute to be upheld as merely altering 
the procedure for jury trial is whether it deprives the defendant 
of any right of substance which he had before its enactment. 
It is the ref ore imp era ti v e to com pa re the def end ant's rrac tic a .l 
problems in proving the insanity defense under the present procedure 
with the problems he would have under th,? proposed procedure. The 
defendant is now entitled to have his insanity defense tried as a fact 
by a jury of twelve. At the outset of the insanity trial, the 
def,?ndant is presumed sane and it is incumbent on him "to g,rnerate a 
reasonable doubt" of his sanity. (Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 53~), 546, 
322 P. 2d 674 (1958).) The defendant may be acquitted, under present 
procedures by mer~ly introducing~ reasonable doubt of his sanity 
in the minds of the twelve jurors. Probably more important, from the 
practical point of view, he can escape conviction by merely raising a 
reasonable doubt of his sanity in the mind of a single juror, for any 
conviction must be by unanimous vote. He has, under present law, 
twelve chances -- twelve theoretically independent minds, any one of 
which can give him at least a hung jury. 
Under the proposed procedure, only three persons act as triers 
of fact, and the proposal does not indicate whether their determination 
must be unanimous, nor is it indicated whether the defendant or 
the state has the burden of proof on the insanity issue or by what 
weight of evidence proof must be made. Assuming these points are 
settled in a manner leaving the statute as strong as possible -- that 
is that the defendant can be acquitted by raising a reasonable doubt of 
his sanity in the minds of the three judges and can obtain a second 
trial of the issue by raising such a doubt in the mind of only one 
judge, the proposal still leaves the defendant in a worse position than 
under present law. Instead of having twelve ·minds to which his ,plea 
may be addressed, he has only three. Thus he has been deprived of nine 
of the prior twelve chances to obtain at least a hung jury. Under the 
present rules, once the defendant has produced evidence tending to 
beget a reasonable doubt, he casts upon the prosecution the heavy burden 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt to twelve minds that he is sane. 
(Leick v. People, supra.) It appears clear that the state's burden is 
lightened when instead of being required to persuade twelve jurors, 
it is required only to persuade three. The proposal would indeed 
deprive the defendant of a jury trial right of practical, substantial 
vrJlue. 
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Comments From Other Authorities 
The constitutionality of the proposed change was raised with 
several law professors who are nationally recognized authorities 
in the field of criminal procedure as it relates to constitutional 
law. Their respective opinions on the proposal follow. 
Professor Henry Weihofen, who is presently servinq as director 
of the Mental Competency Study at George Wast1ington University Law 
Center, commented as follows on the jury trial problem: 
The more interesting change, as you say, is the 
procedural one. I assume that the proposal includes 
a provision not spelled out in the summary, namely, 
that the proceedings for quashing the indictment or 
information are dispositive - that is, if the court 
finds the defendant sane and denies the motion to 
quash, the defendant will be denied permission to 
introduce the insanity defense at the jury trial 
(except for the "specific intent" issue). 
Without that exception, I suppose most lawyers would 
be of the opinion that the scheme would be 
unconstitutional. With only few minor exceptions, 
the statutory definition of all crimes includes a 
mental element, and a statutory scheme that attempted 
to deny defendants the right to have the jury pass on 
the issue of whether that element of the crime was 
actually proved would probably be held unconstitutional .... 
Is the "specific intent" exception enough to justify 
the opposite result? I'm inclined to doubt it. The 
mental element in some serious crimes, including common 
law murder, is usually regarded as general rather than 
specific. It seems difficult to justify a distinction 
under which a jury trial is constitutionally required for 
a crime involving specific intent but not for a crime 
involving mens rea generally. And since a charge of a 
more serious offense requiring specific .intent usually 
includes lesser offenses ... and the jury on an indictment 
for the greater may find the lesser, the distinction seems 
not only illogical but impractical. Even if the 
cons ti tuti ona l hurdle is overcome, there remains the 
broader question of whether the proposal seems desirable. 
The answer depends largely on what its objective is. I 
gather that the objective is to keep the bifurcated 
trial now used in Colorado but to eliminate the jury for 
the insanity issue. Except for eliminating the jury, I 
see nothing to be gained by having the insanity issue 
raised on a motion to quash the indictment instead of as 
a defense on the trial ... 
Persons who may be inclined to favor the current 
proposal because they think juries are t?o prone to be 
misled by the "insanity dodge," may consider whether 
this proposdl might not give juries more power rather 
than less. On a verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity, a defendant is not set free; he is sent to 
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a mental hospital and his stay there is indefinite. 
Statistics show thdt dS a matter of fact such persons 
spend more time in the hospital than they would if 
they had been sent to prison. [1ut under the "specific 
intent" exception, evidence of mental abnormality would 
be addressed to a verdict of not guilty, rather than 
not guilty by reason of insanity. An acquittal would 
therefore mean that the defendant walks out a wholly 
free man ... (Letter dated November 5, 1962) 
Professor David W. Louisell of the University of California 
School of Law (at Berkeley), who has devoted considerable thought and 
effort to studying California's problems with the insanity plea, writes 
as follows concerning the Byrne proposal: 
Speaking for myself, in all frankness, I must say that 
I am not very sanguine about the proposal to abolish 
trial by jury in the area of mental responsibility, 
whatever semantics may be used to achieve that formula. 
In this connection I do not worry much about the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process, but 
I do worry considerably about the Colorado constitutional 
guarantee of jury trial in criminal cases. Even more 
basically, however, I question the social desirability 
at this stage of removing the ultimate sanction of jury 
trial, even conceding that on many occasions it is wise 
to waive it. I do not think that we have yet reached 
the stage where it would be wise, from the standpoint 
of protecting individual rights, totally to destroy the 
protection implicit in jury trial against arbitrary 
judicial conduct. And, from the social standpoint, I 
question very much whether we are yet at the stage of 
psychiatric knowledge which justifies remitting the 
problem of responsibility to the psychiatrists and the 
judges. Complex and difficult though the problem is, 
in my opinion it is still one that society must bear. 
(Letter dated October 29, 1962) 
Professor Arthur H. Sherry of the University of California 
School of Law at Berkeley, who is presently co-chairman of the 
California Special Commissions on Insanity and Criminal Offenders, writes 
as follows: 
The device of determining the issue of responsibility 
by a procedure which may result in the quashing of 
an indictment or information by a three-judge court 
is unique. In effect, it seems to me that this is 
simply making it possible to employ a civil commitment 
procedure where a criminal action is pending in lieu of 
determining the issue in the criminal proceeding. I 
suppose this can be done now under existing Colorado 
law should the District Attorney choose to invoke civil 
procedures in lieu of initiating a criminal prosecution. 
The p:i;actical considerations, however, cannot be 
avoided, and strong reasons may exist which ~ould 
militate against the proposal for the three-Judge 
court. Apart from the constitution,llity of the 
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procedure with respect to jury trial as it has been 
formulated in the proposal, some question might arise 
dS to the constitutiondlity of depriving the defendant 
of his common law defense of not guilty by reason of 
insanity in the event the three-judge court found him 
sane. I realize that there is a clause which does 
preserve his right to introduce evidence of "mental 
condition" in a subsequent criminal proceeding, but this 
may well be interpreted to include evidence of 
"insanity." If so, the proposal may not effect any 
real improvement or change in present procedures. 
(Letter dated November 19, 1962) 
Professor Robert B. McKay of New York University School of Law, 
concurs as follows: 
I must agree that the proposal for determination of 
insanity by a three-judge panel does seem to impinge 
upon the Colorado Constitution's guaranty of jury 
trial. Thus I would agree with your own judgment 
and that which you have received from Professors 
Weihofen and Louisell. I do not see in this a 
Fourteenth Amendment due process problem, however, 
since there is no jury trial guaranty incorporated 
into the Fuurteenth Amendment. (Letter dated November 
27, 1962) 
In summary, it appears that the proposal for having the insanity 
plea heard by a three-judge court is unconstitutional as depriving 
defendants of the jury trial in criminal cases guaranteed by the 
Colorado Constitution. This hurdle, however, may not be insurmountable. 
Obviously it could be overcome by a constitutional amendment. Short 
of that, the proposal could be passed and an opinion as to its 
constitutionality could be obtained from the Colorado Supreme Court 
befort? signature by the governor. Finally, the proposal might be 
considered for enactment without this one f~ature which raises the 
constitutional problem. 
Other 1\srects of the Proposal 
The remaining features of the proposal seem highly desirable 
and apparently raise no constitutional problems. The proposed new 
legal standard for determining the sanity of a defendant at the time 
of the allegedly criminal conduct would greatly modernize and improve 
present procedure. It would accord expert witnesses considerably 
more latitude in testimony and thus would bring law and psychiatry closer 
together in this vital arec1. One note of caution should be sounded, 
however. The proposed test of insc1nity, based on the standards adopted 
in United Stdtes v. Currens, 290 A. 2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961) would probably 
make the insanity defense available to more defendants than are now 
benefited by the present test. This is not a defect, but rather a 
great advantage, for it would enable the state thus to identify and 
treat persons whose illness is responsible for their anti-social 
conduct. Moreover, it would provide a means of identifying those who 
would flrobably rereat their anti-social conduct after a brief period 
in prison. These offenders could be held until it is determined by a 
competent hoard thdt it is safe for socie~y to release.them. ,\ new 
maximum security facility where mentally ill or defective offen~e~s_may 
be trec1ted c1ppears ·to be required by the proposed test and confin~ment 
provision. 
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